Table of contents
A. Plan of Investigation………………………………. 3
B. Summary of Evidence…………………………….. 3
C. Evaluation of Sources……………………………... 4
D. Analysis……………………………………………. 4
E. Conclusion………………………………………… 6
F. List of Sources………………………………………………6
Internal Assessment
In which way did Ostpolitik provide a change in West German foreign policy in regards to East Germany?
A Plan of the investigation
This investigation seeks to evaluate the change in West German foreign policy in the period from 1969 to 1974 analysing the central document of the West German policy in regards to East Germany, the Basic Treaty of 1972, and in particular Heinrich August Winkler’s interpretation of Ostpolitik in his study “Germany. The Long Road West. Volume 2: 1933-1990”. Following Winkler’s analysis, this investigation will focus on the political aspect and the international policy at that time. In B, the main source will be put in the broader context of German foreign policy since 1955 and the other main treaties of Ostpolitik presenting in which way Brandt’s new approach constituted a dramatic change in Germany’s foreign policy. After the evaluation of the Treaty and Winkler’s broader interpretation of Ostpolitk in part C, they will be analysed in part D under the focus of the importance of US foreign policy for the Ostpolitik leading to a conclusion of the central question in E.
B Summary of evidence
The dramatic change of German foreign policy in the period from 1969-1974 can only be understood in the context of German foreign policy since 1955 when West Germany officially became a sovereign state and the main doctrine of West German policy, the Hallstein Doctrine, was formulated. It declared that “every country which has diplomatic relations with the GDR will not be allowed to have diplomatic relations with the FRG”. West Germany was regarded as the only legitimate state presenting Germany as a whole. Proving successful in 1957, when West Germany cut off its ties with Yugoslavia who had officially recognized East Germany as a separate state, East Germany was forced to tie its alignment with the USSR. But there was another side to the Hallstein Doctrine, which prevented an open policy towards other East European states. The Warsaw Pact states had recognized the GDR in 1949-50 and therefore West Germany was refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with those countries.
In the meantime during the 1960s, the relations between the two superpowers had changed. After the Berlin crises in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy started to promote a new approach in US foreign policy towards the USSR looking for a way of cooperation. In a speech at the American University of Washington in June 1963, Kennedy emphasized to look for a strategy of peace between the USA and the USSR. The leading opposition party of West Germany, the Social Democrats, who opposed the Hallstein Doctrine, developed a new foreign policy concept “Change through Rapprochement”. It sought to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state by putting aside the idea of German unification for the near future. The main idea was that changes in East Germany could only be made in a long term through numerous little steps which were necessary for the reunification of both German states emphasizing on stronger cooperation with the goal of dismantling the status quo in the long run.
This concept became a political reality after Brandt had been elected Chancellor in 1969. He immediately began talks with leaders from East Germany and East European countries meeting with the East German prime-minister Willi Stoph. These talks were the first direct talks between top German politicians since 1948 taking place in West and East Germany in 1970. Even so Brandt refused to recognize East Germany as a sovereign state, communication lines were opened.
After policy goals were made with the United States, Brandt entered negotiations with the USSR in which both countries renounced the use of force. The FRG agreed to make no territorial claims recognizing the borders in Eastern Europe. TheTreaty with Moscow was the first treaty of the Ostpolitik signed on August 12th 1970. It followed the Warsaw Treaty four month later with a similar content towards Poland. This policy was backed by the USA who had started negotiations about the status of Berlin leading to the Agreement on Berlin on 3rd September 1971 with France, England and the USSR, marking a relaxation of tension in East-West relations, in particular since it guaranteed civil communications between West Berlin and the FRG. It was the Treaty with East Berlin (Basic Treaty) however that proved to be the central and controversial document of Ostpolitik. Both states had committed themselves in the treaty to develop normal relations on the basis of equality. Recognizing each other’s independence and sovereignty as well as territorial integrity, both sides agreed to exchange permanent missions in Bonn and East Berlin avoiding the pivotal question of German unification. Brandt faced tough opposition. Many of his conservative critics feared that by neglecting the goal of unification he was selling out to the Communists. When West and East Germany became members of the UN in 1973, the new reality of two German states had become a fact. West Germany had lost his right to be the only sovereign speaking for Germany as a whole and therefore the Hallstein Doctrine was abolished. This new policy of direct talks, negotiations and treaties with the USSR, Poland and GDR and later on with Czechoslovakia in December 1973 was backed by the USA. In this regard, Brandt’s approach “Change though Rapprochement” led from a foreign policy of isolation of the GDR to a policy of cooperation and legal recognition overcoming the Cold War situation between the two German states which had dominated their relation under the Hallstein Doctrine.
C Evaluation of the sources
The Basic treaty was the most controversial of all treaties signed during Ostpolitik and has to be seen in the context of the other treaties. Its purpose was to regulate the relationship between the two Germanys on a mutual agreement that would make it possible to facilitate regulations concerning the improvement of having economical, cultural and political exchanges with de facto recognition to the GDR. Instead of embassies permanent legations were opened in both German states as it was stressed in supplementary text leading the way open to a later reunification. Its value lies in the fact that numerous improvements followed the treaty such as the “Besucherregelung”, which allowed West German Citizens to visit East Germany and also facilitated family reunions for East German Citizens aged over 60 years to travel to West Germany. However, the limitation lied in the unresolved question of German unity leading to the concept of two German states within one German nation. East Germany stressed the idea that it had become a sovereign state, while West Germany continued to claim that the German question was not resolved finally.
Winkler’s leading question is, why Germany, much later than Great Britain and France, became a national state and even later a democracy. It is under this perspective that he focuses on the Ostpolitik. His two volumes of Germany.The Long Road West which were published 10 years after the German reunification are a major source for modern German history. The value of this book is that Winkler argues clearly under a central question, leaving room for critical remarks. He analysis the Ostpolitik in the second volume (279-290 and 296-314) mainly in the context of international politics rejecting the idea that it was mainly a European or German question. Arguing this way, Winkler is convinced that external factors dominated German foreign policy at that time and that the Ostpolitik was not a reaction to the changes within the German society.
The purpose of this source is the argument that Ostpolitik lead to a new political reality in Germany and Europe. By recognizing the political sovereignty, both German states became more independent in their political decisions and it seemed a new reality had come true: a Europe with two German states. Winkler focuses on the importance of the US foreign policy under Kennedy and Nixon to show that Ostpolitik depended heavenly on the changes of US foreign policy. In this regard Ostpolitik has to be studied mainly in the context of international politics rather than in the context of German or European history. The limitation of Winkler’s analysis may lie in a too one sided focus on US policy as the main factor of the Ostpolitik. Historians like Jürgen Kocka strengthen the point that the events of 1989 and in that regard the Ostpolitik should be seen in the context of historical continuities in European history. Winkler’s point of view is linked to his conviction that the Western Alliance under the guidance of the USA is the best solution to the German question leaving little room for alternative analysis of the Ostpolitik in the framework of a European history.
D Analysis
The dramatic changes of German foreign policy from 1969-1974 have to be put into the context of the German foreign policy since 1955. The Hallstein Doctrine was a typical approach of foreign policy during the first period of the Cold War until the Berlin and Cuba Missile Crises. Germany and Berlin which had been the major battleground of the Cold War in Europe were the division line between West and East. Adenauer’s intention was clear from the beginning: integration of FRG into the Western world renouncing to the immediate reunification of Germany. The changes of international politics in particular of the US administration under President Kennedy made this policy unreasonable. In this context a new approach of German foreign policy could be formulated. The new concept “Change through Rapprochement” reflected much better the intentions of the Kennedy administration than the Hallstein Doctrine.
There is no serious disagreement about the fact that “Challenge through Rapprochement” abolished the Hallstein Doctrine. Even revisionist historians like Hillgruber during the period before the German Reunification did not put this fact into question.
Concerning the question in which way it came to this change in German foreign policy, many historians in recent years emphasize on the external factors. While Winkler strongly focuses on Kennedy’s state visit to Germany in 1963 emphasizing the importance of US foreign policy during the whole period of the Ostpolitik, historians like Görtemaker argue that Ostpolitik became an engine of change in 1970 and has to be seen from that year on in the context of European policy. The immediate impact was not only the improvement of inner German relations but that this policy resulted directly in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe beginning in November 1972 and ending in August 1975. Ostpolitik in that regard developed much more into a European policy leading to the Helsinki agreement giving space for human right activists in East Europe.
The Ostpolitik overcame the Cold War mentality between the two German states, but did not resolved in any way the German question. This policy was in the interest of the US foreign policy and in this regard is as much their product as a new approach by Chancellor Brandt. It was in both interests that the Hallstein Doctrine was abolished leading to a policy of cooperation between the two German states.
E Conclusion
When it comes to the question in which way Ostpolitik provided a change in West German foreign policy in regards to East Germany, the answer seems to be clear. The improving relations between the two German states following the Ostpolitik and the Basic Treaty overcame years of a non dialogue between the two German sides and little improvements for family affairs and visiting rights took place. It helped to overcome the Cold War mentality. “Change through Rapprochement” was therefore a dramatic change in the way that German foreign policy towards Eastern Europe focused on dialogue instead of isolating the GDR. The Basic treaty recognized the existence of two German states and made therefore an end to the Hallstein Doctrine. Winkler’s analysis supports this idea by making clear that Ostpolitik opened a new chapter of dialogue between the two German states. By putting the Ostpolitk in the context of American foreign policy, Winkler makes clear, that West German foreign policy depended heavily on American policy.
Words: 2000
F List of sources
Bahr, Egon, "Wandel durch Annäherung" ["Change through Rapprochement"], speech
delivered on July 15, 1963, at the Evangelical Academy in Tutzing
(http://germanhistorydocs.ghi- dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=81)
Berger, Stefan, Historians and nation-building in Germany after reunification, August 1995
(http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2279/is_n148/ai_17474757/pg_18)
Deutsch-Polnisches Jahrbuch 2005. Polish-German Annual 13/2005.
(http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=770ded1f-d6e3-4f6b-9986-
cca69865ae17&articleId=54e09275-1640-43a7-995a-5af8bfa8c9e1)
Görtemaker, Manfred. 1994. Entspannung und Neue Ostpolitik (Détente and New Ostpolitik),
in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung, 4.Quartal 1994, S.34-41. (Informations about
political education. 1.Quarter 1994, 34-41).
Görtemaker, Manfred. 1994. Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ära der Entspannung. (From the Cold
War to the policy of detente), in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung, 4.Quartal 1994,
S.26-33). (Informations about political education. 1.Quarter 1994,
26-33).
Grundlagenvertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR, 21.Dezember
1972, in: Informationen zur politischen Bildung 4.Quartal 1994, p.39. (The Basic Treaty, in:
Informations about political education. 1.Quarter 1994).
Hillgruber, Andreas. 1980. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1975. Die deutsche Frage in der
Weltpolitik. Frankfurt-Berlin-Wien. (German history 1945-1975. The German question in
the perspective of world history. Frankfurt-Berlin-Vienna 1980).
Le Quintrec, Guillaume und Peter Geiss. 2006. Histoire/Geschichte. Europa und die Welt
seit 1945. Leipzig (Guillaume Le Quintrec and Peter Geiss, History. Europe and the World
since 1945. Leipzig 2006).
Löwenthal, Richard. 1974. Vom Kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik, in: Die zweite Republik. 25 Jahre
Bundesrepublik Deutschland – eine Bilanz, hrsg. Von Richard Löwenthal und Hans- Peter
Schwarz. Stuttgart. (From the cold war to the Ostpolitik. The Second Republic. 25 years
history of the German Federal Republic – a resume. Edited by Richard Löwenthal and
Peter Schwarz, Stuttgart 1974).
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin - Berlin 3 September 1971 (http://www.ena.lu)
Schöllgen, Gregor. 2001. Willy Brandt. Die Biographie. Berlin/München 2001. (Willy Brandt,
the biography. Berlin/Munich 2001).
Weber, Jürgen/Pfändtner, Bernhard. 1995. Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zur Gegenwart,
Bamberg. (From the Second World War to the Present, Bamberg 1995).
Winkler, Heinrich August. 2000. Der lange Weg nach Westen, Zweiter Band, Deutsche
Geschichte vom „Dritten Reich“ bis zur Wiedervereinigung. München 2000. (Germany.
The Long Road West. Volume 2: 1933-1990, Oxford University Press.)
Showing posts with label Cold War. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cold War. Show all posts
To what extent did the legislative structure of Czechoslovakia under the Husák regime in Czechoslovakia contribute to the breakup Czechs and Slovaks?
Investigation plan…………………….….………..………………….…page 3
Summary of evidence…………………..…...…………………...........….page 4
Evaluation of sources…………….……..…………….……………....…page 9
Analysis…………………………….……….….…………………....…page 11
Conclusion……………………..…...……………………..………...…page 16
List of sources……………..………..………………..……………..….page 18
Appendix A1…………………………………………………………..page 21
Appendix A2…………………………….…………………………….page 22
Appendix A3…………………………….…………………………….page 24
Investigation plan
To what extent did the legislative structure of Czechoslovakia under the Husák regime contribute to the breakup of Czechs and Slovaks?
This research examines the relationships between the two main ethnical groups living in the federative Czechoslovakia before it broke up. The Czech-Slovak relations were influenced by many factors before the final split. However this research is focused to examine only the influence of the legislative structure of the Husák’s centralised federalism in communistic Czechoslovakia.
Czech historian Rychlík’s Rozpad Československa was used as the primary source, providing a deep overview of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Pollák, chronicler of the former Slovak president as well as Pavol Dubček, son of Alexander Dubček, were interviewed. Secondary sources, the majority of which are Czech and Slovakian, will be used to provide insight from books, newspapers and various statistics to analyse the relationships between the two nations in Czechoslovakia under Husák’s rule.
(Investigation Plan- 148 words)
Summary of evidence
Czechoslovakia at its establishment after the Pittsburgh Agreement was an artificial state contradicting the idea of self-determination as it included many nations, including the majority Czechs and Slovaks. [1] First president T. G. Masaryk denied self-determination for Slovaks stating “The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language”[2]. Leff called the policies of Czech politicians the assimilation of Slovaks under a common umbrella of Czechoslovakism.[3] Goebbels in the dying days of the Third Reich had prophesised that Czechoslovakia would become “the organising centre of Bolshevik plots against Europe.”[4] Indeed, Czechoslovakia finally fell under the direct rule of Moscow after the February 1948 coup.[5] During the time of so-called normalization post-1969[6], Head of State Husák declared his intention to return to the idea of “real socialism”.[7] Although communists proclaimed themselves the biggest nationalists,[8] the legislative structure of federation during this time exacerbated national problems between Czechs and Slovaks. The conflicts, which had their origins during Husák’s regime, culminated in final the separation of these nations in 1992, were:
1. Social
Because Marxist-Leninism could not justify the connection of Czechs and Slovaks in one nation because it emphasised national traditions over communist ideology, legislative restrictions were partially based on emphasizing common ideas of Czechoslovakism,[9] while ideas of self-determination were forbidden. [10] For Czechs this negated the ideas of Masaryk and Beneš since they asserted Slovaks were a part of Czech culture, while Slovaks were denied studying Hlinka and Tiso, supporters of independence.[11] This censorship was ensured by having teachers and professors appointed after strict verification by the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) and by state directives which allowed work from ‘forbidden’ authors to be read only after special authorisation, which was practically impossible to get.[12] This ultimately caused both sides to feel denied of their national history and to subsequently blame each other.
