“You may gain temporary appeasement by a policy of concession to violence, but you do not gain lasting peace that way,”[1] said Robert Anthony Eden, who was British Foreign Secretary from 1935 to 1955. But he resigned in the 30s because of his anger over appeasement! He was Foreign Secretary 1935–8, 1940–5, and then 1951–5. Please don’t use your essays to tell lies like that anymore. A typical example of appeasement could be that of Hitler in the 1930s. Since Germany left the League of Nations in 1933, Hitler started breaking the Treaty of Versailles, for instance, by rearming German army two years later which became his outset of territorial acquirements such as invasion of Rhineland and Austria in the following years. Britain and France therefore pursued a diplomatic policy of appeasement to prevent another outbreak of world war in the future. I don’t see where you get your “therefore”. France and Britain did not simply let Hitler have his own way in taking military actions but -since Neville Chamberlain became Britain’s prime minister- developed appeasement into a more eminent degree, for instance, ratifying Germany’s takeover of Sudetenland by Munich Agreement. As Sir Anthony Eden said, the outbreak of the Second World War was inevitable despite the efforts put into appeasement which aimed international peace, but the appeasement was not always proved to be bad.
The appeasement of Hitler acted as a catalyst of Hitler’s strength and ambitions for further territorial acquirement. After Hitler broke disarmament and left the League of Nations in 1933, he declared Germany’s rearmament in 1935. In the same year, Britain signed Anglo-German Naval Agreement with Germany which allowed Germany to have 35% of the Royal Navy’s fleet, giving Hitler an encouraging opportunity to strengthen German power. Furthermore, Britain and France were enabling Hitler to break two international treaties, Treaty of Versailles and Locarno Treaties, by not intervening Hitler for his invasion of Rhineland. France was not going to take action unless it had Britain’s assistance but as Britain viewed German action to be justified[2], (George Bernard Shaw described it as a "triumphant rescue of his country from the yoke the Allies imposed)"[3] Britain, who wanted to settle complaint of Germany and create balance of power, did not make any attempt to prevent Hitler’s violation and so neither did France. In fact Germany had a much weaker military force than France (evidence?) as AJP Taylor states that it would have taken 10 years for Germany to “become a formidable military power.”[4] German generals were disapproving of Hitler’s plan for its uncertainty[5] and even Hitler warned his soldiers to withdraw if the French were to fight back.[6] However, the nonintervention of France and Britain reassured Hitler that these countries would not prevent him from such aggressive actions like in Rhineland since their only focus was placed on the maintenance of peace without provoking any war. As a result this “triumphant rescue” was not simply limited to a rescue but was rather seemed to be a triumphant ignition point of Hitler’s territorial invasion. Jeffery Record, a professor at U.S. Air Force’s Air War College notes in his book that “With each act of appeasement, Hitler's appetite grew.”[7] Austria was easily taken over, Hitler once more breaking the Treaty of Versailles by the German-Austrian Anschluss. There were no more guarantees remaining in international treaties. Winston Churchill said, “What is the effect of this upon what is called the balance of power?”[8] He was correct, for Britain and France were offering Hitler too many chances than their action to be considered as merely ways to keep balance of power. In 1938, Neville Chamberlain, who became Prime Minister of Britain in 1937, made a conspicuous mark on appeasement with Munich Agreement. He was ratifying Germany’s takeover of Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, which was an astonishing fact that Britain was not simply remaining nonchalant as usual but proposing to legalize the invasion. What made this agreement look worse was the noteworthy calibre of the land given. Sudetenland, although was not the entire Czechoslovakia, was containing important resources such as coal and -as the country’s defensive zone- had majority of border fortifications.[9] Czechoslovakia now lost the most important core region of its country and was geographically fragile. Moreover, Czechoslovakia’s high-developed arms industry was under German control. Simply by taking what the agreement has offered him, Hitler was not only expanding German territory but also its militaristic strength. With such acquirement, according to R.J. Overy, “German demands became more uncompromising,”[10] and it easily invaded the entire Czechoslovakia, having his first conquering success with non-German population, and Poland, giving Neville Chamberlain’s realization of the limitation to appeasement. Britain was the country which mostly contributed to the appeasement policy with its consolidated aim to prevent war but it consequentially made itself to declare war, not Germany. Appeasement, which aimed to keep peace by settlement of grievances of Germany, was thought to be meaningless for it failed to continue the peace but lead to another catastrophic war—The Second World War. Good.
