Was the Holmodor an intentional genocidal policy by the Soviet Union Leadership?

Was the Holmodor an intentional genocidal policy by the Soviet Union Leadership?
A: Plan of Investigation
1. Subject- Was the Holdomor an intentional genocidal policy of the Soviet Union leadership?
2. Methods- Will use two basic sets of sources, newspapers written at the time from prominent journalists such as Walter Duranty, Malcolm Muggeridge, and Gareth Jones as well as later books written by prominent historians such as Robert Conquest. The summary of evidence will consist of three basic sections the policies taken by the Soviet Union leading to the famine, their policies during the famine and a section focusing on the famine itself. For section C the one source will be two of Walter Duranty's articles in the New York Times and the other Robert Conquest's book Harvest of Sorrows: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine.
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B: Summary of Evidence
Stalin had introduced forced collectivization in 1928. The policy was meant to combine the smaller farms into larger ‘more efficient’ collective farms called kolkhozes. The 25 million peasant farmsteads were turned into 200,000 collective farms. This forced collectivization however, was highly unpopular among the peasants who resisted in a variety of ways including the slaughtering of their live stock as well as the burning of their crops culminating in large scale revolts braking out in mostly non-Russian areas including Ukraine. Such peasants were then bunched under the term “Kulaks” on which he declared “war”. It is estimated 5 million Soviet citizens were eventually classified as kulaks and either stripped of their land to be given the poorest land in the area, were deported to other nearby regions of the country or, in extreme cases to distant inhospitable regions without shelter or resources, or sent to gulags. The overall result was the inverse of what had been desired- rather then increasing the food output, the grain output dropped and livestock numbers fell; “famine was the natural outcome”.
The Holmodor refers specifically to such famine within Ukraine between 1932-33 which was part of a larger famine within the Soviet Union. The meaning of the word itself is debated, but is often translated as “death by hunger”. The actual number of casualties is recognized to be somewhere between 2.5 and 5 million though estimates vary. Cannibalism became widespread as the starving became more and more desperate resulting in the publishing of slogan by the Soviet authorities “Eating dead children is barbarism”. Disease, particularly typhoid, was widespread.
The Soviets pursued a number of policies during the famine 1932, introducing the law “On Safeguarding Socialist Property” which made stealing food punishable by death . The borders of the Ukraine were sealed by Red Army Units, and when aid arrived it was sent to all areas except the Ukraine. People trying to flee were rounded up and returned to famine stricken areas. The government went house to house in Ukraine removing all grain; in March 1933 220,000 starving people who left trying to find grain were returned as soon as they were caught. The quota was cut three times before the famine ended in 1934 when Stalin called a stop to the forced seizure of grain.
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C: Evaluation of Sources
Harvest of Sorrows: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine
Written by well respected Robert Conquest, viewed by many as one of the foremost Soviet historians, the book has been described as “(t)he first major scholarly book on the horrors of collectivization” and hailed as “the most comprehensive history of the soviet agricultural crisis,” especially as Conquest himself states his focus on the Holmodor. However, having been published before the opening of the Soviet Archives, the book omits numerous sources that have come to light which indicate that many of the numbers and facts used in the book exceed the actual numbers. Furthermore, Conquest has since rescinded his claim in the book that the Holomodor was an intentional policy, instead saying that had Soviet policy of collectivization and dekulakization been dropped when the famine became eminent many lives could have been saved. Many of the book’s detractors claim that that the book is merely propaganda with “more than half of the references are come from extreme-right-wing Ukrainian émigrés”; As one of the advisors of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher Conquest's true motives for the book have become suspect.