2. Political
Furthermore, the ‘federative’ system in Czechoslovakia, modelled on the USSR, caused Czechs and Slovaks to have unequal powers which limited the real meaning of federation.[13] Although both Czechs and Slovaks had their own governments[14], from 1970 the decisions of these governments could be vetoed by the federative government under restrictions of the KSČ led from Prague.[15] De facto, other institutions were directly subordinate to Prague’s KSČ, such as the Slovak Communist Party (KSS), various ministries[16], Slovak National Council (SNR), National Front (NF), army, security institutions, or courts.[17] Members and plenums of these institutions were fully organised by the KSČ. Even the results of ‘elections’ of Slovakia’s federative government and KSS were decided in Prague before actual elections, because the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ) was arranging all three governments in Czechoslovakia.[18] Čarnogurský argues Slovaks were not a real part of this federation having lost control over Slovakia and its internal affairs.[19]
3. Economic
Finally, economic measures under Husák were unequal. Slovak economist Slavo Koštúch stated as early as 1971: “You are saying that we are brothers, but our wallets are not sisters.”[20] Slovakian economists agreed that the country’s budget, depending on Slovakian money through the highest taxes of all socialist countries[21], were charged from Slovakian industries with only a miniscule amount returning to Slovakia; the rest being spent on Czech infrastructure and rebuilding the capital city.[22] This strengthened the view that Slovakia was economically exploited by Czechs and Moravians. Czech economists such as Komárek, Zeman and Klaus [23] retorted that the economy in fact suffered because Czech was providing enormous amounts of money to Slovakia rather than rebuilding the ‘homeland’.[24] This caused both sides to feel that the federation was inefficient and exploitative.
(Summary of evidence- 597 words)
Evaluation of sources
Czech historian Jan Rychlík’s, Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy was published in Slovakia in 2002 with the stated purpose of analysing the causes for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.[25] Rychlík took full advantage of the opening of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian archives and the first-hand experiences of Czechoslovak politicians[26] who provided him interviews, to support his argument. However the archives were not fully profitable for research given that Slovakia does not allow documents within the last 30 years to be made public and not all documents in the Czech Republic were available in the public archive. [27] His analysis of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks is helped by the fact that he studied and worked in both countries. During Husák’s regime, he experienced the impact of communism on Czechoslovakia first-hand. Given that his main focus of the book is analysing of the last three years of federation (1989-1992), he tends to gloss over important events of the 1970s and 1980s which later influenced events.
Pavol Pollák, a Slovakian politician in communist-era Czechoslovakia, was Alexander Dubček’s collaborator from the start of the latter’s political career until his ‘disappearance’. His specialty was mainly within the Soviet-Czechoslovak communication sphere.[28] After disintegration he worked as a chronicler for Slovakian president Kováč. The purpose of the interview was to gauge the view of a politician in the position of providing a unique and personal analysis of the impact of communist legislation on Czech-Slovak relations, particularly given his role over such a long period of time. As a chronicler in the presidential agency, he had access to the national and communist archives, which were opened after 1992. While acknowledging his support of a common Czechoslovak federation, he admits disagreeing with Husák’s centralised model of federation which at times colours his opinions of a number of the sources. A number of topics, including comparison of Husák’s and Dubček’s government, were not fully open to discussion given his continued loyalty to the latter.
(Evaluation of sources- 323 word)
Analysis
The Husák era was most important in the history of the Czechoslovak nations because it marked the start of normalisation up to abolition of communism in the USSR, leading to the division of for the first time in 460 years.[29] Far from strengthening and ‘normalising’ Czechoslovakia, the hard-line rule of Gustav Husák created even more internal conflicts, leading to final disintegration in 1992.
The structure of the state should be studied when considering its legislation. Although Czechoslovakia was a federation, it was still a communist state based on the centralistic model of the USSR federation with the centre in Prague.[30] Nevertheless, Husák’s state did not seek to assimilate Slovaks under the common culture of Czechoslovakism as happened in the Soviet model with non-Russian nationalities, but sought good relations under the motto qietum non movere while propagating socialism as the best solution for solving the Czech-Slovak ‘question’.[31]
Although both nations in Czechoslovakia felt their national historical identities threatened during the communist era, Czech and Slovak cultures were strengthened in many ways. The similar languages helped Czechoslovaks to be naturally bilingual since the mass-media provided information in both languages, such as national television CSTV.[32] Abolition of national festivals such as 28th September and 29th August, and emphasising the “Czechoslovakia’s Day of Liberation by Soviet troops” created common customs and cultures for both nations resulting in a Czechoslovak culture containing two subcultures which were mutually interconnected creating a European country in times of peaceful internal stability appear strong and united[33].
Most agree that Slovaks never had the power to run their own internal affairs at any time in their history stretching back four centuries,[34] but Steiner argues that under Husák, Slovakia was finally regarded as a separate part of the national unit and administrative region.[35] From the time of normalization, Husák, a Slovak, was head of the KSČ and also president of Czechoslovakia; it appeared to many that the Slovaks were actually the ones “running the show”.[36] Besides Husák, the government included many other Slovaks in important positions[37], although they were in the minority according to the proportional division of government, which allowed 1500 Slovaks to 4500 Czechs in new federal institutions.[38] These views created the opinion among Czechs that they were ruled by the minority, antagonising Czech-Slovak relations. Nevertheless, the KSČ had the power to deny decisions of both national governments when it felt it was necessary to run the federation.[39] Slovak Husák himself could not be considered to have worked for Slovakian prosperity; although his 1969 motto was “Slovakia for Slovakians” emphasising the Slovak nationality,[40] the opposite became true. He did not give Slovaks their promised constitution or national arms and in public he only spoke Czech, leading to the Slovakian complaint that he was a “Prague Slovak”.[41]
Thirdly, both nations in the common federation felt that the economical measures of the legislation are unfair. High transfer of resources from Czech lands to Slovakia, which was the reason for dissatisfaction of Czechs, was caused by the big gap between living conditions in both republics, which had to be eliminated.[42] Nevertheless, it is important to consider that it is difficult to follow the financial flows in Czechoslovakia in that era because of common federative budget, so it is hard to arbitrate between ‘exploiting’ of Slovak economy and ‘suffering’ of Czech one. It is important to consider that Czechoslovak economy was working as uniform economy of one state, and it is necessary and natural even today that the ‘richer’ parts of one country have to supply ‘poorer’ ones, such as also ‘poorer’ parts of the country have to pay taxes even though the infrastructure of the ‘richer’ part could profit from these taxes more.[43] So the whole economic conflict was just artificially made up as the result of the high tension between two nations living in the same state.
(Analysis- 638 words)
Conclusion
The hard-line communist regime in Czechoslovakia occurred during so-called normalization of Czechoslovakia after Gustav Husák became the first secretary of the KSČ in 1969. The legislative measures and restrictions of this regime caused disagreements about some national, political and economical questions between Czechs and Slovaks in the common state. Both nations were felt to be denied for their national spirit, felt to be aggrieved because of the division of powers and felt to suffer because of the economical measures in the communist Czechoslovakia. These were also some of the causes that led to the final division of these two ‘brotherly’ nations after Husák left the position of head of the state and after the fall of communism in November 1989, when the separation was possible, since Czechoslovakia was not anymore occupied by the soviet troops[44] and under influence of the USSR. However, legislation in this communist regime did not have only negative influence on the relationships between Czechs and Slovaks and living conditions in Czechoslovakia, since the big part of the nation was finally against the separation of this federation.[45]
(Conclusion- 180 words)
List of sources
Bibliography
• Brager, L. B.: The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe. Philadelphia 2004
• Cottrell, C. R.: The Czech Republic- Arbitrary Borders. Philadelphia 2005
• Hochman, J.: Nádej zomiera posledná Bratislava 1993
• Hradecka, V. - Koudelka, F.: Kádrova politika a nomenklatúra KSČ. Prague 1998
• Hubl, M.: Cesty k moci. Prague 1990
• Kirschbaum, S. J.: A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York 1995
• Kishlansky M. – Geary P. - O’Brien P.: Societies and Cultures in World History. New York 1995
• Leff, Skalnik, C.: National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton 1988
• Lettrich, J.: History of Modern Slovakia New York 1955
• Millar R. J.: Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR Cambridge 1988
• Millar, R. J. – Wolchik, L. S.: The Social Legacy of Communism Washington 1997
• Naďovič, S.: Foertsch H. - Karacsony, I. - Ostrowski, Z.: The Great Withdrawal. Bratislava 2005
• Nejedlý, Z.: Komunisté- dedici velkých tradic českého národa. 4. ed. Prague 1951
• Nogueres, H.: Munich, Peace for Our Time. New York 1965
• Plevza, V.: Historie československé současnosti. Prague 1978
• Roberts J. M.: The Penguin History of the World London 1997
• Rychlík, J.: Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy. Bratislava 2002
• Šaling, S. – Šalingová Ivanová, M. – Manikova, Z.: Slovník cudzích slov. Bratislava 2002
• Steiner, E.: The Slovak Dilemma. London 1973
• Tkáč, M.: Národ bez peňazí. Bratislava 1992
• Tomašek, D.: Pozor, Cenzurováno. Prague 1994
• Wessel, S. M.: Loyalitaten in Tsechoslowakischen Republic 1918-1938. Munich 2004
• Žatkuliak, J.: Normalizácia česko-slovenskej federácie roku 1970 a jej následky. Banská Bystrica 1997
Newspapers
• Journal Alternativa: “Interview with Jan Čarnogurský” 2/1989
• The New York Times: "Prague Turns on Those Who Brought the 'Spring'", Tagliabue, John 24 Feb. 1992
• Journal Pravda: “The structure of the federative government” 27. Feb. 1969
Internet
• Danielle Seiler: Czechoslovakia: A state of perceived bias. 28 April 1998, (Date accessed: November 2007)
• Policy research department of the World Bank: Cash social transfers, direct taxes, and income distribution in late socialism. September 1993, (Date accessed: November 2007)
• The sociological institute SAV Bratislava: Československá Česká a Slovenská európska identita. April 2002, (Date accessed: November 2007)
• Open society archives: Eastern Europe’s Communist Leaders. 1 September 1966, (Date accessed: November 2007)
Interviews
• Dubček P., interview held during personal meeting, 14th July 2007, Bratislava, Slovakia
• Pollák P., interview held during meeting in his apartment, 2nd August, Bratislava, Slovakia
Appendixes
Appendix A1
Abbreviations used in the assessment
• FZ- (Federálne Zhromaždenie) Federal Congress
• CNR- (Česká Národní Rada) Czech National Council
• KSČ- (Komunistická Strana Československa) Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• KSS- (Komunistická Strana Slovenska) Communist Party of Slovakia
• ÚV KSČ- (Ústredný Výbor Komunistickej Strany Československa) Central Committee of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• SNR- (Slovenská Národná Rada) Slovak National Council
• NF- (Národná Fronta) National Front
[1] Lettrich (p. 289)
[2] Masaryk propagated that Slovaks are actually the same nation as Czechs. He wanted to include Slovaks, a ‘tribe’, under the Czech culture. Kirschbaum (p. 149)
[3] Skalnik Leff (p. 136)
[4] Nogueres (p. 249-251)
[5] The communist coup in the last non-communist country in Eastern Europe destroyed all beliefs for Czechoslovakia’s independence. Roberts (p. 939)
[6] Hochman (p. 212) called it a step back to totalitarian Czechoslovakia after promising democratisation by Dubček in 1968 during Prague Spring. The resulting Soviet invasion was already the second betrayal by allies (the first one was Munich 1938) resulted in the most cynic joke in Czechoslovakia: “Every Czech knows what is the luckiest country in the world: Israel, because it is surrounded only by enemies” Brager (p. 99)
[7] “Real socialism” supposed to eliminate the ‘mistakes’ made during the Prague Spring. It was used as the reason to made KSČ centralised and autocratic. Rychlík (p. 15)
[8] According to Nejdlý (p. 71) Marxism proclaimed that “proletariat does not have homeland”, however the communism after 1945 which came to Eastern Europe and Asia was contrary, since it was based on ideas of patriotism, independence and national unity.
[9] Wessel (p. 23) states that Czechoslovakism was a political ideology from the first Czechoslovak republic (1918-1938), which stated that Czechs and Slovaks are one Czechoslovak nation including two ‘tribes’. Cottrell (p. 56) continues that the constitution of 1920 deemed “Czechoslovak” as the official language of the new republic, and designed Slovaks as “state people”, not members of a national minority.
[10] Dubček P., interview, 2nd August 2007
[11] According to secret directive of the Ministry of culture from 31 May 1972, all books that could called as ‘harmful’ or ‘revisionist’ were forbidden for public- Rychlík (p. 20)
[12] According to Tomašek (p. 154-155) this supposed to guarantee that no public discussions, which could disrupt the Czech-Slovak relations, will be held.
[13] Real meaning of Czechoslovak world federácia (federation) meant- “political connection of two or more states with equality before one constitution and where each state has the control of its internal affairs”, however this wasn’t the case. Šaling- Ivanová Šalingová- Maníková (p. 191)
[14] Czechs had ČNR- Česká Národní Rada, while Slovaks had SNR- Slovenská Národná Rada
[15] Therefore the real meaning of “federation” had been lost. Real Czechoslovak federation would have two non-subordinate political bodies like it was in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Rychlík (p. 26)
[16] Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Industry Development and Ministry of Internal Affairs were indeed subordinated to KSČ
[17] This gave Husák power to appoint ‘his people’ for the important positions in the state institutions. Hradecká (p. 97) An analogy could be the way how Stalin came to absolute power in the Soviet Union, which was also through these powers and connections.
[18] Rychlík (p.29) provides the example: Jozef Lenárt was announced to be the new secretary of KSS even before the actual elections. Indeed, as Pollák related to me, the political results of all elections were a foregone conclusion as the communist party always obtained more than 99% of the votes (interview, 2nd August 2007).
