Evaluating Appeasement

As Winston Churchill said: “An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last.”[1] In this case Britain was feeding Germany with power and time which allowed her to re-arm and prepare for a full scale war which broke out on September 1^st, 1939. [2] The trigger of war was the invasion of Poland in 1939 supplemented by long term factors which built up international tension between Nazi Germany and neighbouring countries. However, these events should not be classified as primary reasons for the outbreak of World War Two. The main reason should in fact be Britain and France’s unwillingness to stand up to Germany and appease her in a greatly beneficial manner. This is because the appeasement policy they chose to adopt was the catalyst for the strengthening of Germany and moreover their more rational demands. As A.J.P. Taylor said: “It was said at the time, and has often been said since, that 7 March 1936 was "the last chance", the last occasion when Germany could have been stopped without all the sacrifice and suffering of a great war.” [3] If Chamberlain had said no and stood up to Germany’s demands as A.J.P Taylor argues, there could have been a lessening of the loss of lives or maybe even a prevention of war at an early stage. As Churchill remarked, let it not be said that the English have no word for “no”

The policy of appeasement adopted by Britain was unnecessary and ultimately had many negative consequences. One of the major acts of appeasement Britain was involved in was the Munich Agreement signed on September 30^th, 1938. [4] The happening of such a disastrous event which was a major component in the on course towards the Second World War deserves a degree of criticism on Neville Chamberlain’s behalf. Allowing this ruinous incident to occur was morally wrong as they did not even consider inviting a Czechoslovakian representative as they were the country that was being discussed. On the other hand it had also left Britain and France in a much weaker position. As William Shirer says: “The year’s breathing space said to be ’gained’ by Munich left Britain and France in a much worse position compared to Hitler’s Germany than they had been at the Munich crisis.” [5]William Shirer describes the signing of the Munich agreement as “THE SURRENDER AT MUNICH: SEPTEMBER 29-30, 1938.” [6] In other words it was Britain and France surrendering to Hitler’s demands. The only person that had the opportunity to stand up to Nazi Germany’s geographical expansion or as the Nazis described “the need for lebensraum” was Neville Chamberlain. In not doing so, Neville Chamberlain was not only deceiving the Czechoslovakians but he was also unknowingly making Germany stronger and the Western Democracies, Britain and France weaker. From William Shirer’s perspective Chamberlain actions should be disapproved of. On Neville Chamberlain’s third visit to Munich to discuss with Hitler what would happen with the Czechs moving out of the Sudetenland. The Prime Minster objected to the condition that the Czechs moving out of the Sudetenland could not even take their cattle with them. This was a demand of the Godesberg. In return Hitler exploded saying “Does this mean that the farmers will be expelled but that their cattle will be retained?” “Our time is too valuable to be wasted on such trivialities” he shouted at Chamberlain.[7] So in return the Prime Minister dropped the matter. This not only shows that Chamberlain was weak when it came to political discussions with leaders such as Hitler. Perhaps it even shows his inconsideration for the Czechoslovakian population that were moving out of the Sudetenland as he did not stand up for them. We can also understand that all the other demands by the Czechs would most likely have been ignored as they were not even allowed to take their cattle with them. However, the most vital point we should get from this is that Chamberlain did not work as hard as he could of for Britain and for the Czechs. Britain was part of the covenant of the League of Nations and he was representing the British people and the League itself. As Neville Chamberlain said during the Czech Crisis: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country, between people whom we know nothing… I am myself a man of peace to the depth of my soul. Armed conflict between nations is a nightmare to me. But if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by force I should feel that it must be resisted….”[8] What Neville Chamberlain is saying here is quite contradictory to his actions. Why does he contemplate there being a nation wanting to take over the world by force? This is maybe because he sees Germany becoming more of an aggressor and he knows that Hitler is progressing in the direction of war. But in fact, he gives into Hitler at the Munich Conference and does not stick with what he says about resisting aggression and maintaining world peace. From an extremists perspective you could even say that he was blindly aiding Nazi Germany in preparing for World War Two. This can be confirmed as there were secret German and Italian documents revealed much later, showing that Hitler and Mussolini had already agreed at the Munich meeting that they would fight “side by side” against Britain.[9] William Shirer writes in The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich: “ With the instinct of a genius rare in German history he had divined not only the weaknesses of the smaller states in Central Europe but those of the two principal Western democracies, Britain and France, and forced them to bend to his will. He had invented and used with staggering success a new strategy and technique of political warfare, which made actual war unnecessary.” [10] From this extraction we can understand that Neville Chamberlain was “useless” at the Munich agreement. Hitler was able to manipulate both him and his appeasement policy and the level of demand at the Munich Conference. As A.J.P.Taylor said: “They were men confronted with real problems, doing their best in the circumstances of their time.” [11] There were real problems at hand, the Munich Crisis for one, but Chamberlain had made very mild accomplishments. He also did not deal with the problem rationally. William Shirer also argues that Germany was in no position to go to war on October 1, 1938. That Germany would not last against Czechoslovakia and France and Britain, “not to mention Russia.” If Germany had gone to war, she would have been quickly defeated. If Hitler had initiated a direct attack on Czechoslovakia he might have been overthrown by Haider and Witzlebnen and their confederates that were planning on arresting him. [12] Britain and France were in a weaker position What I am trying to argue here is that Chamberlain in fact accomplished very little or in fact nothing in going to Munich. What he had accomplished from going to Munich was Hitler’s signature on a piece of paper that was later destroyed as he invaded and took over Czechoslovakia not long after his promising of peace. As William Shirer argues, the Munich agreement had actually put Britain and France in a weaker position. So in conclusion, Chamberlain deserves heavy criticism on his actions at the Munich conference. He was inconsiderate of the welfare Czechoslovakian people even that he was a leader of the League of Nations. He did little or nothing to prevent the take over of the Sudetenland. He gave in Hitler’s demands and was manipulated and deceived. So what did Chamberlain really accomplish?