Besides, the Anglo-French appeasement, though somehow managing to satisfy Hitler, stirred up grievances and apprehension in other nations. Since Britain and France were in the collective security of the League of Nations was this really an organ of “collective security” at the time? , many nations turned out to be relying on these countries to be protected from Germany. For example, the Soviet Union, which feared Poland since its invasion of Soviet Union in 1920 (more lies) , was more scared for it was signing a pact with Germany, so it joined the League of Nations. However, as mentioned above, Germany was growing in its strength and the appeasement was beginning to be mistrusted. Britain had promised not to breach any treaty unilaterally in Stresa Front (1935), signed with France and Italy, but it did sign the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with Germany in the next year, allowing Germany to have stronger navy. Britain’s action against the Stresa Front made France and Italy to have suspicion of its position as appeaser because they thought Britain was helping Germany to grow stronger and more aggressive. Italy, who was invading Abyssinia, thought Britain was weak and it will not try to stop its action just like it did not for Hitler, and continued its invasion, seizing the capital of Abyssinia. France had once again disappointed at Britain when it rejected to help France fight against Hitler invading Rhineland, for it thought Hitler’s action was justified. In 1938, Germany invaded Sudetenland and in the next year, invaded the entire Czechoslovakia and Poland; Hitler was making his territorial expansion eastwards. Stalin could not rely on Britain or France at all; he had to find ways to protect his country. Soviet Union signed Nazi-Soviet Pact with Hitler, solving Hitler’s fear of having two-front war again like Germany did in the First World War. Jeffrey Record writes this pact was the product of “Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler.”[11] Gabriel Gorodetsky also states in his book Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German invasion of Russia that the pact was ‘rather the result of profound Soviet mistrust of Britain and France,’ not ‘a “stab in the back” action or revolutionary “blueprint” or the “alliance.” ’ [12] Germany, because of Stalin, was now free to attack the West as it did not have to worry about the East anymore. Munich Agreement bought a great deal of hatred from Czechoslovakia as it did not simply let Germany have Sudetenland and offer an opportunity to invade the country but more for the fact that it did so without engaging Czechoslovakia, the victim itself. Even right before his flight to Munich, Chamberlain telegraphed to Prague, saying “I shall have the interests of Czechoslovakia fully in my mind.”[13] However, this was completely proved to be a lie. To Edvard Benes, the President of Czechoslovakia, Britain and France were not “friends” but only “cowards” who “must be punished.”[14] The appeasement policy was providing Hitler chances to satisfy his desire of territorial expansion and simultaneously, turned many other nations’ viewpoint to be pessimistic. Britain was seen to be irresponsible and unsuitable to its position as appeaser and so was France. Furthermore, the Anglo-French appeasement was creating mistrust between France and Britain. Appeasement was not limited to two leading nations of it, Britain and France, but required support form a wide range of area since it was a diplomatic policy that aimed to achieve global peace, not satisfying Hitler individually. However, it was only focusing on Germany, and by causing suspicion and rage in other nations, it could not earn much support and was therefore doomed to fail. You could have offered Czech chances of beating Hitler without the British or french
Nonetheless, the Anglo-French appeasement was making contribution to a maximum extent to prevent war and in doing so helped Britain to prepare war against Germany in the future. In Britain’s perspective, the Treaty of Versailles was being too harsh on Germany and it thought such aggressive German actions were only possible due to its grievances produced from the injustice of the treaty. For instance, the Disarmament Conference was only making Germany to disarm more and more while highly militarized nations such as France were not even disarming until fifth year and then did so only in terms of number of soldiers.[15] So for Hitler to break disarmament was not an unfair pursuit of his own interest but settlement of the injustice of Western powers. When Germany started rearmament, Britain seemed not to stop Hitler, but in fact Britain did by negotiating with him by giving him a limited growth of arms with Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The agreement might have been regarded as an opportunity for Hitler to grow German military strength but Britain was offering a limit to it, without its presence, Germany would have been able to rearm with no such limitation. There were also plausible reasons for Britain to allow Germany invading Rhineland, Austria and Sudetenland. Britain thought these lands were, if no coercive restriction was set by the Treaty of Versailles, supposed to belong to Germany. There were 6 million Germans in Austria, who were forbidden to reunify with Germany due to Treaty of Versailles; 3 million in Czechoslovakia, who were ignored.[16] The demilitarization of Rhineland was also set by the treaty in 1919 and Britain considered German reoccupation of it merely as returning Germany’s “own backyard.”