[19] “With federation we received formal coequality in the state, but still cannot solve our internal affairs by ourselves, because communism does not allow it. This overshadows all the assets of federation. By assets I mean national affairs, the nation should solve by itself, such as mainly education, culture, or partially economy.” Journal Alternativa, 2/1989, p. 41
[20] Koštúch- after KSČ declined the idea of two independent economies in the federation. Hubl (p.42-43)
[21] Direct and payroll taxes of some socialist countries in 1980s can be seen in Table 2- Appendix A2
[22] Tkáč (126) discusses that while central government was locating not profitable primary industry businesses to Slovakia, the secondary and tertiary industry of the federation was located mainly in Czech lands, so naturally Czech lands profited more money from the material that Slovakia produced.
[23] All would later become Czech politicians while arguing about the perceived exploitation of the Czech economy by Slovakia and thus justifying Czech independence. Pavol Pollák, interview 2nd August 2007
[24] The transfer of resources from the Czech lands to Slovak region can be seen in Table 2 in Appendix A2
[25] In author’s own words, the period of the federation during normalization with the final years of disintegration in 1989-1992 are the most important things to analyse to understand the Czech- Slovak relationships- Rychlík (p. 9)
[26] In particular Petr Pithard, Ján Čarnorurský, Václav Žák, Martin Porubjak, Mikuláš Huba, Anton Hrnko, Jacek Balouch, Gyorgy Varga and others
[27] Therefore Rychlík could not use the national archives for the research of 1980s and 90s. This made him use mainly private archives and the archives of non-governmental organisations. Jan Rychlík (p. 9)
[28] Pollák also was previously a member of Interhelpo, which included more than a thousand idealistic Czechoslovak Communists who formed an industrial cooperation with the Soviet Union which remained in existence until 1943- http://www.osa.ceu.hu/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/17-3-143.shtml
[29] Except the period of WWII when Czech lands were occupied by the Nazi Germany, both nations were in one country since 1526 when Ferdinand I included Czech lands into Habsburg monarchy
[30] However, Žatkuliak (p.251) states that the ideas of communism and a federation are contradictory. While communism is based on so-called democratic centralism with subordination lower party sections to higher ones like in army, federation requires division of powers.
[31] Normalisation historian Plevza (p. 36-42) states that the important moment, the creation of Czechoslovakia, was destroyed because of bureaucratic politicians (Masaryk, Beneš) who made Czechoslovakia easily destroyable by Germany. The communist putsch in 1948 opened the doors for the right solution for Czech-Slovak relations, however it still had some small ‘mistakes’ (Dubček). After 1968, KSČ finally realised the right Marxist-Leninists policies in national questions.
[32] The good example for importance of language could be seen here in China, where all the movies have Mandarin subtitles, so all the ethnical minorities speaking different dialects can understand them.
[33] Same nation cultures and same everyday problems in both republics created apparently one solid nation. However, big social and political changes in 1980s and 90s actually showed that the common national awareness was actually weak. Rychlík (p. 25)
[34] Kishlansky- Geary- O’Brien (p. 981) stated that Slovaks were never accepted as a national unit running own internal affairs. During Habsburg’s monarchy, word “Slovaks” were not even used, then during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1948) there was only Czechoslovak nation, not Slovak one, and even during the short period during the World War II, when Slovakia declared independence, Tiso made agreement with Hitler according to which Slovakia was like a protectorate of Nazi Germany.
[35] Slovaks were recognised as a different nation and national unit and had their own government (SNR) according to Steiner (p. 41)
[36] Leff (p. 251). An analogy today could be Scot-educated Tony Blair and Scot Gordon Brown running #s 10 and 11 Downing St while the Midlothian question allows for Scotland to have a say in English issues.
[37] Slovaks- Minister of Foreign Affairs was Chnoupek, his deputy Nálepka, Minister of National Security Dzúr, Minister of Foreign Trades Barčák and the Ministries of Industry Stancel and Bahýl.- Rychlík (p.31)
[38] However, it was problematic to maintain this ratio since three out of seven ministries in the federation crated in 1969 maintained already from 1960s, where Czechs were in clear superiority. Pravda, 27. 2. 1969
[39] However even Slovak politician Karol Laco defends this veto power of the KSČ, so the common politics of Czechoslovakia were able to be achieved Rychlík (p. 27)
[40] Ibid (p. 33)
[41] However Pollák stated that Husák could not afford strengthening of Slovak patriotism, because it would result in destabilisation of internal affairs and bad image in the view of Moscow. For Husák it was much more profitable to be the head of whole Czechoslovakia, than to be just a head of ‘poor’ Slovakia.
[42] E.g. the income per capita gap in 1948 was 40% between Czech Lands and Slovakia, however thanks to the transfer of resources, in 1970s this gap was reduces to half- http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-42098-14735/unrestricted/etd.pdf. According to Millar and Wolchik, in book The social legacy of communism (p. 219), under Husák Czechoslovakia was socially and economically one of the best socialist countries. See Appendix A2 Table 3. However, Millar in his other book, Politics, work, and daily life in the USSR (p. 172), argues that the social position of Czechoslovak citizens was one of the worst from all the Eastern European countries in 1980s, since Czechoslovakia was the most egalitarian from all the countries.
[43] Rychlík (p. 43) argues that these financial supplies are negligible in one-nation country, however because of high tension between Czechs and Slovaks, politicians often used the economic reasons to accuse the other side.
[44] The last soviet soldier in Czechoslovakia, Colonel General Eduard Vorobiov left Czechoslovakia in Jun 21 1991. Naďovič- Foertsch- Karacsony- Ostrowski (p. 88)
[45] In 1993, only one year after Czechoslovakia was separated, more than 40 % of the nation assessed the separation of these two nations as negative. see Appendix A3 (Figure 1 and Figure 2)
Summary of evidence…………………..…...…………………...........….page 4
Evaluation of sources…………….……..…………….……………....…page 9
Analysis…………………………….……….….…………………....…page 11
Conclusion……………………..…...……………………..………...…page 16
List of sources……………..………..………………..……………..….page 18
Appendix A1…………………………………………………………..page 21
Appendix A2…………………………….…………………………….page 22
Appendix A3…………………………….…………………………….page 24
Investigation plan
To what extent did the legislative structure of Czechoslovakia under the Husák regime contribute to the breakup of Czechs and Slovaks?
This research examines the relationships between the two main ethnical groups living in the federative Czechoslovakia before it broke up. The Czech-Slovak relations were influenced by many factors before the final split. However this research is focused to examine only the influence of the legislative structure of the Husák’s centralised federalism in communistic Czechoslovakia.
Czech historian Rychlík’s Rozpad Československa was used as the primary source, providing a deep overview of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Pollák, chronicler of the former Slovak president as well as Pavol Dubček, son of Alexander Dubček, were interviewed. Secondary sources, the majority of which are Czech and Slovakian, will be used to provide insight from books, newspapers and various statistics to analyse the relationships between the two nations in Czechoslovakia under Husák’s rule.
(Investigation Plan- 148 words)
Summary of evidence
Czechoslovakia at its establishment after the Pittsburgh Agreement was an artificial state contradicting the idea of self-determination as it included many nations, including the majority Czechs and Slovaks. [1] First president T. G. Masaryk denied self-determination for Slovaks stating “The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language”[2]. Leff called the policies of Czech politicians the assimilation of Slovaks under a common umbrella of Czechoslovakism.[3] Goebbels in the dying days of the Third Reich had prophesised that Czechoslovakia would become “the organising centre of Bolshevik plots against Europe.”[4] Indeed, Czechoslovakia finally fell under the direct rule of Moscow after the February 1948 coup.[5] During the time of so-called normalization post-1969[6], Head of State Husák declared his intention to return to the idea of “real socialism”.[7] Although communists proclaimed themselves the biggest nationalists,[8] the legislative structure of federation during this time exacerbated national problems between Czechs and Slovaks. The conflicts, which had their origins during Husák’s regime, culminated in final the separation of these nations in 1992, were:
1. Social
Because Marxist-Leninism could not justify the connection of Czechs and Slovaks in one nation because it emphasised national traditions over communist ideology, legislative restrictions were partially based on emphasizing common ideas of Czechoslovakism,[9] while ideas of self-determination were forbidden. [10] For Czechs this negated the ideas of Masaryk and Beneš since they asserted Slovaks were a part of Czech culture, while Slovaks were denied studying Hlinka and Tiso, supporters of independence.[11] This censorship was ensured by having teachers and professors appointed after strict verification by the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) and by state directives which allowed work from ‘forbidden’ authors to be read only after special authorisation, which was practically impossible to get.[12] This ultimately caused both sides to feel denied of their national history and to subsequently blame each other.
2. Political
Furthermore, the ‘federative’ system in Czechoslovakia, modelled on the USSR, caused Czechs and Slovaks to have unequal powers which limited the real meaning of federation.[13] Although both Czechs and Slovaks had their own governments[14], from 1970 the decisions of these governments could be vetoed by the federative government under restrictions of the KSČ led from Prague.[15] De facto, other institutions were directly subordinate to Prague’s KSČ, such as the Slovak Communist Party (KSS), various ministries[16], Slovak National Council (SNR), National Front (NF), army, security institutions, or courts.[17] Members and plenums of these institutions were fully organised by the KSČ. Even the results of ‘elections’ of Slovakia’s federative government and KSS were decided in Prague before actual elections, because the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ) was arranging all three governments in Czechoslovakia.[18] Čarnogurský argues Slovaks were not a real part of this federation having lost control over Slovakia and its internal affairs.[19]
3. Economic
Finally, economic measures under Husák were unequal. Slovak economist Slavo Koštúch stated as early as 1971: “You are saying that we are brothers, but our wallets are not sisters.”[20] Slovakian economists agreed that the country’s budget, depending on Slovakian money through the highest taxes of all socialist countries[21], were charged from Slovakian industries with only a miniscule amount returning to Slovakia; the rest being spent on Czech infrastructure and rebuilding the capital city.[22] This strengthened the view that Slovakia was economically exploited by Czechs and Moravians. Czech economists such as Komárek, Zeman and Klaus [23] retorted that the economy in fact suffered because Czech was providing enormous amounts of money to Slovakia rather than rebuilding the ‘homeland’.[24] This caused both sides to feel that the federation was inefficient and exploitative.
(Summary of evidence- 597 words)
Evaluation of sources
Czech historian Jan Rychlík’s, Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy was published in Slovakia in 2002 with the stated purpose of analysing the causes for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.[25] Rychlík took full advantage of the opening of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian archives and the first-hand experiences of Czechoslovak politicians[26] who provided him interviews, to support his argument. However the archives were not fully profitable for research given that Slovakia does not allow documents within the last 30 years to be made public and not all documents in the Czech Republic were available in the public archive. [27] His analysis of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks is helped by the fact that he studied and worked in both countries. During Husák’s regime, he experienced the impact of communism on Czechoslovakia first-hand. Given that his main focus of the book is analysing of the last three years of federation (1989-1992), he tends to gloss over important events of the 1970s and 1980s which later influenced events.
Pavol Pollák, a Slovakian politician in communist-era Czechoslovakia, was Alexander Dubček’s collaborator from the start of the latter’s political career until his ‘disappearance’. His specialty was mainly within the Soviet-Czechoslovak communication sphere.[28] After disintegration he worked as a chronicler for Slovakian president Kováč. The purpose of the interview was to gauge the view of a politician in the position of providing a unique and personal analysis of the impact of communist legislation on Czech-Slovak relations, particularly given his role over such a long period of time. As a chronicler in the presidential agency, he had access to the national and communist archives, which were opened after 1992. While acknowledging his support of a common Czechoslovak federation, he admits disagreeing with Husák’s centralised model of federation which at times colours his opinions of a number of the sources. A number of topics, including comparison of Husák’s and Dubček’s government, were not fully open to discussion given his continued loyalty to the latter.
(Evaluation of sources- 323 word)
Analysis
The Husák era was most important in the history of the Czechoslovak nations because it marked the start of normalisation up to abolition of communism in the USSR, leading to the division of for the first time in 460 years.[29] Far from strengthening and ‘normalising’ Czechoslovakia, the hard-line rule of Gustav Husák created even more internal conflicts, leading to final disintegration in 1992.
The structure of the state should be studied when considering its legislation. Although Czechoslovakia was a federation, it was still a communist state based on the centralistic model of the USSR federation with the centre in Prague.[30] Nevertheless, Husák’s state did not seek to assimilate Slovaks under the common culture of Czechoslovakism as happened in the Soviet model with non-Russian nationalities, but sought good relations under the motto qietum non movere while propagating socialism as the best solution for solving the Czech-Slovak ‘question’.[31]
Although both nations in Czechoslovakia felt their national historical identities threatened during the communist era, Czech and Slovak cultures were strengthened in many ways. The similar languages helped Czechoslovaks to be naturally bilingual since the mass-media provided information in both languages, such as national television CSTV.[32] Abolition of national festivals such as 28th September and 29th August, and emphasising the “Czechoslovakia’s Day of Liberation by Soviet troops” created common customs and cultures for both nations resulting in a Czechoslovak culture containing two subcultures which were mutually interconnected creating a European country in times of peaceful internal stability appear strong and united[33].
Most agree that Slovaks never had the power to run their own internal affairs at any time in their history stretching back four centuries,[34] but Steiner argues that under Husák, Slovakia was finally regarded as a separate part of the national unit and administrative region.[35] From the time of normalization, Husák, a Slovak, was head of the KSČ and also president of Czechoslovakia; it appeared to many that the Slovaks were actually the ones “running the show”.[36] Besides Husák, the government included many other Slovaks in important positions[37], although they were in the minority according to the proportional division of government, which allowed 1500 Slovaks to 4500 Czechs in new federal institutions.[38] These views created the opinion among Czechs that they were ruled by the minority, antagonising Czech-Slovak relations. Nevertheless, the KSČ had the power to deny decisions of both national governments when it felt it was necessary to run the federation.[39] Slovak Husák himself could not be considered to have worked for Slovakian prosperity; although his 1969 motto was “Slovakia for Slovakians” emphasising the Slovak nationality,[40] the opposite became true. He did not give Slovaks their promised constitution or national arms and in public he only spoke Czech, leading to the Slovakian complaint that he was a “Prague Slovak”.[41]
Thirdly, both nations in the common federation felt that the economical measures of the legislation are unfair. High transfer of resources from Czech lands to Slovakia, which was the reason for dissatisfaction of Czechs, was caused by the big gap between living conditions in both republics, which had to be eliminated.[42] Nevertheless, it is important to consider that it is difficult to follow the financial flows in Czechoslovakia in that era because of common federative budget, so it is hard to arbitrate between ‘exploiting’ of Slovak economy and ‘suffering’ of Czech one. It is important to consider that Czechoslovak economy was working as uniform economy of one state, and it is necessary and natural even today that the ‘richer’ parts of one country have to supply ‘poorer’ ones, such as also ‘poorer’ parts of the country have to pay taxes even though the infrastructure of the ‘richer’ part could profit from these taxes more.[43] So the whole economic conflict was just artificially made up as the result of the high tension between two nations living in the same state.