What a huge, burdensome paragraph. However, with the wealth of facts and real, hard analysis of every point raised, at this stage I think it’s entirely justified,

The consequences of the Munich Agreement were drastic in terms of damage done to Czechoslovakia. After the Munich agreement, The Poles and Hungarians were also keen for territory in Czechoslovakia. They were threatening military action against the defenseless nation. The Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck insisted on annex Czechoslovakian land. They took 650 square miles of territory around Teschen which accounted of a population of 280,000 inhabitants where more than 50% were Czechs. [13] On November 2^nd, Hungary took 7500 square miles containing a population of 500,000 Magyars and 272,000Slovaks. [14] From this we can confirm that the Munich agreement had heavily injured Czechoslovakia as it was from now on defenceless against countries that it could have defeated before the betrayal of Britain and France. However, what is more astounding is Czechoslovakia’s destruction of transportation, services and communication that it previously had. Their entire system of rail, road, telephone and telegraph communications was disrupted.[15] But that was not all. According to German figures, Czechoslovakia lost 66 per cent of its coal, 80 per cent of its lignite, 86 per cent of its chemical, 80 per cent of cement and textiles and 70 per cent of its iron, steel and electric power.[16] This is actually the most shocking consequence of Munich. The previously prosperous nation was divided and bankrupt. They were economically, socially and politically annihilated in one night because of Chamberlains incapability of handling the crisis at hand. Above all of this, if you take into consideration the amount of lives lost because of the Munich Agreement and the decree of the Nuremburg Blood laws after Czechoslovakia became part of Germany. There were 3,500,000 Jews living in Czechoslovakia and only twenty thousand of them managed to escape. The rest were all killed during the six years of Nazi reign over the country. By considering these factors the Munich Agreement was a very disastrous event. It completely ruined a country, its people and everything it represented.

Appeasement was unnecessary and by doing so, it elevated each of the crises at hand. Hitler was able to manipulate the Chamberlain and demand for more. In return, he became more and more aggressive and demanded even more as time progressed. The appeasement policy was generally a failure with minute accomplishments which could in fact be cancelled out as positive factors as they were more beneficial for Hitler and regime.

Historiography- 4/4

Skill- 4/4

Understand Question- 4/4

Knowledge ¾- Seems limited to Czechoslovakia

Meets demands of Question- ¾ Can’t be a true evaluation without seeing it in the context of events outside Germany and over the long-term. Nothing about Hitler’s actions 33-38 or about Mussolini’s role.

Given the overall result, I will forgive the day lateness

18/20

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[1] http://www.enotes.com/famous-quotes/an-appeaser-is-one-who-feeds-a-crocodile-hoping-it

[2] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, page 546.

[3] The Origins of the Second World War, A.J.P. Taylor, page 134.

[4] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, page 380

[5] Ibid, page 390

[6] Ibid, page 380

[7] Ibid, Page 382.

[8] http://www.earthstation1.com/WWIIAudio/Chamberlain_on_Czech_Crisis_09.27.38_LL.wav

[9] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, page 385.