[17] In fact Britain did not always let Germany use violation. When Spanish civil War broke out, Britain and France organized Non-Intervention Committee and Germany joined it, though was a lie, to stay as neutral country. [18] Germany later broke its promise and fought in the war by joining forces with Italy. Considering this perspective, it was Italy that made Hitler more ambitious, not Britain or France, who simply put efforts and tried to stop Hitler being too violent. When Hitler tried to dismember Czechoslovakia and rejected to listen to Britain to stop its action, Chamberlain flew to Germany to meet Hitler in person, which was the first time of a British prime minister’s flight. This, in addition to France’s decision not to fight, convinced Hitler to sign Munich Agreement and promise that it would be his “last territorial demand.” He could have attempted to invade the entire Czechoslovakia but Britain succeeded in stopping him and make an end-mark of his territorial invasion by giving only a part of the country. Neville Chamberlain was not a person who could foresee the future in which Hitler would break his promise and though Hitler broke the agreement, Chamberlain surely has to be given a credit since he put great amount of efforts to stop Hitler’s aggression as much as he could. A country which gave this credit was the United States, an isolationist who, at the initial stage, was unwilling to intervene in European affairs. The US, despite its position as a neutral country, was now trying to supply arms and raw materials to Britain and France.[19] More importantly, this help was largely due to the high moral ground built by Chamberlain’s efforts. More I think to its hope to get money. Though it was beyond people’s attention, Chamberlain was the leading figure in rearming Britain during the years of appeasement,[20] huh? which meant he was also caring about the protection and strength of its own country and wanted them to be secured. Some nations like France and members of British Foreign Office regretted for allowing Rhineland invasion and thought they had to fight against Germany with force. According to AJP Taylor, Germany had strong government and it could “again make Germany a great military power.” [21] However, Britain did not have sufficient economy to increase arms expenditure nor any armed force,[22] and it has been mentioned, the US was isolationist and France was a country which (who is for PEOPLE) relied on Britain. If the war was to break out anyway, it is very clear that it was much better to break out in the year it actually did, because without this period of rearmament and the support from the U.S., the situation might have looked quite different, in a bad way. Shortly, the appeasement helped as much as it could to prevent war and though it failed to, it had given Britain high morality during its years of process. With such moral ground, Britain succeeded in being supported by the US and making itself stronger enough to fight in a war. Wow- what a huge paragraph
In consequence, the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler in the 1930’s, though a failure as a result, at least was a genuine attempt to maintain peace by solving complaints of a nation. During its years, it was seen unsuccessful due to the fact that it initially settled grievances of Hitler but later made Hitler’s desire bold and even provided opportunities for him to fulfil it. Many nations were beginning to be skeptical about the appeasement and Britain. They felt it was threatening their countries as it made Germany more aggressive and started to seek ways to protect their own countries, some persuading Britain to take action against Hitler, and some deserting hope of being protected by Britain and directly going to support Hitler. Nonetheless, the appeasement was, for quite many times, setting limits on Germany’s aggressive action, such as those on arms growth and the area it was going to take over. Moreover, by offering Britain high moral ground, the appeasement made the country deserve to get military support from the US and it gave enough time for Britain to strengthen itself by rearmament. Therefore, no matter how the consequence was, the appeasement should not always be seen with criticism but to be considered with addition of compliment, for it did settle grievances of Germany and many times did made contributions to the prevention war.
19.5/20
I think you kind of went over the rails in your penultimate paragraph and went beyond what could have been a clear, concise argument, it was very good with great research. You managed to address all the points we raised in class and argued them very well.
[1] http://thinkexist.com/quotes/anthony_eden/
[2] AJP
[3] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,958452-5,00.html
[4] AJP
[5]http://www.ellonacademy.org.uk/subjects/Departments/history/Inter_Advanced_Higher_pages/Appeasement%20notes/rhrineland.htm
[6] http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remilitarization_of_the_Rhineland
[7] Jeffrey Record, Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s, DIANE Publishing, 2005, pg. 2
[8] http://www.ers.north-ayrshire.gov.uk/History/Sources.htm
[9] http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/czechoslovakia_1938.htm
[10] R.J. Overy, The origins of the Second World War, Longman, 1998, pg. 66
[11] Jeffrey Record, Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s, DIANE Publishing, 2005, pg. 39
[12] http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3686/is_/ai_n8915701
[13] AJP
[14] Igor Lukes,
[15] International Military Tribunal, Trial of German Major War Criminals, William S Hein & Co, 2001, Pg. 284
[16] AJP
[17] http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/3116.html
[18] R.J. Overy, The origins of the Second World War, Longman, 1998, pg. 26
[19] ibid., pg. 70
[20] AJP
[21] ibid. pg. 102
[22] ibid., pg. 102
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