The second source consists of two articles by Walter Duranty- the now infamous “Russians Hungry But Not Starving” published on March 31st 1933 and the second less known piece “Soviet Industry Shows Big Gains” published the following week on April 6. At the time they were written the two pieces were valuable both as a “first hand account” and the fact Walter Duranty was a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist for his work on the Soviet Union. Also the pieces were published in the New York Times one of the most respected newspapers. However it has since been proven that famine occurred, which Duranty had flatly denied in both pieces. In fact efforts have been made to rescind Duranty's Pulitzer Prize and he was referred to by fellow journalist Malcolm Muggeridge as “the greatest liar I have met in journalism”.
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D: Analysis
The famine is considered one of the greatest national calamities of modern Ukrainian history, an unprecedented peacetime catastrophe. The famine is such a flash point that the Ukrainian Communist Party refused to even acknowledge that it occurred until 1990, over 55 years after it happened. The current Ukrainian president has announced his attention to make denial of the Holodomor illegal. To date over 19 countries other then Ukraine have recognized it as an act of genocide and the European Parliament adopted a resolution on October 23, 2008 recognizing the famine calling it “an appalling crime against the Ukrainian people, and against humanity” and calling “on the countries which emerged following the break-up of the Soviet Union to open up their archives on the Holodomor”. The document also “strongly condemns these acts, directed against the Ukrainian peasantry, and marked by mass annihilation and violations of human rights and freedoms”.
But was the famine actually the result of a genocidal policy by Stalin? Duranty, possibly the most prominent journalist in the Soviet Union, completely denied the famine, claiming that “conditions are bad, but there is no famine”. His sources were “Soviet commissariats and in foreign embassies with their network of consuls, [...] Britons working as specialists and from my personal connections, Russian and foreign”, sources he fails to ascribe a name to, are “more trustworthy information than I could get by a brief trip through any one area”. He instead inserts any deaths are the result of “diseases due to malnutrition.” A number of prominent Westerners in 1934 agreed with him. However there can be question now of the falsity of their reports especially with the Soviet admitting its occurrence in the 80s and the Ukrainian Communist Party adopting a resolution in 1990 also acknowledging the disaster took place. In fact Duranty's work has become so discredited an attempt to revoke his Pulitzer Prize was put forward and even encouraged by the New York Times.
Robert Conquest on the other hand refers to the catastrophe as a “terror famine” and “inflicted for its own sake” is supported to differing extents by large number of historians. His assertion that the famine was the result of “the setting of grain quotas far above the possible, removing of handful of foods and preventing of help from outside” is collaborated by historian Jasper Becker, “Stalin allowed relief to all other areas”, “Party deliberately and consciously took all grain it could from the peasants” and Robert Service, “starving majority […] had to fulfill state's requirements”. Peter Wiles says “Conquest's research has established beyond a doubt that the famine was deliberately inflicted there for the ethnic reasons to undermine the Ukrainian nation”. However not all historians agree with Conquest and Becker, both Martens and Tottle are critical of Conquest's arguments asserting that the famine was actually caused not by Stalin but by four factors, a civil war perpetrated by the Kulaks and Czarist elements, the drought, the typhoid epidemic and some by the disorder resulting from the economic and social changes and pointing to the drought rather then Soviet policy. Both Marten's and Tottle's arguments are vastly weakened by the Russian's Federation co-sponsorship of a 2003 resolution holding the Soviet Union responsible for the famine which appears to be an admission of guilt. The official documents in the archives likewise “convincingly demonstrates that the blame for the suffering and deaths of millions of people lies squarely with the Stalinist leadership”. However Robert Service notes using the definition of genocide as killing an entire ethnic group or nationality then the Holdomor doesn't really apply. Other nationalities in the Ukraine were in conditions just as poor as the Ukrainians and the grain quotas were cut multiple times 3 times at the report of famines.
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E: Conclusion
While clearly Duranty and Conquest don't agree on whether or not the Soviets are to blame for the Holomodor its clear they agree on the answer to whether or not it was genocide. Both believe that the famine was not the result of a genocidal policy when genocide is defined as “the killing of an entire national or ethnic group”. This is a position also supported by historians Service, Tottle, and Martens among others. But Service and Conquest do accuse Stalin of failing to act adequately to prevent or stop the continuation of the famine which means while he was not guilty of genocide the Soviet leader were guilty of a kind of extreme case of criminal malfeasance.
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F: List of Sources
Becker, Jasper. Hungry Ghosts Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1996
Conquest, Robert. Harvest of Sorrows: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine Oxford University Press US, 1987
Duranty, Walter. “Russians Hungry, But Not Starving”. New York Times New York, March 31st, 1933
Martens, Ludo. “The Resolution on Dekulakization”. Another View of Stalin 1995
Meurs, Mielke. Many Shades of Red Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
“Resolution on the Commemoration of the Holodomor, the Ukrainian artificial famine(1932-1933)”. European Parliament Oct. 23, 2008. June 9, 2009
Service, Robert. A History of modern Russia from Nicholas II to Vladamir Putin Harvard University Press: New Haven, 2005
Sysyn, Frank. “The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-3: The Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion”. Studies in Comparative Genocide Ed: Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian, Palgrave Macmillan 1999. pg. 182
Tottle, Douglas. Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard Progress Books: Toronto Canada, 1987
Tucker, Robert C. “Stalinism as Revolution from Above”. Stalinism Ed: Robert C. Tucker Transaction Publishers, 1999