[10] Ibid, page 387

[11] The Origins of the Second World War, A.J.P Taylor, page 25

[12] Ibid, page 391

[13] Ibid, page 387

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

Evaluation of the Appeasement of Hitler in the 1930’s

“You may gain temporary appeasement by a policy of concession to violence, but you do not gain lasting peace that way,”[1] said Robert Anthony Eden, who was British Foreign Secretary from 1935 to 1955. But he resigned in the 30s because of his anger over appeasement! He was Foreign Secretary 1935–8, 1940–5, and then 1951–5. Please don’t use your essays to tell lies like that anymore. A typical example of appeasement could be that of Hitler in the 1930s. Since Germany left the League of Nations in 1933, Hitler started breaking the Treaty of Versailles, for instance, by rearming German army two years later which became his outset of territorial acquirements such as invasion of Rhineland and Austria in the following years. Britain and France therefore pursued a diplomatic policy of appeasement to prevent another outbreak of world war in the future. I don’t see where you get your “therefore”. France and Britain did not simply let Hitler have his own way in taking military actions but -since Neville Chamberlain became Britain’s prime minister- developed appeasement into a more eminent degree, for instance, ratifying Germany’s takeover of Sudetenland by Munich Agreement. As Sir Anthony Eden said, the outbreak of the Second World War was inevitable despite the efforts put into appeasement which aimed international peace, but the appeasement was not always proved to be bad.

The appeasement of Hitler acted as a catalyst of Hitler’s strength and ambitions for further territorial acquirement. After Hitler broke disarmament and left the League of Nations in 1933, he declared Germany’s rearmament in 1935. In the same year, Britain signed Anglo-German Naval Agreement with Germany which allowed Germany to have 35% of the Royal Navy’s fleet, giving Hitler an encouraging opportunity to strengthen German power. Furthermore, Britain and France were enabling Hitler to break two international treaties, Treaty of Versailles and Locarno Treaties, by not intervening Hitler for his invasion of Rhineland. France was not going to take action unless it had Britain’s assistance but as Britain viewed German action to be justified[2], (George Bernard Shaw described it as a "triumphant rescue of his country from the yoke the Allies imposed)"[3] Britain, who wanted to settle complaint of Germany and create balance of power, did not make any attempt to prevent Hitler’s violation and so neither did France. In fact Germany had a much weaker military force than France (evidence?) as AJP Taylor states that it would have taken 10 years for Germany to “become a formidable military power.”[4] German generals were disapproving of Hitler’s plan for its uncertainty[5] and even Hitler warned his soldiers to withdraw if the French were to fight back.[6] However, the nonintervention of France and Britain reassured Hitler that these countries would not prevent him from such aggressive actions like in Rhineland since their only focus was placed on the maintenance of peace without provoking any war. As a result this “triumphant rescue” was not simply limited to a rescue but was rather seemed to be a triumphant ignition point of Hitler’s territorial invasion. Jeffery Record, a professor at U.S. Air Force’s Air War College notes in his book that “With each act of appeasement, Hitler's appetite grew.”[7] Austria was easily taken over, Hitler once more breaking the Treaty of Versailles by the German-Austrian Anschluss. There were no more guarantees remaining in international treaties. Winston Churchill said, “What is the effect of this upon what is called the balance of power?”[8] He was correct, for Britain and France were offering Hitler too many chances than their action to be considered as merely ways to keep balance of power. In 1938, Neville Chamberlain, who became Prime Minister of Britain in 1937, made a conspicuous mark on appeasement with Munich Agreement. He was ratifying Germany’s takeover of Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, which was an astonishing fact that Britain was not simply remaining nonchalant as usual but proposing to legalize the invasion. What made this agreement look worse was the noteworthy calibre of the land given. Sudetenland, although was not the entire Czechoslovakia, was containing important resources such as coal and -as the country’s defensive zone- had majority of border fortifications.[9] Czechoslovakia now lost the most important core region of its country and was geographically fragile. Moreover, Czechoslovakia’s high-developed arms industry was under German control. Simply by taking what the agreement has offered him, Hitler was not only expanding German territory but also its militaristic strength. With such acquirement, according to R.J. Overy, “German demands became more uncompromising,”[10] and it easily invaded the entire Czechoslovakia, having his first conquering success with non-German population, and Poland, giving Neville Chamberlain’s realization of the limitation to appeasement. Britain was the country which mostly contributed to the appeasement policy with its consolidated aim to prevent war but it consequentially made itself to declare war, not Germany. Appeasement, which aimed to keep peace by settlement of grievances of Germany, was thought to be meaningless for it failed to continue the peace but lead to another catastrophic war—The Second World War. Good.