(Analysis- 638 words)
Conclusion
The hard-line communist regime in Czechoslovakia occurred during so-called normalization of Czechoslovakia after Gustav Husák became the first secretary of the KSČ in 1969. The legislative measures and restrictions of this regime caused disagreements about some national, political and economical questions between Czechs and Slovaks in the common state. Both nations were felt to be denied for their national spirit, felt to be aggrieved because of the division of powers and felt to suffer because of the economical measures in the communist Czechoslovakia. These were also some of the causes that led to the final division of these two ‘brotherly’ nations after Husák left the position of head of the state and after the fall of communism in November 1989, when the separation was possible, since Czechoslovakia was not anymore occupied by the soviet troops[44] and under influence of the USSR. However, legislation in this communist regime did not have only negative influence on the relationships between Czechs and Slovaks and living conditions in Czechoslovakia, since the big part of the nation was finally against the separation of this federation.[45]
(Conclusion- 180 words)
List of sources
Bibliography
• Brager, L. B.: The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe. Philadelphia 2004
• Cottrell, C. R.: The Czech Republic- Arbitrary Borders. Philadelphia 2005
• Hochman, J.: Nádej zomiera posledná Bratislava 1993
• Hradecka, V. - Koudelka, F.: Kádrova politika a nomenklatúra KSČ. Prague 1998
• Hubl, M.: Cesty k moci. Prague 1990
• Kirschbaum, S. J.: A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York 1995
• Kishlansky M. – Geary P. - O’Brien P.: Societies and Cultures in World History. New York 1995
• Leff, Skalnik, C.: National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton 1988
• Lettrich, J.: History of Modern Slovakia New York 1955
• Millar R. J.: Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR Cambridge 1988
• Millar, R. J. – Wolchik, L. S.: The Social Legacy of Communism Washington 1997
• Naďovič, S.: Foertsch H. - Karacsony, I. - Ostrowski, Z.: The Great Withdrawal. Bratislava 2005
• Nejedlý, Z.: Komunisté- dedici velkých tradic českého národa. 4. ed. Prague 1951
• Nogueres, H.: Munich, Peace for Our Time. New York 1965
• Plevza, V.: Historie československé současnosti. Prague 1978
• Roberts J. M.: The Penguin History of the World London 1997
• Rychlík, J.: Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy. Bratislava 2002
• Šaling, S. – Šalingová Ivanová, M. – Manikova, Z.: Slovník cudzích slov. Bratislava 2002
• Steiner, E.: The Slovak Dilemma. London 1973
• Tkáč, M.: Národ bez peňazí. Bratislava 1992
• Tomašek, D.: Pozor, Cenzurováno. Prague 1994
• Wessel, S. M.: Loyalitaten in Tsechoslowakischen Republic 1918-1938. Munich 2004
• Žatkuliak, J.: Normalizácia česko-slovenskej federácie roku 1970 a jej následky. Banská Bystrica 1997
Newspapers
• Journal Alternativa: “Interview with Jan Čarnogurský” 2/1989
• The New York Times: "Prague Turns on Those Who Brought the 'Spring'", Tagliabue, John 24 Feb. 1992
• Journal Pravda: “The structure of the federative government” 27. Feb. 1969
Internet
• Danielle Seiler: Czechoslovakia: A state of perceived bias. 28 April 1998,
• Policy research department of the World Bank: Cash social transfers, direct taxes, and income distribution in late socialism. September 1993,
• The sociological institute SAV Bratislava: Československá Česká a Slovenská európska identita. April 2002,
• Open society archives: Eastern Europe’s Communist Leaders. 1 September 1966,
Interviews
• Dubček P., interview held during personal meeting, 14th July 2007, Bratislava, Slovakia
• Pollák P., interview held during meeting in his apartment, 2nd August, Bratislava, Slovakia
Appendixes
Appendix A1
Abbreviations used in the assessment
• FZ- (Federálne Zhromaždenie) Federal Congress
• CNR- (Česká Národní Rada) Czech National Council
• KSČ- (Komunistická Strana Československa) Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• KSS- (Komunistická Strana Slovenska) Communist Party of Slovakia
• ÚV KSČ- (Ústredný Výbor Komunistickej Strany Československa) Central Committee of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• SNR- (Slovenská Národná Rada) Slovak National Council
• NF- (Národná Fronta) National Front
[1] Lettrich (p. 289)
[2] Masaryk propagated that Slovaks are actually the same nation as Czechs. He wanted to include Slovaks, a ‘tribe’, under the Czech culture. Kirschbaum (p. 149)
[3] Skalnik Leff (p. 136)
[4] Nogueres (p. 249-251)
[5] The communist coup in the last non-communist country in Eastern Europe destroyed all beliefs for Czechoslovakia’s independence. Roberts (p. 939)
[6] Hochman (p. 212) called it a step back to totalitarian Czechoslovakia after promising democratisation by Dubček in 1968 during Prague Spring. The resulting Soviet invasion was already the second betrayal by allies (the first one was Munich 1938) resulted in the most cynic joke in Czechoslovakia: “Every Czech knows what is the luckiest country in the world: Israel, because it is surrounded only by enemies” Brager (p. 99)
[7] “Real socialism” supposed to eliminate the ‘mistakes’ made during the Prague Spring. It was used as the reason to made KSČ centralised and autocratic. Rychlík (p. 15)
[8] According to Nejdlý (p. 71) Marxism proclaimed that “proletariat does not have homeland”, however the communism after 1945 which came to Eastern Europe and Asia was contrary, since it was based on ideas of patriotism, independence and national unity.
[9] Wessel (p. 23) states that Czechoslovakism was a political ideology from the first Czechoslovak republic (1918-1938), which stated that Czechs and Slovaks are one Czechoslovak nation including two ‘tribes’. Cottrell (p. 56) continues that the constitution of 1920 deemed “Czechoslovak” as the official language of the new republic, and designed Slovaks as “state people”, not members of a national minority.
[10] Dubček P., interview, 2nd August 2007
[11] According to secret directive of the Ministry of culture from 31 May 1972, all books that could called as ‘harmful’ or ‘revisionist’ were forbidden for public- Rychlík (p. 20)
[12] According to Tomašek (p. 154-155) this supposed to guarantee that no public discussions, which could disrupt the Czech-Slovak relations, will be held.
[13] Real meaning of Czechoslovak world federácia (federation) meant- “political connection of two or more states with equality before one constitution and where each state has the control of its internal affairs”, however this wasn’t the case. Šaling- Ivanová Šalingová- Maníková (p. 191)
[14] Czechs had ČNR- Česká Národní Rada, while Slovaks had SNR- Slovenská Národná Rada
[15] Therefore the real meaning of “federation” had been lost. Real Czechoslovak federation would have two non-subordinate political bodies like it was in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Rychlík (p. 26)
[16] Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Industry Development and Ministry of Internal Affairs were indeed subordinated to KSČ
[17] This gave Husák power to appoint ‘his people’ for the important positions in the state institutions. Hradecká (p. 97) An analogy could be the way how Stalin came to absolute power in the Soviet Union, which was also through these powers and connections.
[18] Rychlík (p.29) provides the example: Jozef Lenárt was announced to be the new secretary of KSS even before the actual elections. Indeed, as Pollák related to me, the political results of all elections were a foregone conclusion as the communist party always obtained more than 99% of the votes (interview, 2nd August 2007).
[19] “With federation we received formal coequality in the state, but still cannot solve our internal affairs by ourselves, because communism does not allow it. This overshadows all the assets of federation. By assets I mean national affairs, the nation should solve by itself, such as mainly education, culture, or partially economy.” Journal Alternativa, 2/1989, p. 41
[20] Koštúch- after KSČ declined the idea of two independent economies in the federation. Hubl (p.42-43)
[21] Direct and payroll taxes of some socialist countries in 1980s can be seen in Table 2- Appendix A2
[22] Tkáč (126) discusses that while central government was locating not profitable primary industry businesses to Slovakia, the secondary and tertiary industry of the federation was located mainly in Czech lands, so naturally Czech lands profited more money from the material that Slovakia produced.
[23] All would later become Czech politicians while arguing about the perceived exploitation of the Czech economy by Slovakia and thus justifying Czech independence. Pavol Pollák, interview 2nd August 2007
[24] The transfer of resources from the Czech lands to Slovak region can be seen in Table 2 in Appendix A2
[25] In author’s own words, the period of the federation during normalization with the final years of disintegration in 1989-1992 are the most important things to analyse to understand the Czech- Slovak relationships- Rychlík (p. 9)
[26] In particular Petr Pithard, Ján Čarnorurský, Václav Žák, Martin Porubjak, Mikuláš Huba, Anton Hrnko, Jacek Balouch, Gyorgy Varga and others
[27] Therefore Rychlík could not use the national archives for the research of 1980s and 90s. This made him use mainly private archives and the archives of non-governmental organisations. Jan Rychlík (p. 9)
[28] Pollák also was previously a member of Interhelpo, which included more than a thousand idealistic Czechoslovak Communists who formed an industrial cooperation with the Soviet Union which remained in existence until 1943- http://www.osa.ceu.hu/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/17-3-143.shtml
[29] Except the period of WWII when Czech lands were occupied by the Nazi Germany, both nations were in one country since 1526 when Ferdinand I included Czech lands into Habsburg monarchy
[30] However, Žatkuliak (p.251) states that the ideas of communism and a federation are contradictory. While communism is based on so-called democratic centralism with subordination lower party sections to higher ones like in army, federation requires division of powers.
[31] Normalisation historian Plevza (p. 36-42) states that the important moment, the creation of Czechoslovakia, was destroyed because of bureaucratic politicians (Masaryk, Beneš) who made Czechoslovakia easily destroyable by Germany. The communist putsch in 1948 opened the doors for the right solution for Czech-Slovak relations, however it still had some small ‘mistakes’ (Dubček). After 1968, KSČ finally realised the right Marxist-Leninists policies in national questions.
[32] The good example for importance of language could be seen here in China, where all the movies have Mandarin subtitles, so all the ethnical minorities speaking different dialects can understand them.
[33] Same nation cultures and same everyday problems in both republics created apparently one solid nation. However, big social and political changes in 1980s and 90s actually showed that the common national awareness was actually weak. Rychlík (p. 25)
[34] Kishlansky- Geary- O’Brien (p. 981) stated that Slovaks were never accepted as a national unit running own internal affairs. During Habsburg’s monarchy, word “Slovaks” were not even used, then during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1948) there was only Czechoslovak nation, not Slovak one, and even during the short period during the World War II, when Slovakia declared independence, Tiso made agreement with Hitler according to which Slovakia was like a protectorate of Nazi Germany.
[35] Slovaks were recognised as a different nation and national unit and had their own government (SNR) according to Steiner (p. 41)
[36] Leff (p. 251). An analogy today could be Scot-educated Tony Blair and Scot Gordon Brown running #s 10 and 11 Downing St while the Midlothian question allows for Scotland to have a say in English issues.
[37] Slovaks- Minister of Foreign Affairs was Chnoupek, his deputy Nálepka, Minister of National Security Dzúr, Minister of Foreign Trades Barčák and the Ministries of Industry Stancel and Bahýl.- Rychlík (p.31)
[38] However, it was problematic to maintain this ratio since three out of seven ministries in the federation crated in 1969 maintained already from 1960s, where Czechs were in clear superiority. Pravda, 27. 2. 1969
[39] However even Slovak politician Karol Laco defends this veto power of the KSČ, so the common politics of Czechoslovakia were able to be achieved Rychlík (p. 27)
[40] Ibid (p. 33)
[41] However Pollák stated that Husák could not afford strengthening of Slovak patriotism, because it would result in destabilisation of internal affairs and bad image in the view of Moscow. For Husák it was much more profitable to be the head of whole Czechoslovakia, than to be just a head of ‘poor’ Slovakia.
[42] E.g. the income per capita gap in 1948 was 40% between Czech Lands and Slovakia, however thanks to the transfer of resources, in 1970s this gap was reduces to half- http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-42098-14735/unrestricted/etd.pdf. According to Millar and Wolchik, in book The social legacy of communism (p. 219), under Husák Czechoslovakia was socially and economically one of the best socialist countries. See Appendix A2 Table 3. However, Millar in his other book, Politics, work, and daily life in the USSR (p. 172), argues that the social position of Czechoslovak citizens was one of the worst from all the Eastern European countries in 1980s, since Czechoslovakia was the most egalitarian from all the countries.
[43] Rychlík (p. 43) argues that these financial supplies are negligible in one-nation country, however because of high tension between Czechs and Slovaks, politicians often used the economic reasons to accuse the other side.
[44] The last soviet soldier in Czechoslovakia, Colonel General Eduard Vorobiov left Czechoslovakia in Jun 21 1991. Naďovič- Foertsch- Karacsony- Ostrowski (p. 88)
[45] In 1993, only one year after Czechoslovakia was separated, more than 40 % of the nation assessed the separation of these two nations as negative. see Appendix A3 (Figure 1 and Figure 2)
Was Stalin’s Death a Result of Beria’s Poisoning?
Summary of Evidence
∙Stalin’s Condition Before 1953
Stalin was going through deterioration in his health since his minor strokes before 1953. From 1951 to 1952, however, he refused to take any medication and yet his high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis and rheumatism were all developing.
∙The Final Stroke that Led Stalin to His Death
On the night of February 28th, Stalin watched a film at the Kremlin, and returned to his dacha where he was joined by Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Bulganin, who stayed until and left at 4:00 A.M, Khruschev and Bulganin separately, while Beria and Malenkov together in a car. Then the guards received an order from Stalin through Khrustalev, which was to go off duty. Up to the evening on the next day, there was a complete silence, which led to a suspicion within the guards, who were yet afraid to counter Stalin’s order and go into his suite. Eventually, Pyotr Lozgachev, one of Stalin’s bodyguards, went into his suite at 22:00 and found the crippled Stalin lying on the floor. Next to him was his broken pocket watch showing 6:30 and there was an open bottle of mineral water on the table. The guards were called in by Lozgachev and they helped him move the Boss to the sofa. The guards called Ignatiev, the Minister of State Security, who referred to Malenkov and Beria.