Was Stalin’s Death a Result of Beria’s Poisoning?

Summary of Evidence
∙Stalin’s Condition Before 1953
Stalin was going through deterioration in his health since his minor strokes before 1953. From 1951 to 1952, however, he refused to take any medication and yet his high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis and rheumatism were all developing.
∙The Final Stroke that Led Stalin to His Death
On the night of February 28th, Stalin watched a film at the Kremlin, and returned to his dacha where he was joined by Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Bulganin, who stayed until and left at 4:00 A.M, Khruschev and Bulganin separately, while Beria and Malenkov together in a car. Then the guards received an order from Stalin through Khrustalev, which was to go off duty. Up to the evening on the next day, there was a complete silence, which led to a suspicion within the guards, who were yet afraid to counter Stalin’s order and go into his suite. Eventually, Pyotr Lozgachev, one of Stalin’s bodyguards, went into his suite at 22:00 and found the crippled Stalin lying on the floor. Next to him was his broken pocket watch showing 6:30 and there was an open bottle of mineral water on the table. The guards were called in by Lozgachev and they helped him move the Boss to the sofa. The guards called Ignatiev, the Minister of State Security, who referred to Malenkov and Beria.
∙The Response of the Politburo Members
Malenkov called Beria, Bulganin and Khrushchev to inform about the guards’ report of Stalin’s physical state. It was thirty minutes after Starostin called when a call came from Malenkov, saying that he could not find Beria. Another thirty minutes later, Beria rang the guards to tell them not to inform anybody about Stalin’s illness.
At 3:00 A.M., Beria came into Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov, glanced at Stalin and swore at the guards, telling them that Stalin was asleep and therefore they should not panic or disturb him. He prohibited any use of the telephone and left the place. Around 8 in the morning Khrushchev came into the dacha, telling the guards that he summoned doctors, who arrived between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M. with artificial ventilation which, unknown for what reason, was not used.
∙The Doctors’ Examination
Stalin’s symptoms were due to brain hemorrhage caused by his hypertension and atherosclerosis but the doctors also concluded that Stalin was poisoned and they tried to treat him for poisoning while at the same time did not expose this fact to other people, including the four Politburo members. Stalin’s condition got worse as the time went by. On March 4th, besides the symptoms involving the skin on his face, legs and arms turning blue and his liver being enlarged, his blood and urine examination results proved that he was poisoned. In the morning of March 5th, Stalin vomited blood which led to a decrease in his blood pressure and several times of collapse on the same day.
∙Stalin’s Death
Stalin eventually died at 9:50 P.M., after going through a severe hardship with breathing.
∙After Stalin’s Death
Beria ran out to the corridor, calling Khrustalev to get his car to go to the Kremlin. After a while, the other Politburo members went to the Kremlin as well, to acquire power. Then the car with stretcher arrived to carry Stalin to the hospital for embalming and Khrustalev went to the hospital as well.
The guards who served Stalin were to be eliminated from their jobs, so Starostin, Orlov and Tukov went to see Beria and resist but Beria’s threat of killing them made them to depart immediately. Other jobs were given to the guards except Khrustalev who fell ill and died soon.