Besides, the Anglo-French appeasement, though somehow managing to satisfy Hitler, stirred up grievances and apprehension in other nations. Since Britain and France were in the collective security of the League of Nations was this really an organ of “collective security” at the time? , many nations turned out to be relying on these countries to be protected from Germany. For example, the Soviet Union, which feared Poland since its invasion of Soviet Union in 1920 (more lies) , was more scared for it was signing a pact with Germany, so it joined the League of Nations. However, as mentioned above, Germany was growing in its strength and the appeasement was beginning to be mistrusted. Britain had promised not to breach any treaty unilaterally in Stresa Front (1935), signed with France and Italy, but it did sign the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with Germany in the next year, allowing Germany to have stronger navy. Britain’s action against the Stresa Front made France and Italy to have suspicion of its position as appeaser because they thought Britain was helping Germany to grow stronger and more aggressive. Italy, who was invading Abyssinia, thought Britain was weak and it will not try to stop its action just like it did not for Hitler, and continued its invasion, seizing the capital of Abyssinia. France had once again disappointed at Britain when it rejected to help France fight against Hitler invading Rhineland, for it thought Hitler’s action was justified. In 1938, Germany invaded Sudetenland and in the next year, invaded the entire Czechoslovakia and Poland; Hitler was making his territorial expansion eastwards. Stalin could not rely on Britain or France at all; he had to find ways to protect his country. Soviet Union signed Nazi-Soviet Pact with Hitler, solving Hitler’s fear of having two-front war again like Germany did in the First World War. Jeffrey Record writes this pact was the product of “Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler.”[11] Gabriel Gorodetsky also states in his book Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German invasion of Russia that the pact was ‘rather the result of profound Soviet mistrust of Britain and France,’ not ‘a “stab in the back” action or revolutionary “blueprint” or the “alliance.” ’ [12] Germany, because of Stalin, was now free to attack the West as it did not have to worry about the East anymore. Munich Agreement bought a great deal of hatred from Czechoslovakia as it did not simply let Germany have Sudetenland and offer an opportunity to invade the country but more for the fact that it did so without engaging Czechoslovakia, the victim itself. Even right before his flight to Munich, Chamberlain telegraphed to Prague, saying “I shall have the interests of Czechoslovakia fully in my mind.”[13] However, this was completely proved to be a lie. To Edvard Benes, the President of Czechoslovakia, Britain and France were not “friends” but only “cowards” who “must be punished.”[14] The appeasement policy was providing Hitler chances to satisfy his desire of territorial expansion and simultaneously, turned many other nations’ viewpoint to be pessimistic. Britain was seen to be irresponsible and unsuitable to its position as appeaser and so was France. Furthermore, the Anglo-French appeasement was creating mistrust between France and Britain. Appeasement was not limited to two leading nations of it, Britain and France, but required support form a wide range of area since it was a diplomatic policy that aimed to achieve global peace, not satisfying Hitler individually. However, it was only focusing on Germany, and by causing suspicion and rage in other nations, it could not earn much support and was therefore doomed to fail. You could have offered Czech chances of beating Hitler without the British or french