∙The Response of the Politburo Members
Malenkov called Beria, Bulganin and Khrushchev to inform about the guards’ report of Stalin’s physical state. It was thirty minutes after Starostin called when a call came from Malenkov, saying that he could not find Beria. Another thirty minutes later, Beria rang the guards to tell them not to inform anybody about Stalin’s illness.
At 3:00 A.M., Beria came into Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov, glanced at Stalin and swore at the guards, telling them that Stalin was asleep and therefore they should not panic or disturb him. He prohibited any use of the telephone and left the place. Around 8 in the morning Khrushchev came into the dacha, telling the guards that he summoned doctors, who arrived between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M. with artificial ventilation which, unknown for what reason, was not used.
∙The Doctors’ Examination
Stalin’s symptoms were due to brain hemorrhage caused by his hypertension and atherosclerosis but the doctors also concluded that Stalin was poisoned and they tried to treat him for poisoning while at the same time did not expose this fact to other people, including the four Politburo members. Stalin’s condition got worse as the time went by. On March 4th, besides the symptoms involving the skin on his face, legs and arms turning blue and his liver being enlarged, his blood and urine examination results proved that he was poisoned. In the morning of March 5th, Stalin vomited blood which led to a decrease in his blood pressure and several times of collapse on the same day.
∙Stalin’s Death
Stalin eventually died at 9:50 P.M., after going through a severe hardship with breathing.
∙After Stalin’s Death
Beria ran out to the corridor, calling Khrustalev to get his car to go to the Kremlin. After a while, the other Politburo members went to the Kremlin as well, to acquire power. Then the car with stretcher arrived to carry Stalin to the hospital for embalming and Khrustalev went to the hospital as well.
The guards who served Stalin were to be eliminated from their jobs, so Starostin, Orlov and Tukov went to see Beria and resist but Beria’s threat of killing them made them to depart immediately. Other jobs were given to the guards except Khrustalev who fell ill and died soon.
Evaluation of Sources
Source 1
CHUEV: Beria himself was said to have killed him.
MOLOTOV: …‘Sometimes he seemed about to come to. At those moments Beria would stay close to Stalin. Oh! He was always ready...
One cannot exclude the possibility that he had a hand in Stalin's death... he did drop hints…"I did him in!...I saved all of you!" ’
This source could be valuable in supporting the conviction of Beria as Stalin’s assassinate, referring to its origin, which is the interview of Molotov, to whom whom the suspect, Beria, talked to in person. The exact quotation from Beria, together with Molotov’s witnesses of his mysterious behavior which made Molotov believe that “he was always ready” to harm the Boss, elevates the convincing aspect of the argument. The main value of this source could be that the statement was from Molotov, the contemporary Politburo member, not a historian.
However, it should be in consideration that the book was published in 1993, which is far after Stalin’s death, and the source’s origin, to be more precise, is Chuev, who interviewed Molotov. His interview question seems to be a guiding one, as Molotov says “Oh!” indicating his realization right at that time. It arises the possibility of Chuev trying to use Molotov’s words to support his opinion and the publish date which makes this source too modern also undermines the reliability of the source because it was after when the theory of Beria’s planned murder of Stalin had been introduced. Molotov says that Beria dropped “hints” through his words but one cannot absolutely ensure if Beria really meant that he poisoned Stalin tactfully or simply contributed to Stalin’s death with some delay in summoning doctors. He seems to be creating a distorted characterization of Beria with some words that would have been not as intricate or Machiavellian to support his argument.
Source 2
“Arteriosclerosis, which developed during the night of March 1-2 on the basis of hypertonia and cerebral hemorrhage in his left brain hemisphere, has resulted, apart from the right-side paralysis of limbs and loss of consciousness, in impaired stem section of the brain, accompanied by disturbances of the vital functions of breathing and blood circulation.”
Unlike Source 1, this source originates in the contemporary newspaper articles from Pravda and contains medical reports with specific diagnoses of Stalin’s health conditions, not human judgment from a particular political member. The source could be appreciated for containing factual descriptions of Stalin’s health and as it involves nothing about Stalin being poisoned or symptoms related to it, it strongly denies the idea that Stalin was poisoned by Beria before his death.
On the other hand, this is not an official medical report from the doctors but an announcement from the Soviet government. Pravda, as a national paper published by the Soviet government, was famous to the public for being biased and inaccurate. The possibility of the manipulation made in the Politburo members’ favor cannot be excluded. Therefore the source, in spite of medical facts, lacks accuracy and the strong negative impression that Pravda gave to the contemporary society prevents one from judging Stalin’s condition totally based on such report.
Analysis
To figure out if Stalin died because Beria poisoned him, it is important to start considering the possibility firstly by exploring the events around Stalin’s death. After the four Politburo members left Stalin’s dacha at 4, it was Khrustalev, not Stalin himself who talked to the guards about going off duty. Beria, among the four guests, being the closest with Khrustalev suggests that he ordered Khrustalev to let the guards vacate. In addition, the fact that other guards got substitute jobs but Khrustalev, the only guard who was allowed to see Stalin being embalmed, fell ill and died raises a question if this was one of Beria’s efforts to expunge evidence that could prove him guilty.
When Lozgachev went in, he saw a bottle of water next to Stalin. Why was this bottle not sent to the Stalin Museum from the Kremlin sanitary department when it had to send medicaments and empty mineral bottles in November 1953? Was it because it contained the poison that killed Stalin? The very possible scenario in Stalin’s suite on March 1st during the hours between 4 A.M. and 10 P.M. is that Khrustalev put poison in Stalin’s water bottle while all the guards were back at home by Beria’s command.
Beria had been delaying in his response to the guards and when he came to Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov at 3 o’ clock, he swore at the guards and left the place immediately but forbade their use of communication line. According to Khrushchev, Malenkov called him right after the guards called and he thought the visit from all four Politburo members around 8 o’clock was the first visit from all of them but it was the second one made by Beria, which Khrushchev did not know. He was trying to hide Stalin’s condition and his awareness of it from others.
After Stalin’s death, Beria went out immediately to Kremlin, where he assumed authority and this, together with all his suspicious behavior before Stalin’s death, conveys the idea that Beria, with his strong motive of gaining power, took advantage of Stalin’s health to kill him with poison and achieve what he wanted.
On the other hand, there are counter-arguments that defend Beria. As Medvedev argues, for years, Stalin denied taking medication so his death could have been nothing more than a corollary of his long-term diseases. But this argument now seems to be nominal as all the symptoms due to poison written in the official medical records were exposed. The doctors knew Stalin was poisoned and that was why they did not use the artificial ventilation, which was not useful. The absence of such facts in articles from Pravda, controlled by the Soviet government, does not argue against conviction of Beria but supports it by explaining why the reports in Pravda were falsified: Beria killed Stalin and he had enough power to manipulate the facts about Stalin’s symptoms.
Yet blaming Beria with asperity for power, seen after Stalin’s death, is quite unreasonable because he did not try to appoint himself as the President but Vice-President. If Beria is to be blamed for such motive, then why not other people like Vasili Stalin, who despised his father and suffered humiliation after Stalin forfeiting his authority or Khrushchev, who was the successor of Stalin after all?
Shortly, the argument stating Stalin died because Beria poisoned him gets supports from Beria’s suspicious behaviour, his relation with Khrustalev, and the recently-discovered official medical reports. The opposite argument arises from that Stalin’s death was the result of neglected delayed treatment and that there are other possible suspects.
Conclusion
Certainly, there are a variety of supporters of the argument that convicts Beria as the assassin using poison to kill Stalin. On the other hand, their argument is depreciated by the facts that Stalin’s health was already on a rapid wane and that there are other possible suspects including his family members and the Politburo members. However, with recently discovered official medical reports corroborating Stalin being poisoned and Beria’s possession of the closest contact with the guards including Khrustalev, this argument seems to have a sizeable amount of evidentiary support. To conclude, Stalin died because he was poisoned by Beria.
Bibliography
Books
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
Brent, Jonathan. Naumov, Vlamidir. Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993.
Committee on Slavic Studies. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Cambridge: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1953.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. London:Penguin, 1992.
Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality, Duplicity, and Intrigue. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, 1998.
Deriabin, Peter. Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1984.
Eaton, Katherine. Daily Life in the Soviet Union. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.
Radzinsky, Edvard. STALIN: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996.
Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
Medvedev, Zhores. Dahrendorf, Ellen. The Unknown Stalin. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton, 2004.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.
DVD
Who Killed Stalin, DVD. Directed by Tim Robinson. UK: BBC Timewatch, 2005.
Internet
Pravda.Ru, “Secret documents reveal Stalin was poisoned.” Pravda.Ru (December 29, 2005), http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/90/363/16693_Stalin.html.
∙Stalin’s Condition Before 1953
Stalin was going through deterioration in his health since his minor strokes before 1953. From 1951 to 1952, however, he refused to take any medication and yet his high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis and rheumatism were all developing.
∙The Final Stroke that Led Stalin to His Death
On the night of February 28th, Stalin watched a film at the Kremlin, and returned to his dacha where he was joined by Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Bulganin, who stayed until and left at 4:00 A.M, Khruschev and Bulganin separately, while Beria and Malenkov together in a car. Then the guards received an order from Stalin through Khrustalev, which was to go off duty. Up to the evening on the next day, there was a complete silence, which led to a suspicion within the guards, who were yet afraid to counter Stalin’s order and go into his suite. Eventually, Pyotr Lozgachev, one of Stalin’s bodyguards, went into his suite at 22:00 and found the crippled Stalin lying on the floor. Next to him was his broken pocket watch showing 6:30 and there was an open bottle of mineral water on the table. The guards were called in by Lozgachev and they helped him move the Boss to the sofa. The guards called Ignatiev, the Minister of State Security, who referred to Malenkov and Beria.
∙The Response of the Politburo Members
Malenkov called Beria, Bulganin and Khrushchev to inform about the guards’ report of Stalin’s physical state. It was thirty minutes after Starostin called when a call came from Malenkov, saying that he could not find Beria. Another thirty minutes later, Beria rang the guards to tell them not to inform anybody about Stalin’s illness.
At 3:00 A.M., Beria came into Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov, glanced at Stalin and swore at the guards, telling them that Stalin was asleep and therefore they should not panic or disturb him. He prohibited any use of the telephone and left the place. Around 8 in the morning Khrushchev came into the dacha, telling the guards that he summoned doctors, who arrived between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M. with artificial ventilation which, unknown for what reason, was not used.
∙The Doctors’ Examination
Stalin’s symptoms were due to brain hemorrhage caused by his hypertension and atherosclerosis but the doctors also concluded that Stalin was poisoned and they tried to treat him for poisoning while at the same time did not expose this fact to other people, including the four Politburo members. Stalin’s condition got worse as the time went by. On March 4th, besides the symptoms involving the skin on his face, legs and arms turning blue and his liver being enlarged, his blood and urine examination results proved that he was poisoned. In the morning of March 5th, Stalin vomited blood which led to a decrease in his blood pressure and several times of collapse on the same day.
∙Stalin’s Death
Stalin eventually died at 9:50 P.M., after going through a severe hardship with breathing.
∙After Stalin’s Death
Beria ran out to the corridor, calling Khrustalev to get his car to go to the Kremlin. After a while, the other Politburo members went to the Kremlin as well, to acquire power. Then the car with stretcher arrived to carry Stalin to the hospital for embalming and Khrustalev went to the hospital as well.
The guards who served Stalin were to be eliminated from their jobs, so Starostin, Orlov and Tukov went to see Beria and resist but Beria’s threat of killing them made them to depart immediately. Other jobs were given to the guards except Khrustalev who fell ill and died soon.
Evaluation of Sources
Source 1
CHUEV: Beria himself was said to have killed him.
MOLOTOV: …‘Sometimes he seemed about to come to. At those moments Beria would stay close to Stalin. Oh! He was always ready...
One cannot exclude the possibility that he had a hand in Stalin's death... he did drop hints…"I did him in!...I saved all of you!" ’
This source could be valuable in supporting the conviction of Beria as Stalin’s assassinate, referring to its origin, which is the interview of Molotov, to whom whom the suspect, Beria, talked to in person. The exact quotation from Beria, together with Molotov’s witnesses of his mysterious behavior which made Molotov believe that “he was always ready” to harm the Boss, elevates the convincing aspect of the argument. The main value of this source could be that the statement was from Molotov, the contemporary Politburo member, not a historian.
However, it should be in consideration that the book was published in 1993, which is far after Stalin’s death, and the source’s origin, to be more precise, is Chuev, who interviewed Molotov. His interview question seems to be a guiding one, as Molotov says “Oh!” indicating his realization right at that time. It arises the possibility of Chuev trying to use Molotov’s words to support his opinion and the publish date which makes this source too modern also undermines the reliability of the source because it was after when the theory of Beria’s planned murder of Stalin had been introduced. Molotov says that Beria dropped “hints” through his words but one cannot absolutely ensure if Beria really meant that he poisoned Stalin tactfully or simply contributed to Stalin’s death with some delay in summoning doctors. He seems to be creating a distorted characterization of Beria with some words that would have been not as intricate or Machiavellian to support his argument.
Source 2
“Arteriosclerosis, which developed during the night of March 1-2 on the basis of hypertonia and cerebral hemorrhage in his left brain hemisphere, has resulted, apart from the right-side paralysis of limbs and loss of consciousness, in impaired stem section of the brain, accompanied by disturbances of the vital functions of breathing and blood circulation.”
Unlike Source 1, this source originates in the contemporary newspaper articles from Pravda and contains medical reports with specific diagnoses of Stalin’s health conditions, not human judgment from a particular political member. The source could be appreciated for containing factual descriptions of Stalin’s health and as it involves nothing about Stalin being poisoned or symptoms related to it, it strongly denies the idea that Stalin was poisoned by Beria before his death.
On the other hand, this is not an official medical report from the doctors but an announcement from the Soviet government. Pravda, as a national paper published by the Soviet government, was famous to the public for being biased and inaccurate. The possibility of the manipulation made in the Politburo members’ favor cannot be excluded. Therefore the source, in spite of medical facts, lacks accuracy and the strong negative impression that Pravda gave to the contemporary society prevents one from judging Stalin’s condition totally based on such report.
Analysis
To figure out if Stalin died because Beria poisoned him, it is important to start considering the possibility firstly by exploring the events around Stalin’s death. After the four Politburo members left Stalin’s dacha at 4, it was Khrustalev, not Stalin himself who talked to the guards about going off duty. Beria, among the four guests, being the closest with Khrustalev suggests that he ordered Khrustalev to let the guards vacate. In addition, the fact that other guards got substitute jobs but Khrustalev, the only guard who was allowed to see Stalin being embalmed, fell ill and died raises a question if this was one of Beria’s efforts to expunge evidence that could prove him guilty.
