content="15; IB History Essays: Rise/Rule of Single Party States
Showing posts with label Rise/Rule of Single Party States. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rise/Rule of Single Party States. Show all posts

To what extent did the legislative structure of Czechoslovakia under the Husák regime in Czechoslovakia contribute to the breakup Czechs and Slovaks?

Investigation plan…………………….….………..………………….…page 3
Summary of evidence…………………..…...…………………...........….page 4
Evaluation of sources…………….……..…………….……………....…page 9
Analysis…………………………….……….….…………………....…page 11
Conclusion……………………..…...……………………..………...…page 16
List of sources……………..………..………………..……………..….page 18
Appendix A1…………………………………………………………..page 21
Appendix A2…………………………….…………………………….page 22
Appendix A3…………………………….…………………………….page 24

Investigation plan

To what extent did the legislative structure of Czechoslovakia under the Husák regime contribute to the breakup of Czechs and Slovaks?

This research examines the relationships between the two main ethnical groups living in the federative Czechoslovakia before it broke up. The Czech-Slovak relations were influenced by many factors before the final split. However this research is focused to examine only the influence of the legislative structure of the Husák’s centralised federalism in communistic Czechoslovakia.

Czech historian Rychlík’s Rozpad Československa was used as the primary source, providing a deep overview of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Pollák, chronicler of the former Slovak president as well as Pavol Dubček, son of Alexander Dubček, were interviewed. Secondary sources, the majority of which are Czech and Slovakian, will be used to provide insight from books, newspapers and various statistics to analyse the relationships between the two nations in Czechoslovakia under Husák’s rule.

(Investigation Plan- 148 words)

Summary of evidence


Czechoslovakia at its establishment after the Pittsburgh Agreement was an artificial state contradicting the idea of self-determination as it included many nations, including the majority Czechs and Slovaks. [1] First president T. G. Masaryk denied self-determination for Slovaks stating “The Slovaks are Bohemians in spite of their using their dialect as their literary language”[2]. Leff called the policies of Czech politicians the assimilation of Slovaks under a common umbrella of Czechoslovakism.[3] Goebbels in the dying days of the Third Reich had prophesised that Czechoslovakia would become “the organising centre of Bolshevik plots against Europe.”[4] Indeed, Czechoslovakia finally fell under the direct rule of Moscow after the February 1948 coup.[5] During the time of so-called normalization post-1969[6], Head of State Husák declared his intention to return to the idea of “real socialism”.[7] Although communists proclaimed themselves the biggest nationalists,[8] the legislative structure of federation during this time exacerbated national problems between Czechs and Slovaks. The conflicts, which had their origins during Husák’s regime, culminated in final the separation of these nations in 1992, were:

1. Social

Because Marxist-Leninism could not justify the connection of Czechs and Slovaks in one nation because it emphasised national traditions over communist ideology, legislative restrictions were partially based on emphasizing common ideas of Czechoslovakism,[9] while ideas of self-determination were forbidden. [10] For Czechs this negated the ideas of Masaryk and Beneš since they asserted Slovaks were a part of Czech culture, while Slovaks were denied studying Hlinka and Tiso, supporters of independence.[11] This censorship was ensured by having teachers and professors appointed after strict verification by the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ) and by state directives which allowed work from ‘forbidden’ authors to be read only after special authorisation, which was practically impossible to get.[12] This ultimately caused both sides to feel denied of their national history and to subsequently blame each other.




2. Political

Furthermore, the ‘federative’ system in Czechoslovakia, modelled on the USSR, caused Czechs and Slovaks to have unequal powers which limited the real meaning of federation.[13] Although both Czechs and Slovaks had their own governments[14], from 1970 the decisions of these governments could be vetoed by the federative government under restrictions of the KSČ led from Prague.[15] De facto, other institutions were directly subordinate to Prague’s KSČ, such as the Slovak Communist Party (KSS), various ministries[16], Slovak National Council (SNR), National Front (NF), army, security institutions, or courts.[17] Members and plenums of these institutions were fully organised by the KSČ. Even the results of ‘elections’ of Slovakia’s federative government and KSS were decided in Prague before actual elections, because the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (ÚV KSČ) was arranging all three governments in Czechoslovakia.[18] Čarnogurský argues Slovaks were not a real part of this federation having lost control over Slovakia and its internal affairs.[19]



3. Economic


Finally, economic measures under Husák were unequal. Slovak economist Slavo Koštúch stated as early as 1971: “You are saying that we are brothers, but our wallets are not sisters.”[20] Slovakian economists agreed that the country’s budget, depending on Slovakian money through the highest taxes of all socialist countries[21], were charged from Slovakian industries with only a miniscule amount returning to Slovakia; the rest being spent on Czech infrastructure and rebuilding the capital city.[22] This strengthened the view that Slovakia was economically exploited by Czechs and Moravians. Czech economists such as Komárek, Zeman and Klaus [23] retorted that the economy in fact suffered because Czech was providing enormous amounts of money to Slovakia rather than rebuilding the ‘homeland’.[24] This caused both sides to feel that the federation was inefficient and exploitative.