Evaluation of Sources
Source 1
CHUEV: Beria himself was said to have killed him.
MOLOTOV: …‘Sometimes he seemed about to come to. At those moments Beria would stay close to Stalin. Oh! He was always ready...
One cannot exclude the possibility that he had a hand in Stalin's death... he did drop hints…"I did him in!...I saved all of you!" ’

This source could be valuable in supporting the conviction of Beria as Stalin’s assassinate, referring to its origin, which is the interview of Molotov, to whom whom the suspect, Beria, talked to in person. The exact quotation from Beria, together with Molotov’s witnesses of his mysterious behavior which made Molotov believe that “he was always ready” to harm the Boss, elevates the convincing aspect of the argument. The main value of this source could be that the statement was from Molotov, the contemporary Politburo member, not a historian.
However, it should be in consideration that the book was published in 1993, which is far after Stalin’s death, and the source’s origin, to be more precise, is Chuev, who interviewed Molotov. His interview question seems to be a guiding one, as Molotov says “Oh!” indicating his realization right at that time. It arises the possibility of Chuev trying to use Molotov’s words to support his opinion and the publish date which makes this source too modern also undermines the reliability of the source because it was after when the theory of Beria’s planned murder of Stalin had been introduced. Molotov says that Beria dropped “hints” through his words but one cannot absolutely ensure if Beria really meant that he poisoned Stalin tactfully or simply contributed to Stalin’s death with some delay in summoning doctors. He seems to be creating a distorted characterization of Beria with some words that would have been not as intricate or Machiavellian to support his argument.

Source 2
“Arteriosclerosis, which developed during the night of March 1-2 on the basis of hypertonia and cerebral hemorrhage in his left brain hemisphere, has resulted, apart from the right-side paralysis of limbs and loss of consciousness, in impaired stem section of the brain, accompanied by disturbances of the vital functions of breathing and blood circulation.”

Unlike Source 1, this source originates in the contemporary newspaper articles from Pravda and contains medical reports with specific diagnoses of Stalin’s health conditions, not human judgment from a particular political member. The source could be appreciated for containing factual descriptions of Stalin’s health and as it involves nothing about Stalin being poisoned or symptoms related to it, it strongly denies the idea that Stalin was poisoned by Beria before his death.
On the other hand, this is not an official medical report from the doctors but an announcement from the Soviet government. Pravda, as a national paper published by the Soviet government, was famous to the public for being biased and inaccurate. The possibility of the manipulation made in the Politburo members’ favor cannot be excluded. Therefore the source, in spite of medical facts, lacks accuracy and the strong negative impression that Pravda gave to the contemporary society prevents one from judging Stalin’s condition totally based on such report.