Nonetheless, the Anglo-French appeasement was making contribution to a maximum extent to prevent war and in doing so helped Britain to prepare war against Germany in the future. In Britain’s perspective, the Treaty of Versailles was being too harsh on Germany and it thought such aggressive German actions were only possible due to its grievances produced from the injustice of the treaty. For instance, the Disarmament Conference was only making Germany to disarm more and more while highly militarized nations such as France were not even disarming until fifth year and then did so only in terms of number of soldiers.[15] So for Hitler to break disarmament was not an unfair pursuit of his own interest but settlement of the injustice of Western powers. When Germany started rearmament, Britain seemed not to stop Hitler, but in fact Britain did by negotiating with him by giving him a limited growth of arms with Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The agreement might have been regarded as an opportunity for Hitler to grow German military strength but Britain was offering a limit to it, without its presence, Germany would have been able to rearm with no such limitation. There were also plausible reasons for Britain to allow Germany invading Rhineland, Austria and Sudetenland. Britain thought these lands were, if no coercive restriction was set by the Treaty of Versailles, supposed to belong to Germany. There were 6 million Germans in Austria, who were forbidden to reunify with Germany due to Treaty of Versailles; 3 million in Czechoslovakia, who were ignored.[16] The demilitarization of Rhineland was also set by the treaty in 1919 and Britain considered German reoccupation of it merely as returning Germany’s “own backyard.”[17] In fact Britain did not always let Germany use violation. When Spanish civil War broke out, Britain and France organized Non-Intervention Committee and Germany joined it, though was a lie, to stay as neutral country. [18] Germany later broke its promise and fought in the war by joining forces with Italy. Considering this perspective, it was Italy that made Hitler more ambitious, not Britain or France, who simply put efforts and tried to stop Hitler being too violent. When Hitler tried to dismember Czechoslovakia and rejected to listen to Britain to stop its action, Chamberlain flew to Germany to meet Hitler in person, which was the first time of a British prime minister’s flight. This, in addition to France’s decision not to fight, convinced Hitler to sign Munich Agreement and promise that it would be his “last territorial demand.” He could have attempted to invade the entire Czechoslovakia but Britain succeeded in stopping him and make an end-mark of his territorial invasion by giving only a part of the country. Neville Chamberlain was not a person who could foresee the future in which Hitler would break his promise and though Hitler broke the agreement, Chamberlain surely has to be given a credit since he put great amount of efforts to stop Hitler’s aggression as much as he could. A country which gave this credit was the United States, an isolationist who, at the initial stage, was unwilling to intervene in European affairs. The US, despite its position as a neutral country, was now trying to supply arms and raw materials to Britain and France.[19] More importantly, this help was largely due to the high moral ground built by Chamberlain’s efforts. More I think to its hope to get money. Though it was beyond people’s attention, Chamberlain was the leading figure in rearming Britain during the years of appeasement,[20] huh? which meant he was also caring about the protection and strength of its own country and wanted them to be secured. Some nations like France and members of British Foreign Office regretted for allowing Rhineland invasion and thought they had to fight against Germany with force. According to AJP Taylor, Germany had strong government and it could “again make Germany a great military power.” [21] However, Britain did not have sufficient economy to increase arms expenditure nor any armed force,[22] and it has been mentioned, the US was isolationist and France was a country which (who is for PEOPLE) relied on Britain. If the war was to break out anyway, it is very clear that it was much better to break out in the year it actually did, because without this period of rearmament and the support from the U.S., the situation might have looked quite different, in a bad way. Shortly, the appeasement helped as much as it could to prevent war and though it failed to, it had given Britain high morality during its years of process. With such moral ground, Britain succeeded in being supported by the US and making itself stronger enough to fight in a war. Wow- what a huge paragraph

In consequence, the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler in the 1930’s, though a failure as a result, at least was a genuine attempt to maintain peace by solving complaints of a nation. During its years, it was seen unsuccessful due to the fact that it initially settled grievances of Hitler but later made Hitler’s desire bold and even provided opportunities for him to fulfil it. Many nations were beginning to be skeptical about the appeasement and Britain. They felt it was threatening their countries as it made Germany more aggressive and started to seek ways to protect their own countries, some persuading Britain to take action against Hitler, and some deserting hope of being protected by Britain and directly going to support Hitler. Nonetheless, the appeasement was, for quite many times, setting limits on Germany’s aggressive action, such as those on arms growth and the area it was going to take over. Moreover, by offering Britain high moral ground, the appeasement made the country deserve to get military support from the US and it gave enough time for Britain to strengthen itself by rearmament. Therefore, no matter how the consequence was, the appeasement should not always be seen with criticism but to be considered with addition of compliment, for it did settle grievances of Germany and many times did made contributions to the prevention war.

19.5/20

I think you kind of went over the rails in your penultimate paragraph and went beyond what could have been a clear, concise argument, it was very good with great research. You managed to address all the points we raised in class and argued them very well.

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[1] http://thinkexist.com/quotes/anthony_eden/

[2] AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961, pg. 103

[3] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,958452-5,00.html

[4] AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961, pg. 104

[5]http://www.ellonacademy.org.uk/subjects/Departments/history/Inter_Advanced_Higher_pages/Appeasement%20notes/rhrineland.htm

[6] http://anonymouse.org/cgi-bin/anon-www.cgi/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Remilitarization_of_the_Rhineland

[7] Jeffrey Record, Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s, DIANE Publishing, 2005, pg. 2

[8] http://www.ers.north-ayrshire.gov.uk/History/Sources.htm

[9] http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/czechoslovakia_1938.htm

[10] R.J. Overy, The origins of the Second World War, Longman, 1998, pg. 66

[11] Jeffrey Record, Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s, DIANE Publishing, 2005, pg. 39

[12] http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3686/is_/ai_n8915701

[13] AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961, pg. 228

[14] Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 1930’s, Oxford University Press, 1996, pg. 262

[15] International Military Tribunal, Trial of German Major War Criminals, William S Hein & Co, 2001, Pg. 284

[16] AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961, pg. 172-173

[17] http://www.blacksacademy.net/content/3116.html

[18] R.J. Overy, The origins of the Second World War, Longman, 1998, pg. 26

[19] ibid., pg. 70

[20] AJP Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961, pg. 172

[21] ibid. pg. 102

[22] ibid., pg. 102