When Lozgachev went in, he saw a bottle of water next to Stalin. Why was this bottle not sent to the Stalin Museum from the Kremlin sanitary department when it had to send medicaments and empty mineral bottles in November 1953? Was it because it contained the poison that killed Stalin? The very possible scenario in Stalin’s suite on March 1st during the hours between 4 A.M. and 10 P.M. is that Khrustalev put poison in Stalin’s water bottle while all the guards were back at home by Beria’s command.
Beria had been delaying in his response to the guards and when he came to Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov at 3 o’ clock, he swore at the guards and left the place immediately but forbade their use of communication line. According to Khrushchev, Malenkov called him right after the guards called and he thought the visit from all four Politburo members around 8 o’clock was the first visit from all of them but it was the second one made by Beria, which Khrushchev did not know. He was trying to hide Stalin’s condition and his awareness of it from others.
After Stalin’s death, Beria went out immediately to Kremlin, where he assumed authority and this, together with all his suspicious behavior before Stalin’s death, conveys the idea that Beria, with his strong motive of gaining power, took advantage of Stalin’s health to kill him with poison and achieve what he wanted.
On the other hand, there are counter-arguments that defend Beria. As Medvedev argues, for years, Stalin denied taking medication so his death could have been nothing more than a corollary of his long-term diseases. But this argument now seems to be nominal as all the symptoms due to poison written in the official medical records were exposed. The doctors knew Stalin was poisoned and that was why they did not use the artificial ventilation, which was not useful. The absence of such facts in articles from Pravda, controlled by the Soviet government, does not argue against conviction of Beria but supports it by explaining why the reports in Pravda were falsified: Beria killed Stalin and he had enough power to manipulate the facts about Stalin’s symptoms.
Yet blaming Beria with asperity for power, seen after Stalin’s death, is quite unreasonable because he did not try to appoint himself as the President but Vice-President. If Beria is to be blamed for such motive, then why not other people like Vasili Stalin, who despised his father and suffered humiliation after Stalin forfeiting his authority or Khrushchev, who was the successor of Stalin after all?
Shortly, the argument stating Stalin died because Beria poisoned him gets supports from Beria’s suspicious behaviour, his relation with Khrustalev, and the recently-discovered official medical reports. The opposite argument arises from that Stalin’s death was the result of neglected delayed treatment and that there are other possible suspects.
Conclusion
Certainly, there are a variety of supporters of the argument that convicts Beria as the assassin using poison to kill Stalin. On the other hand, their argument is depreciated by the facts that Stalin’s health was already on a rapid wane and that there are other possible suspects including his family members and the Politburo members. However, with recently discovered official medical reports corroborating Stalin being poisoned and Beria’s possession of the closest contact with the guards including Khrustalev, this argument seems to have a sizeable amount of evidentiary support. To conclude, Stalin died because he was poisoned by Beria.
Bibliography
Books
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
Brent, Jonathan. Naumov, Vlamidir. Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.
Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993.
Committee on Slavic Studies. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Cambridge: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1953.
Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. London:Penguin, 1992.
Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality, Duplicity, and Intrigue. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, 1998.
Deriabin, Peter. Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1984.
Eaton, Katherine. Daily Life in the Soviet Union. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.
Radzinsky, Edvard. STALIN: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996.
Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
Medvedev, Zhores. Dahrendorf, Ellen. The Unknown Stalin. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.
Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton, 2004.
Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.
DVD
Who Killed Stalin, DVD. Directed by Tim Robinson. UK: BBC Timewatch, 2005.
Internet
Pravda.Ru, “Secret documents reveal Stalin was poisoned.” Pravda.Ru (December 29, 2005), http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/90/363/16693_Stalin.html.
To what extent was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 a result of the AVO’S violent regime in Hungary?
This investigation aims to cover the events leading up to and after the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and to see whether or not the AVO (Hungarian Secret Police) were responsible for the swift break out of protesting that occurred among Hungarian workers, students and normal citizens. The main body of the essay describes and gives evidence of the AVO’S actions towards the Hungarian people and why they were such an influential force in pushing the people towards revolution. The essay will also show direct accounts of normal Hungarian people and important national figures that were victims of the AVO (Hungarian Secret Police). A brief history of the AVO will be presented, so as the reader can see for themselves why the Hungarian people revolted and lived in constant fear of the AVO. The two main sources, George Paloczi-Horvath’s account of his arrest by the Hungarian Secret police, published in the Daily Herald (11th December 1956) and Peter Fryer, Hungarian Tragedy (1956) will be both assessed in terms of their value, origins and purpose.
When Hungary was among the defeated countries after the Second World War (1945), the USSR in their words liberated the country and introduced their form of Stalinism to Hungary and other Eastern European countries. Unfortunately this so-called liberation was the complete opposite of freedom. Now Hungary was a puppet regime of the strong Soviet Union and the people were then subjected to no rights, no freedom of speech and constant food shortages. The oppression, which had been supervised by the communist Soviet Union-in the defeated and occupied Hungary-was one of the most cruel and dreadful 50 years of coercion in Hungarian History. The communist regime had trampled underfoot all the human and constitutional rights of the once democratic Hungary. Russia and its communist ideology were feared by most of the European nations, but not all the countries enjoyed distinctive attention. To realize the attention towards Hungary, The Russians started to emerge into Hungary’s life and political system from several sides; one side was of the development of the AVO (Allamvedelmi Osztaly).
The AVO, later named the AVH was founded in 1945. The AVO was organized in accordance with Soviet principles back home. Each satellite country must have a secret police in order to maintain the works of Soviet Communism. From the very beginning of power the AVO succeeded in turning the once democratic Hungary into a strict Communist regime controlled between the Government’s of Moscow and Hungary. As Endre Martin an honest witness of all these events said, “The AVH was organized in accordance with the Soviet Pattern”. To ensure complete power within Hungary, The communist party along with the Hungarian Secret Police prepared it’s plan in detail: “ The essential tasks of the new political system became the eradication of dissent and the mobilization of mass support. To promote these goals they developed an exceedingly high regulative capability which rested in the first instance on the secret police”(Vali 180). The AVO had their own cause completely supported and had detailed records of every citizen and highly effective ways of interrogating and torturing victims and prisoners. All of these aspects caused deep fear and resentment towards the AVO.
Under Stalin, Hungary became a Soviet Satellite against the will of the majority. Those who openly objected were either jailed or subjected to torture under the AVO. In many cases the families of those brave enough to voice their own opinions were also dragged into this mess of Soviet Solutions. It is in this way that the AVO ruled over the people with an iron fist and the people had no choice but to surrender to Soviet Rule.
Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty who had bravely opposed the German Nazi’s and the Hungarian Fascist’s in World War II was arrested by the AVO in December 1948 and was falsely accused of treason. After 5 weeks of brutal torture by the AVO he confessed to the charges put against him and was condemned to life imprisonment. The protest churches were also purged and their leaders were replaced by those remaining to stay loyal to Rakosi’s government.
Most people who entered the AVO were social outcasts or rejects of society. They had few friends and often-felt hate towards the rest of the population. The communist officials would know who these certain people were, seek them out; force them to be candidates to the AVO and them train them to be members of the AVO. After the training, these people eventually became the most brutal of interrogators and torturers.
Often, if you were taken as a prisoner by the AVO, you would be brought into a room with several other prisoners and made to stand in front of a line of AVO guards. The guards then proceeded asking each prisoner which metal pole they would like to be beaten with today. The guards would beat them until completely exhausted and then through the bodies in a bath of acid. In some cases the prisoners would still be conscious upon being thrown into the bath of an acid.
With 30,000 members forming the AVO organization, it is not hard to see why the Hungarian people lived in constant fear of these people. If anyone were even suspected of saying anything against the government they would be tortured until they confessed and then killed.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 in retrospect was published in 1977 and was written by Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, who both lived and worked in Hungary for quite a few years. They’re knowledge of Hungarian history is very extensive and the fact that this book was written nearly 20 years after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 makes this quite a reliable source. The fact that since 1956 new findings about the Hungarian revolution have come out so therefore they’re knowledge of this event would be more extensive than a book that was written say the year or the year after this event took place. The purpose of this book is to give a detailed account of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 in retrospect. The book covers certain areas of the Hungarian people’s struggle for freedom and outlines areas such as intellectual aspects of the Hungarian revolution, economic aspects of the Hungarian revolution, political aspects of the Hungarian Revolution, international aspects of the Hungarian revolution and military aspects of the Hungarian revolution. These aspects show how the Hungarian people were deprived of their freedom in many areas and the AVO are specifically talked about in connection with most of these aspects. Bela K. Kiraly, P.H.d, is professor of history, Brooklyn College and Graduate school, City university of New York. In 1956 with the rank of major general, he was commander in chief, national Guard of Hungary; commandant of Budapest; and chairman revolutionary Council of national defense. Paul Jonas, PhD, is professor of economics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. The two joint authors positions make them a very valuable source because of their experience with Hungarian affairs and the actual time they worked in Hungary is very influential as the time coincides with the beginning of the Hungarian Revolution.
The Hungarian Secret Police arrested George Paloczi-Horvath in 1949. He wrote about his experiences in the daily herald on 11th of December 1956. His source is very valuable because it gives an eyewitness account into the atrocities committed by the AVO and reading it from someone who was arrested and tortured by the AVO gives the source no limitations what so ever. The fact that this account was published in 1956 directly after the revolution gives the observer a clearer idea as to why the AVO were the ones most responsible for making the Hungarian people’s life a living hell. He gives eyewitness accounts of how he was tortured by the AVO and forced to own up to a crime that he never committed. Like thousands of innocent Hungarian’s, he was a helpless victim of the AVO and their torture chambers.
The Hungarian Tragedy by Peter Fryer was published in December of 1956 and gives a detailed account of the events that happened throughout the Hungarian Revolution. This source is very reliable as it was written by a noted expert on Hungarian affairs and was also published only a short while after the revolution took place. The book is very detailed and has eyewitness accounts of events that the author had witnessed while in Hungary. The fact that the author was in Hungary make the events more clear to the reader because they have not been filtered over and over and had the actual events inaccurately published.
ANALYSIS
One of the difficulties about analyzing the events of the Hungarian revolution, or in this case the
AVO’S role in instigating the speed of which the revolution broke out is that there are many sources available, but difficulty in finding which one is reliable or not to the reader. Some sources have been published by Hungarian writers who give their accounts of what happened and some by western writers who witnessed all these events on a television screen in the comfort of their own home. There is a chance that some works published by Hungarians could contain bias nature because of the Hungarian people’s loathing for the Soviet Government and the AVO (Hungarian secret police). Sources published in Hungary may also be subject to censorship or falsification as the government keep a watchful eye on what is being published in a hard line communist country such as Hungary.
There is definite evidence to support the argument that the AVO was most responsible for the Hungarian’s revolting when they did. Had they’re been no Secret Police the people would still have been living under a communist government but what not have to fear opening their mouths or getting falsely convicted of a crime they did not commit. George Paloczi-Horvath states in his article about the AVO published in the Daily Herald that “ Like many others, I was arrested by the AVO in 1949” “ I believed that we would be able to assert our innocence. But I soon found out that our fate was worse than if we had been found guilty, because we had nothing to give away in the torture chambers. I was thrown into an icy cell cubicle 3 yards by four. There was a wooden plank for a bed, and a bright naked light glared in my face day and night. Later, it was a great relief to return to this bleak place” This is evidence of the Hungarians hatred towards the AVO. They would show up unexpectedly at people’s houses and take who ever they thought may be guilty. The person/person’s captured would be tortured both physically and mentally until they confessed to crimes they never committed. The reason the Hungarian people needed to revolt against the government was that they were living each day petrified of what might happen to them or their family and this aspect I believe, left them no choice but to revolt in 1956.
CONCLUSION
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was to a very large extent a direct result of the AVO’S actions towards their own citizens. If a person wakes up every day wondering when their time will come for arrest and torture it will destroy the human mind more so than having little food or no proper shelter to live in. A person’s greatest fear is that of death and more so of a painful death, which the AVO were most notorious for. This organization killed people every day and no trouble with it, so in this case the Hungarians were victims of their tyranny upon a nation. It is this compelling fear of the AVO that I believe so swiftly instigated the revolt against the Hungarian Government and the AVO.
The West was responsible for the deaths in Hungary in 1956
When Hungary was among the defeated countries after the Second World War (1945), the USSR in their words liberated the country and introduced their form of Stalinism to Hungary and other Eastern European countries. Unfortunately this so-called liberation was the complete opposite of freedom. Now Hungary was a puppet regime of the strong Soviet Union and the people were then subjected to no rights, no freedom of speech and constant food shortages. The oppression, which had been supervised by the communist Soviet Union-in the defeated and occupied Hungary-was one of the most cruel and dreadful 50 years of coercion in Hungarian History. The communist regime had trampled underfoot all the human and constitutional rights of the once democratic Hungary. Russia and its communist ideology were feared by most of the European nations, but not all the countries enjoyed distinctive attention. To realize the attention towards Hungary, The Russians started to emerge into Hungary’s life and political system from several sides; one side was of the development of the AVO (Allamvedelmi Osztaly).
The AVO, later named the AVH was founded in 1945. The AVO was organized in accordance with Soviet principles back home. Each satellite country must have a secret police in order to maintain the works of Soviet Communism. From the very beginning of power the AVO succeeded in turning the once democratic Hungary into a strict Communist regime controlled between the Government’s of Moscow and Hungary. As Endre Martin an honest witness of all these events said, “The AVH was organized in accordance with the Soviet Pattern”. To ensure complete power within Hungary, The communist party along with the Hungarian Secret Police prepared it’s plan in detail: “ The essential tasks of the new political system became the eradication of dissent and the mobilization of mass support. To promote these goals they developed an exceedingly high regulative capability which rested in the first instance on the secret police”(Vali 180). The AVO had their own cause completely supported and had detailed records of every citizen and highly effective ways of interrogating and torturing victims and prisoners. All of these aspects caused deep fear and resentment towards the AVO.
Under Stalin, Hungary became a Soviet Satellite against the will of the majority. Those who openly objected were either jailed or subjected to torture under the AVO. In many cases the families of those brave enough to voice their own opinions were also dragged into this mess of Soviet Solutions. It is in this way that the AVO ruled over the people with an iron fist and the people had no choice but to surrender to Soviet Rule.
Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty who had bravely opposed the German Nazi’s and the Hungarian Fascist’s in World War II was arrested by the AVO in December 1948 and was falsely accused of treason. After 5 weeks of brutal torture by the AVO he confessed to the charges put against him and was condemned to life imprisonment. The protest churches were also purged and their leaders were replaced by those remaining to stay loyal to Rakosi’s government.
Most people who entered the AVO were social outcasts or rejects of society. They had few friends and often-felt hate towards the rest of the population. The communist officials would know who these certain people were, seek them out; force them to be candidates to the AVO and them train them to be members of the AVO. After the training, these people eventually became the most brutal of interrogators and torturers.
Often, if you were taken as a prisoner by the AVO, you would be brought into a room with several other prisoners and made to stand in front of a line of AVO guards. The guards then proceeded asking each prisoner which metal pole they would like to be beaten with today. The guards would beat them until completely exhausted and then through the bodies in a bath of acid. In some cases the prisoners would still be conscious upon being thrown into the bath of an acid.
With 30,000 members forming the AVO organization, it is not hard to see why the Hungarian people lived in constant fear of these people. If anyone were even suspected of saying anything against the government they would be tortured until they confessed and then killed.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 in retrospect was published in 1977 and was written by Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, who both lived and worked in Hungary for quite a few years. They’re knowledge of Hungarian history is very extensive and the fact that this book was written nearly 20 years after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 makes this quite a reliable source. The fact that since 1956 new findings about the Hungarian revolution have come out so therefore they’re knowledge of this event would be more extensive than a book that was written say the year or the year after this event took place. The purpose of this book is to give a detailed account of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 in retrospect. The book covers certain areas of the Hungarian people’s struggle for freedom and outlines areas such as intellectual aspects of the Hungarian revolution, economic aspects of the Hungarian revolution, political aspects of the Hungarian Revolution, international aspects of the Hungarian revolution and military aspects of the Hungarian revolution. These aspects show how the Hungarian people were deprived of their freedom in many areas and the AVO are specifically talked about in connection with most of these aspects. Bela K. Kiraly, P.H.d, is professor of history, Brooklyn College and Graduate school, City university of New York. In 1956 with the rank of major general, he was commander in chief, national Guard of Hungary; commandant of Budapest; and chairman revolutionary Council of national defense. Paul Jonas, PhD, is professor of economics, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. The two joint authors positions make them a very valuable source because of their experience with Hungarian affairs and the actual time they worked in Hungary is very influential as the time coincides with the beginning of the Hungarian Revolution.
The Hungarian Secret Police arrested George Paloczi-Horvath in 1949. He wrote about his experiences in the daily herald on 11th of December 1956. His source is very valuable because it gives an eyewitness account into the atrocities committed by the AVO and reading it from someone who was arrested and tortured by the AVO gives the source no limitations what so ever. The fact that this account was published in 1956 directly after the revolution gives the observer a clearer idea as to why the AVO were the ones most responsible for making the Hungarian people’s life a living hell. He gives eyewitness accounts of how he was tortured by the AVO and forced to own up to a crime that he never committed. Like thousands of innocent Hungarian’s, he was a helpless victim of the AVO and their torture chambers.
The Hungarian Tragedy by Peter Fryer was published in December of 1956 and gives a detailed account of the events that happened throughout the Hungarian Revolution. This source is very reliable as it was written by a noted expert on Hungarian affairs and was also published only a short while after the revolution took place. The book is very detailed and has eyewitness accounts of events that the author had witnessed while in Hungary. The fact that the author was in Hungary make the events more clear to the reader because they have not been filtered over and over and had the actual events inaccurately published.
ANALYSIS
One of the difficulties about analyzing the events of the Hungarian revolution, or in this case the
AVO’S role in instigating the speed of which the revolution broke out is that there are many sources available, but difficulty in finding which one is reliable or not to the reader. Some sources have been published by Hungarian writers who give their accounts of what happened and some by western writers who witnessed all these events on a television screen in the comfort of their own home. There is a chance that some works published by Hungarians could contain bias nature because of the Hungarian people’s loathing for the Soviet Government and the AVO (Hungarian secret police). Sources published in Hungary may also be subject to censorship or falsification as the government keep a watchful eye on what is being published in a hard line communist country such as Hungary.
There is definite evidence to support the argument that the AVO was most responsible for the Hungarian’s revolting when they did. Had they’re been no Secret Police the people would still have been living under a communist government but what not have to fear opening their mouths or getting falsely convicted of a crime they did not commit. George Paloczi-Horvath states in his article about the AVO published in the Daily Herald that “ Like many others, I was arrested by the AVO in 1949” “ I believed that we would be able to assert our innocence. But I soon found out that our fate was worse than if we had been found guilty, because we had nothing to give away in the torture chambers. I was thrown into an icy cell cubicle 3 yards by four. There was a wooden plank for a bed, and a bright naked light glared in my face day and night. Later, it was a great relief to return to this bleak place” This is evidence of the Hungarians hatred towards the AVO. They would show up unexpectedly at people’s houses and take who ever they thought may be guilty. The person/person’s captured would be tortured both physically and mentally until they confessed to crimes they never committed. The reason the Hungarian people needed to revolt against the government was that they were living each day petrified of what might happen to them or their family and this aspect I believe, left them no choice but to revolt in 1956.
CONCLUSION
The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was to a very large extent a direct result of the AVO’S actions towards their own citizens. If a person wakes up every day wondering when their time will come for arrest and torture it will destroy the human mind more so than having little food or no proper shelter to live in. A person’s greatest fear is that of death and more so of a painful death, which the AVO were most notorious for. This organization killed people every day and no trouble with it, so in this case the Hungarians were victims of their tyranny upon a nation. It is this compelling fear of the AVO that I believe so swiftly instigated the revolt against the Hungarian Government and the AVO.
The West was responsible for the deaths in Hungary in 1956
When the Soviet Union dominated Eastern Europe during the 1940s, many countries, including Hungary, were plundered for resources and their economies geared toward the benefit of the USSR. Because of this, the people of Hungary had long been dissatisfied with Russian despotism. An attempted revolution occurred in 1956 with a loss of around 27,000 lives. Although the role of the USSR is was significant in initiating the events in Hungary, and thus causing the consequential deaths and destruction, it can be argued that the West was actually responsible for what took place in Hungary. Through negligence, broken promises, and refusal of assistance, the situation in Hungary worsened and revolution was unsuccessful. Hungary could only be freed from the tyranny of the USSR over thirty years later.
At the Yalta Conference in 1945, the West gave power over Hungary to the USSR, the first instance where the West predetermined Hungary¡¯'s fate. During the 1940s and 1950s, US foreign policy had hardened, introducing policies of containment and later rollback to control the stop spread of communism. The year that Hungary had fallen to Soviet control, 1947, was the same year that the Truman Doctrine was announced. US president Harry Truman said, ¡°"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."¡± Yet the US had done nothing to stop the USSR's takeover of Eastern Europe. It seemed that the Truman Doctrine, containment, and Iron Fist approach were all meaningless terms. The US said they would bear the responsibility of keeping free nations from turning communist, but they did not keep to their word.
In Hungary, a number of reasons contributed to the uprising in 1956. One reason was the Hungarians thought the West or UN would be able to assist them in the revolution. Such a presumption is not unjustified, for the Truman Doctrine had stated that it was the duty of the US to help countries against attack of communism. Hungary had been incorporating capitalist ideas - in 1956 the new government had introduced democracy and freedoms (freedom of speech and freedom of religion). It is understandable that they would expect assistance from the largest, wealthiest capitalist country in the world, the US. Yet the US again ignored the Truman Doctrine and did not go in to help Hungary when revolution broke out. Without support the West had promised, Hungary seemed to stand alone to face the USSR.
When the Soviet Red Army entered Hungary, Imre Nagy appealed to the West for help - but the West again refused. Eisenhower didn¡¯'t think Hungary was worth starting a possible world war. In addition, Great Britain and France were preoccupied with the Suez Crisis. A website remarks: "The world was too busy with the Suez Canal Crisis to care much. Oil was apparently regarded as much more valuable than the blood of thousands of Hungarian youths. What is the price of a young life compared to the market value of gasoline?" Hungary's only other hope, the United Nations, was rendered useless since both China and the USSR vetoed any suggestion for action.
The factors above prove that the West played a significant role in determining the fate of Hungary. Hungary was given to the USSR at Yalta; nothing was done when the USSR took over the country by using salami tactics from 1945-1947; and the West refused to aid Hungary in revolution against Soviet domination in 1947. Thus, it can be argued that the West was more responsible for the events that occurred in Hungary, leading to death and suffering and marking Hungary's fate for years to come.
Castro's role in intensifying American antagonism.
Building up to the Cuban Missile Crisis, aggression occurred between the USA and Cuba for many reasons. Cuba had been in the hands of Fulgencio Batista since 1933. Batista was a military dictator and his corrupt rule caused popular discontent. Fidel Castro came into power January 1st 1959, after a brief struggle with Batista, with the help of Ernesto "Che" Guevara and nine other rebels. Castro was a brilliant propagandist and a very charismatic person. The incidents which happened between 1959 and 1961 built up tension and resulted in strong animosity.
Economically, Cuba had always been dependent on the United States. The US was exploiting them, owning most of Cuban industry, transportation, electricity production and telephone lines. 80% of Cuba's export revenue was from producing and selling sugar. Most of this sugar was grown on plantations owned by the United States and then sent to the USA. Under Batista's rule, the United States was allowed to continue with their actions but when Fidel Castro came into power in 1959, he formed a new government. Castro wanted to make Cuba an independent country, free from US control and exploitation. He nationalized industry, impounded all foreign-owned property, and collectivized agriculture. This did not please the US government. President Dwight Eisenhower decided to stop trading arms with Cuba and eventually refused to purchase Cuban sugar in July of 1960. Castro looked to the Soviet Union for assistance. The USSR saw this as an opportunity and took advantage of the situation. The Soviets would buy Cuban sugar and in return, they would send oil, machines and money. In response to the US's action, Castro nationalized most US-owned factories and plantations. US-owned oil refineries were nationalized when they refused to take Soviet oil. Eventually, Castro severed all economic and political ties to the United States.
Secondly, political affairs added to the antagonism between the USA and Cuba. After Castro came into power, he established a totalitarian government which benefited the working class at the expense of the middle class. Castro arrested, imprisoned and executed many of Batista's supporters who had been responsible for the repression of Cuba. This heightened tension because many of the people executed were in fact allies to the United States. Most social and political opposition between the United States and Cuba happened because of the fact that Cuba had become communist with the aid of the USSR. At this time, to the United States, communism was seen as the enemy. Cuba was essentially a puppet state of the US. As it wiggled out of their grasp, they needed to act. The United States needed to show the world they were still a super power. Destroying Castro became a priority.
Militarily, the Bay of Pigs invasion was the "straw which broke the camels back". The Bay of Pigs invasion was a very unsuccessful invasion of Cuba issued by the new US president John F. Kennedy. The plan was suggested by Richard Nixon, Eisenhower's Vice president. The CIA had been scheming different strategies to take Castro out of power but none had been successful. Towards the end of Eisenhower's term, the CIA came up with a plan titled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" on March 17th 1960. The Bay of Pigs invasion started on April 17th when six ships sailed from Nicaragua. Roughly 1,500 Cuban exiles landed in the Bay of Pigs, Bahi a de Cochinos, with the sole purpose of ousting the Communist regime present under Castro. These exiles were trained by the CIA and supplied with U.S. arms but they barely made it past the beaches. Most exiles were captured and killed by the Cuban army. 1,189 men were captured and each sentenced to thirty years in prison. After months of interrogation and negotiation, in December of 1962, Cuba traded 1,112 captured rebels for fifty-three million US dollars in food and medicine. Castro saw the Bay of Pigs as confirmation that the USA was working to overthrow his government. The United States was terrified and embarrassed that Cuba, only 90 miles from the shores of Florida, a country in American's sphere of influence, had become communist.
By the end of the Bay of Pigs invasion, both the United States and Cuba were aware that the hostility and aggression towards one another would not go away. Pressure only increased as the US struggled to fight communism.
The consequences of the Korean War in International Relations.
The Korean War was one of the bloodiest wars in the history. After World War II, in order to maintain political prestige among the uncommitted nations of world, neither side could allow any advantages or concession. The Soviets tried to blockade Berlin, but still could not prevent from the war, and which led to the creation of the Korean War.
The Korean War started on June 25, 1950. The war began between 'Democratic People's Republic of Korea' and South Korea and it had strongly affected the Cold War betwen the US, USSR and China. It also harshly strengthened the intensions between them.
The war lasted for three years from June 25 1950. North Korea had a communist system and the south was capitalist. In World War Two, both USSR and USA helped defeat the Japanese in Korea, which eventually divided Korea into two parts. One with the communist system (North) from USSR, and capitalists (South) from the USA. The line that divided them was the 38th parallel. It began with North Korean soldiers crossing the 38th parallel after the Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) outlined a perimeter, which South Korea wasn't included, therefore the north Korean leader Kim Il Song decided to 'unite' Korea. When they almost accomplished the mission, UN army (mainly US army) backed south up from July. It resulted China to join the war when UN army (US army and MacArthur 'rolled back' to the border to China on River Yalu. Finally, this war lasted for 3 years, more than a million people were killed all together, and the armistice was signed in the 38th parallel again. Both North and South Korea had no geographical change, but money, industries, populations were gone, also effected on the Cold.
As a result of the Korean War, nearly 58000 UN troops and 1600000 communist troops were either killed, wounded or reported missing. The loss seemed in vain for many people because they thought the war was unnecessary. On June 25, 1950, the first war between South Korea and North Korea started, and the invasion of South Korea gave a rise to the military advantages for the communists. And the result of the first war gave UN to play a military role. This gave UN a excuse to hit with the communists, so they created a UN military force which was led by McArthur to defend South Korea. UN force didn't expect that China would attack, but to their surprise, China attacked and pushed back the UN force. Another fact which influenced in the Korean War was the death of Stalin in 1953, as Stalin said himself, if he's done, Russia's done. As the result of his death, the USSR realized that they could not continue this war, so they decided to be a pacifist, and settled the conflict by peace and negotiation. UN also thought that there wasn't any point to continue the war, so Armistice was signed between UN and North Korea, which ended the war in the summer of 1953.
From the standpoint of the Korean War, we can see that the result might be a good thing for the development of the Cold War, because it decreased the power of USSR, and could have some peace for a while. However, there wasn't really a peace agreement signed between South Korea and North Korea, and led to the division of the Korea until today.