Analysis
To figure out if Stalin died because Beria poisoned him, it is important to start considering the possibility firstly by exploring the events around Stalin’s death. After the four Politburo members left Stalin’s dacha at 4, it was Khrustalev, not Stalin himself who talked to the guards about going off duty. Beria, among the four guests, being the closest with Khrustalev suggests that he ordered Khrustalev to let the guards vacate. In addition, the fact that other guards got substitute jobs but Khrustalev, the only guard who was allowed to see Stalin being embalmed, fell ill and died raises a question if this was one of Beria’s efforts to expunge evidence that could prove him guilty.
When Lozgachev went in, he saw a bottle of water next to Stalin. Why was this bottle not sent to the Stalin Museum from the Kremlin sanitary department when it had to send medicaments and empty mineral bottles in November 1953? Was it because it contained the poison that killed Stalin? The very possible scenario in Stalin’s suite on March 1st during the hours between 4 A.M. and 10 P.M. is that Khrustalev put poison in Stalin’s water bottle while all the guards were back at home by Beria’s command.
Beria had been delaying in his response to the guards and when he came to Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov at 3 o’ clock, he swore at the guards and left the place immediately but forbade their use of communication line. According to Khrushchev, Malenkov called him right after the guards called and he thought the visit from all four Politburo members around 8 o’clock was the first visit from all of them but it was the second one made by Beria, which Khrushchev did not know. He was trying to hide Stalin’s condition and his awareness of it from others.
After Stalin’s death, Beria went out immediately to Kremlin, where he assumed authority and this, together with all his suspicious behavior before Stalin’s death, conveys the idea that Beria, with his strong motive of gaining power, took advantage of Stalin’s health to kill him with poison and achieve what he wanted.
On the other hand, there are counter-arguments that defend Beria. As Medvedev argues, for years, Stalin denied taking medication so his death could have been nothing more than a corollary of his long-term diseases. But this argument now seems to be nominal as all the symptoms due to poison written in the official medical records were exposed. The doctors knew Stalin was poisoned and that was why they did not use the artificial ventilation, which was not useful. The absence of such facts in articles from Pravda, controlled by the Soviet government, does not argue against conviction of Beria but supports it by explaining why the reports in Pravda were falsified: Beria killed Stalin and he had enough power to manipulate the facts about Stalin’s symptoms.
Yet blaming Beria with asperity for power, seen after Stalin’s death, is quite unreasonable because he did not try to appoint himself as the President but Vice-President. If Beria is to be blamed for such motive, then why not other people like Vasili Stalin, who despised his father and suffered humiliation after Stalin forfeiting his authority or Khrushchev, who was the successor of Stalin after all?
Shortly, the argument stating Stalin died because Beria poisoned him gets supports from Beria’s suspicious behaviour, his relation with Khrustalev, and the recently-discovered official medical reports. The opposite argument arises from that Stalin’s death was the result of neglected delayed treatment and that there are other possible suspects.

Conclusion
Certainly, there are a variety of supporters of the argument that convicts Beria as the assassin using poison to kill Stalin. On the other hand, their argument is depreciated by the facts that Stalin’s health was already on a rapid wane and that there are other possible suspects including his family members and the Politburo members. However, with recently discovered official medical reports corroborating Stalin being poisoned and Beria’s possession of the closest contact with the guards including Khrustalev, this argument seems to have a sizeable amount of evidentiary support. To conclude, Stalin died because he was poisoned by Beria.

Bibliography

Books
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

Brent, Jonathan. Naumov, Vlamidir. Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993.

Committee on Slavic Studies. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Cambridge: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1953.

Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. London:Penguin, 1992.

Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality, Duplicity, and Intrigue. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, 1998.

Deriabin, Peter. Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1984.

Eaton, Katherine. Daily Life in the Soviet Union. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.

Radzinsky, Edvard. STALIN: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996.

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
Medvedev, Zhores. Dahrendorf, Ellen. The Unknown Stalin. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.

Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton, 2004.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.

DVD

Who Killed Stalin, DVD. Directed by Tim Robinson. UK: BBC Timewatch, 2005.

Internet
Pravda.Ru, “Secret documents reveal Stalin was poisoned.” Pravda.Ru (December 29, 2005), http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/90/363/16693_Stalin.html.

Problems with Industrialisation during the first 5 year plan

In 1928, Russia had decided to launch its first 5 year plan to rapidly industrialise and catch up to the rest of Western Europe in terms of economic, and technological strengths. With this rapid industrialisation came many problems ranging from social, political, and economical factors, where one problem ties into another problem from another factor.

Social problems arose from industrialisation in many ways, such as, horrible living conditions that came from too much concentration of building factories and mines by the government. This was a problem because it was contributing to workers discontent to work. This led to more absenteeism which was not only a social problem, but was slowing production and had brought up economic problems as well. Another problem was workers having to work in horrible unsafe conditions, because of the pressures of meeting marked targets of production, leading them to ignore safety.There was also close to no pay or incentive to work, any money workers did make, was nearly useless, since the government's lack of attention to textile and home product productions, gave workers nothing to buy. This could be an extension of another social problem, such as the back breaking hours workers went through in the form of the " uninterrupted week" where factories would be open 7 days a week, only having 1 day off, which would in all likelihood have been different from one's spouse. Working constantly, barely being able to see family, a horrible home and worthless money will all led up to huge social problems and unrest.

Political problems arose from industrialisation in many ways as well, but one of the main effecting problems, that also brings up social and economic problems is the removal of capitalist classes such as Nepmen and "bourgeois experts". Though this may seem to be a victory for communism, by having a class-less society, the removal of these Nepmen and "bourgeuis experts" in reality was an act of "dumbing-down" the country. Most of those people were the people who knew how to run factories and work machinery to it's full potential, and would be able to meet government production targets more effectivily. But with this lowering of expertise, all that the country was left with was inexperienced peasant workers who will only slow down production, and cause more problems such as accidents, worsening working conditions. The example just mentioned can also connet with social and economic problems, since taking the population a step back by ridding it of educated and experienced people, will slow down production and decrease output and profit needed to support the country.

Economic problems arose from industrialisation with many connections to political and social problems. Such as the emphasis on heavy industry and not concentrating enough on things like housing, textile and consumer industries bringing problems of absenteeism, and no content to work with no incentive and rewards. Another example of an economic problem is the increased corruption caused by impossible production targets that lead factory workers and managers to give false data reports, in fear of being punished or losing there life for not reaching targets. For example, the official figure given for the increased industrial production was 852%, compared to the Western estimates that the actual increase in output of industry was 260%. These exaggerated numbers are linked to the corrupted factory managers, but can also be linked to social problems like the lack of skill of many of the workers from political issues such as, elimination of Nepmen and "bourgeois experts" and linking back to other economical problems like the poor pay and conditions causing workers to shift from job to job, keeping them inconsistent and inexperienced in their new fields of work.

The Results of Stalin's first 5 Year Plan

Ambitiously, Stalin started the 5 year plan and until 1941, it had a big impact in Russia economically, politically and socially. It was a big success economically, however there were negative effects socially. Politically, Stalin was able to strengthen his power. Economic and Social effects will be examined in detail.

Stalin emphasized on heavy industries. As a result, there was a huge achievement on the economy. Stalin thought, to make the USSR strong enough to protect itself, emphasizing heavy industries which could make the USSR develop faster, was needed in order to catch up other industrialized countries such as Germany, Japan, the US, the UK etc. He successfully increased coal and steel production by six-fold and four-fold respectively. In addition, new industrial centers such as Magnitogorsk and Gorki were set up. Especially, Magnitogorsk, in south east Siberia, which was based on the metal industries like iron and steel, experienced enormous growth; in 1929 there were only 25 people living there but three years later the number had increased to 250,000. Those achievements, which were seen as the major successes of the 5 year plans, made it possible to recover the USSR's economy which had been disrupted during the WWΙ. In addition, since the Soviet Union takeover in 1917, trade with the rest of the world had been severely reduced but by increase in heavy industries' productions, the USSR could rely in its own resources.

However, there were some social problems ; human rights were attacked. Workers couldn't get any respect from the USSR government. They had to work in extremely poor and dangerous conditions and for big engineering projects (dangerous) such as dams or canals, slave labour (such as political opponents, kulaks or Jews) were used. In fact, when Stalin ordered to build the Belomor canal, 100,000 workers (slave labours) died between 1931 to 1933. In addition, those who made mistakes were sent to the labour camps which were called 'gulag', This showed how ruthless was Stalin; everyone had to work under the fear and to fulfill increasingly unrealistic targets, a wide range of enterprising methods like ambushing resources, offering a bribe were used; corruption increased. Another point which showed Stalin didn't care about their his people was that he only dealt with what were called "capital' industries. Thus, consumer industries were neglected. There was a shortage of consumer goods and thus people suffered from the increased price.

Politically, Stalin seized power by removing those who opposed to the plan or those who might be an obstacle to the progress. For example, Stalin attacked the Muslim faith because he thought it was holding back industrialization. 7 million Kulaks who opposed to his plan were also eliminated. Capitalist classes such as Nepmen and 'bourgeois experts' removed. Therefore, his position was strengthened and this became the basis of his strong policy in the future.

In conclusion, as a result of the five year plan, great success was achieved economically. However, socially, people in the USSR suffered terribly because of Stalin's ruthless policy. Politically, by removing all obstacles, he strengthened his position.