From the US viewpoint, it was more worried about communism and wanting a stronger 'containment' policy. Before, the Cold War was all about European countries, but suddenly China, which is in Far East, fell into communism in 1949. It was a shock to Americans and it was willing to spread throughout like dominoes. Truman was under severe domestic pressure for being too soft on communism. Especially vocal were those who accused the Democrats of having 'Lost China'. The intervention was also an important implementation of the new Truman Doctrine, which advocated the opposition of communism everywhere it tried to expand. The lesson of Munich in 1938 also influenced the American decision, believing that appeasing communism would only encourage further expansion. 302,483 US 'military advisors', in fact soldiers, were sent to Korea to fight expansion of communism, North Korean, Chinese and Soviet Air Force. 33,685 US soldiers were killed in the war. In the end, the US wasn't very happy about the result, but at least, the least missions were achieved. Socially, it stopped from expanding of communism in Asia, otherwise, if Korea fell to communism, Japan, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and so on would have probably fell to communist as domino theory. Militarily, US soldiers stayed in Republic of Korea (South) to defend Korea, which stand a threat to China and other Asian countries from falling to communism. Economically, US saved Asian markets. If those countries fell, then US would have lost their markets. Politically, it has strengthened the power of the West. It was stopped expanding of Communism, it has shown to Soviets that West wouldn't appease no more. Finally, the relationship of USSR and China with US is worsened.
From the Soviets' and Chinese points of view, this war exacerbated the hostility between them and the US. First, China has been unable to recover Taiwan for supporting Korea, but then US claimed to protect Taiwan. Secondly, China has totally killed, wounded or lost about a million soldiers. Thirdly, MacArthur wanted to nuke China, it only grew the hostilities between them. Also, they saw from this war that the West and US are even more worrying about expansion of communism and they were preparing to spread it even faster. West European countries were worrying about Soviets would take over the West Germany during the wartime; therefore they had a bigger rivalry now.
As we can see, the Korean War has a great impact on Cold War and both sides were not willing to stop. After a decade, the Vietnamese war against the Americans had begun.
To what extent did economic considerations influence the American decision to go to war in Korea?
Although Acheson's "Defensive Perimeter" speech in Jan 12, 1950 did not include Korea, when the war broke out the US was involved immediately. The aim of this investigation is to find out to what extent did economic reasons influence the USA's decision to go to war in Korea. The main sources will be books that relate to the Korean War. Internet sources will be used if it is necessary for the summary of evidence. In B, the changes of the American economy will be after and before the involvement Korean War, Acheson's "defensive perimeter" speech, and the expansion of communism after WWII. Then I will evaluate the values and limitations of the two Korean books that relate to Korean War with regarding to the extent of economic reason for the USA involvement in Korean War. The possible political and economic reasons why the USA intervened in the Korean War will also be analysed before reaching a conclusion in E.
B Summary of Evidence
The economic situation of the USA from 1940 to 1953.
The USA's economic situation was rapidly growing during the war with Japan because it had put much effort on military spending, and thus decreasing unemployment. However because of the surrender of Japan, the US's economy started to decrease again. The USA saw another chance to have economic growth due to the Korean War. Indeed, the USA's economy started to grow from 1950.
The USA's declaration of war upon Japan in December 8, 1941 led to the growth of its economy. Industrial factories were at first slow to convert to military output, but by 1942, 33% of the economy was devoted to the war effort. Between 1941 and 1945 the US spent approximately $250 million a day in efforts to produce the military products to defeat its enemies. By the end of the war in 1945, farm income had more than doubled. Corporate profits rose by 70 percent over their 1940 level, and real wages of industrial workers increased by 50 percent. Perhaps most notably, the earnings of the bottom fifth of workers climbed 68 percent. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) nearly doubled, from $832 billion in 1940 to $1559 billion, measured in constant 1987 dollars. Living standards improved significantly.1
Here is a statistical graph shows the change of unemployment rates before, after and during the WWII. It shows the war influence on the economy.
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, FISCAL YEARS 1940-1949
(as percent of total [civilian plus military] labor force)
FiscalYear NondefenseEmployment DefenseEmployment CivilianUnemployment(BLS concept)
1940 82.4 1.8 15.7
1941 79.4 8.5 12.0
1942 67.3 25.7 7.0
1943 57.6 39.4 3.0
1944 58.4 40.3 1.3
1945 59.5 39.2 1.3
1946 88.5 8.9 2.6
1947 90.9 5.3 3.8
1948 90.9 5.3 3.9
1949 88.4 5.2 6.4
Notes: Defense employment includes military personnel, civilian employees of the military, and employees of defense-related industries.2
Rapid demobilization dropped the government's share during the period 1946-50 to the range of 11-15 percent, slightly below the prewar level.
The outbreak of the Korean War led to another steep increase of the government's share, from about 13 percent in 1950 to 22.5 percent in 1953. Although some retrenchment followed cessation of the fighting in Korea, government's share has remained at a high level, about one-fifth of GNP, ever since. Notably, this postwar plateau of the past three decades holds government's share of GNP at approximately three times the level sustained before World War I. By this measure, then, the government during the twentieth century has become three times as important in relation to the economy.3
USA's foreign policy regarding Korea (Acheson's speech)
The purpose of Acheson's speech of "defensive perimeter" in JAN 12, 1950, was stopping Stalin and Mao's expansionism. As seen in the diagram,
But Korea and Taiwan was excluded, and it was blamed that it was the reason of start of Korean War.
The growth of communism after the WWII (China, Eastern Europe, Asia)
After WWII, the Soviets started to occupy Eastern Europe in order to prevent the invasion from Germany in future making them communism. Many Eastern Europe countries and Asian countries fell to communism continuously during 1940's such as the buffer states of USSR, Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, and Vietnam.4 And when Communist North Korea, invaded South Korea, the USA started to worry if South Korea would fall to communism, too thus endangering Taiwan and Japan according to the Domino Theory.
C Evaluation of Sources,
Chull Baum, Kim Korean War and USA.
Kim Chull-Baum is a pioneer on the study of the origins of the Cold War in Korea. He is a political science doctor, the professor of National Defense College, and the president of Korean War investigation group. He has written many books about Korean War and is considered an expert on Korean politics and its war. The book itself is based on many secret documents which were newly released in 1970 from American archives and from Western countries, and the footnotes and endnotes are all there in detail.
The book at times emphasizes too much the point that if Korea fell to communism, the whole of Asia would fall too. His main claim is that the USA intervened because of the threat of communism, neglecting other valid reasons such as economic. Additionally, Kim had no personal experience of the Korean War, but depended on outside sources.
Seung Uk, Park's Both the 38th line and Korean War were USA's works.
The Author's life was noteworthy. He was born in 1919 and adopted into a Japanese family serving as a Japanese naval ensign during WWII. He moved to the US and worked for the CIA from 1947 to 1980 in Far East.
This book was based on the author's own experience and the information he got while working in the CIA, so it is both vivid and detailed. As mentioned above, he knew of and actually witnessed much secret information of the Far East, especially about the Korean War, because he worked as high official in CIA. In addition, he includes a number of first-hand dialogues between him and high officials of the US.
Based as it is on his own experiences, it is at times a subjective account. No footnotes or endnotes have been supplied, limiting the value of his information and opens him to accusations of bias and exaggeration because he was born in Korea and he is critical of the US role during the Korean War.
D Analysis
The economic situation of the USA during 1940's recovered from the depreciation and inflation caused by the Great Depression in 1929, mostly as a result of producing military products in WWII. But after the war ended, the USA economy seemed to depress, because the war ended so quickly, so there was a lot of surplus. Thus the USA needed a new war to recover their economy. The USA thought that Korea could offer a good chance to recover their economy by reducing military damage, using Japan as their base and the Korea is their front-lines. What the US wanted was to destroy all Korea's buildings so the USA could provide them surplus. This partially explains why Korea was excluded from the Acheson's speech in 1950. It was all intended, because the US need to lure Soviet and North Korea to attack South Korea, so when South Korea was invaded by them, USA could change there plan to intervene Korea by using UN. Additionally, the Russia was absent in UN conference, so they couldn't veto it. This is the economical reason in the book wrote by Park why USA intervened Korea War.
However, another interpretation of why Korea WAS excluded from the speech exists. In the late 1940's, some European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Rumania were conquered by the Soviets. In 1949, China fell to Communism, too. So Truman believed and was worried that if the US did not intervene, then the next countries would be Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. Therefore it issued the "Perimeter of Defense" including many Asian countries. So this is the political reason in the book written by Kim as to why USA intervened the Korea War.
However, the economic reason is more reliable than the political reason, because in the book written by Kim, Syngman Rhee didn't know that North Korea would invade the South, but in the book Park said that Sygngman knew it, Syngman even told Truman that the South will be invaded by North soon. But USA didn't recognized it, even they knew it by the CIA. Because what USA needed is the war. Kim also claims that Truman didn't receive any reports about the imminent North invasion, but Park believes that Truman was warned by the CIA and simply ignored it. Truman denied receiving such warnings, so that the situation can coincide with the Acheson's Speech. So briefly, the US knew the North would invade the South, so the US excluded Korea from the "Perimeter of Defense" in Asia to make Stalin and North Korea think that the US did not care about Korea.
There are a number of shocking thing that the USA did. There were about 8240 intelligence men spread out in Beijing, Manchuria, North Korea, and Moscow. So at that time US knew everything in great detail. First, through information obtained in Hong Kong, there was military goods trade between China and UN from through the way that from Aomen to Indonesia and Sri Lanka.5 It was lead by the USA, as the information said, but denied by the US. At the same time, when the North Korean army was nearly driven back to the Yalu River, MacArthur suggested they should banish the North Korea army from Korea and unify Korea. In order to do this, MacArthur needed to bomb their supply base camp and the Yalu bridge. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they should not attack any bridge or supply camps. And when 500-thousand Chinese troops rushed in to Korea, the US ignored MacArthur's proposal of backup. Truman said to MacArthur that they would stop there, and not move north. It was ironic that the USA did not aid MacArthur's army, but sold military goods to China. The purpose was for China and North Korea to destroy all the buildings inside Korea, so if they reached a cease-fire agreement, the USA could use its surplus to rebuild Korea.
Some might argue that it was correct not to aid more armies to fight with Chinese and North Korea troops as it would start WWIII. But at that time, China had just ended a long civil war as well as the war with the Japanese, so their domestic problems were chaotic. Also at that time, the population of China was about 5 hundred million, but their economy was unable to feed up 5hundred million people. And this is the one reason why China helped North Korea, to cut down the huge population.
Secondly, the Soviet did not have the power to start World War III. After the war with the Germans and Japanese, the USSR was too damaged. The amount of damage was about 12billion dollar, the casualties were between 12~15 million. And the people who died while working in labor camps plus the soldiers who were killed were about 23million.6 Thus, from the population of 95million Soviets, 23million men were killed. There should have been a shortage of men to join the army. On Sep, 25th, 1945, the Soviets announced that they had the Atomic-bomb, but they needed 5 to 6 more years to use it in real warfare.7 As the US had a nuclear monopoly, both China and the Soviet Union were unable to start another war.
E Conclusion
As the analysis above shows, the economic reason makes more sense than the reason why USA intervened Korea as shown in the controversial and mysterious events such as the Acheson speech in Jan. 1950, leaking incorrect information, selling weapons to China secretly, and the prohibition in bombing China, matches with the economic reason rather than any real political reason. In conclusion, it was the USA which encouraged North Korea to invade the South while disguising this as a fight for justice and righteousness.
Roots of American involvement in Vietnam.
Vietnam is about 9000 miles away from the USA, but what provoked the USA to determine to get involved in the civil war between the Vietnamese back in the 40's-70's far away from them? Why did they intervene in the Vietnam War between 1954 and 1963? Actually, the answer is very simple. They were afraid of the spreading of the communism and wanted to stop it before it was too late.
Militarily, following up by the defeat of French, the French was compelled to leave Vietnam which would leave a power void for Ho Chi Minh, a communist, to take over easily. In the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, 1954, 16,000 French troops were either killed or captured by the Viet Minh. It convinced the French government to leave Indochina as soon as possible. It was like handed the part of Vietnam which was under French's control to Communism, and the US would not allow it because of the Truman Doctrine--Containment. Also, the US was heavily involved in the French military financially, even the Viet Minh Supreme Commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap said during a interview in 1996, "We see the Dien Bien Phu victory as the victory [over] the French army and [over] the intervention of the Americans --because in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, 80 percent of the war expenditures were spent by the Americans...So the Dien Bien Phu defeat was a defeat for both the French and the Americans...When we received news of the Dien Bien Phu victory, everyone practically jumped up in the air, they were so happy about it." For both of the sake of containment and honor, the US intervened in that Civil War in 1954.
Internationally, the USA was very unhappy with the Geneva Agreement of 1954. It declared the ceasefire between the French and the Viet Minh, Laos and Cambodia became independent state and Vietnam was divided into north and south temporarily by the 17th parallel. An election would be held in two years which would unit the north and south again. The North was ruled by a communist and the south was ruled by a dictator. Between these two, the USA chose to support the dictator. However, the population of the North was already outnumbered the South's, and a lot of South Vietnamese supported Ho Chi Minh. The threat of Communism took over Vietnam increased dramatically. Thus, the US set its mind to help the South.
Politically, President Eisenhower issued the 'Domino Theory' in 1954, which showed why the US thought that Vietnam must not become a Communist country. Eisenhower said, "You
have a row of dominoes set up. You knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly." The first domino was S. Vietnam, then Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma and India. It was just like the dominos of the Korean War, Korea, Japan, Philippines. That was why the US determined to get involved, because it could not afford the first domino to fall. As the Secretary of Defense at that time, Robert McNamara, said during a interview in June 1996 , "[The domino theory] was the primary factor motivating the actions of both the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations, without any qualification. It was put forward by President Eisenhower in 1954, very succinctly: If the West loses control of Vietnam, the security of the West will be in danger. "The dominoes will fall," in Eisenhower's words...The loss of Vietnam would trigger the loss of Southeast Asia, and conceivably even the loss of India, and would strengthen the Chinese and the Soviet position across the world, weakening the security of Western Europe and weakening the security of North America. This was the way we viewed it." This clearly shows the reason why the US intervened in the War, it was because of the fear to the accretion of the Communism.
From the political, military and international views, they all showed that the reason why the US intervened in the Vietnam War was because it was afraid of the spreading of the Communism and wanted to put a stop to it, contain it.
Vo Nguyen Giap." CNN Cold War. 12 Dec. 2005 <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/11/interviews/giap/>
Yelland. 12 Dec. 2005 <http://www.schoolhistory.co.uk/gcselinks/britishworld/vietnam/getinvolved.pdf>
"Robert McNamara." CNN Cold War. 12 Dec. 2005 <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/11/interviews/mcnamara/>
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)