(Summary of evidence- 597 words)

Evaluation of sources

Czech historian Jan Rychlík’s, Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy was published in Slovakia in 2002 with the stated purpose of analysing the causes for the disintegration of Czechoslovakia.[25] Rychlík took full advantage of the opening of the Soviet and Czechoslovakian archives and the first-hand experiences of Czechoslovak politicians[26] who provided him interviews, to support his argument. However the archives were not fully profitable for research given that Slovakia does not allow documents within the last 30 years to be made public and not all documents in the Czech Republic were available in the public archive. [27] His analysis of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks is helped by the fact that he studied and worked in both countries. During Husák’s regime, he experienced the impact of communism on Czechoslovakia first-hand. Given that his main focus of the book is analysing of the last three years of federation (1989-1992), he tends to gloss over important events of the 1970s and 1980s which later influenced events.

Pavol Pollák, a Slovakian politician in communist-era Czechoslovakia, was Alexander Dubček’s collaborator from the start of the latter’s political career until his ‘disappearance’. His specialty was mainly within the Soviet-Czechoslovak communication sphere.[28] After disintegration he worked as a chronicler for Slovakian president Kováč. The purpose of the interview was to gauge the view of a politician in the position of providing a unique and personal analysis of the impact of communist legislation on Czech-Slovak relations, particularly given his role over such a long period of time. As a chronicler in the presidential agency, he had access to the national and communist archives, which were opened after 1992. While acknowledging his support of a common Czechoslovak federation, he admits disagreeing with Husák’s centralised model of federation which at times colours his opinions of a number of the sources. A number of topics, including comparison of Husák’s and Dubček’s government, were not fully open to discussion given his continued loyalty to the latter.

(Evaluation of sources- 323 word)


Analysis

The Husák era was most important in the history of the Czechoslovak nations because it marked the start of normalisation up to abolition of communism in the USSR, leading to the division of for the first time in 460 years.[29] Far from strengthening and ‘normalising’ Czechoslovakia, the hard-line rule of Gustav Husák created even more internal conflicts, leading to final disintegration in 1992.

The structure of the state should be studied when considering its legislation. Although Czechoslovakia was a federation, it was still a communist state based on the centralistic model of the USSR federation with the centre in Prague.[30] Nevertheless, Husák’s state did not seek to assimilate Slovaks under the common culture of Czechoslovakism as happened in the Soviet model with non-Russian nationalities, but sought good relations under the motto qietum non movere while propagating socialism as the best solution for solving the Czech-Slovak ‘question’.[31]

Although both nations in Czechoslovakia felt their national historical identities threatened during the communist era, Czech and Slovak cultures were strengthened in many ways. The similar languages helped Czechoslovaks to be naturally bilingual since the mass-media provided information in both languages, such as national television CSTV.[32] Abolition of national festivals such as 28th September and 29th August, and emphasising the “Czechoslovakia’s Day of Liberation by Soviet troops” created common customs and cultures for both nations resulting in a Czechoslovak culture containing two subcultures which were mutually interconnected creating a European country in times of peaceful internal stability appear strong and united[33].

Most agree that Slovaks never had the power to run their own internal affairs at any time in their history stretching back four centuries,[34] but Steiner argues that under Husák, Slovakia was finally regarded as a separate part of the national unit and administrative region.[35] From the time of normalization, Husák, a Slovak, was head of the KSČ and also president of Czechoslovakia; it appeared to many that the Slovaks were actually the ones “running the show”.[36] Besides Husák, the government included many other Slovaks in important positions[37], although they were in the minority according to the proportional division of government, which allowed 1500 Slovaks to 4500 Czechs in new federal institutions.[38] These views created the opinion among Czechs that they were ruled by the minority, antagonising Czech-Slovak relations. Nevertheless, the KSČ had the power to deny decisions of both national governments when it felt it was necessary to run the federation.[39] Slovak Husák himself could not be considered to have worked for Slovakian prosperity; although his 1969 motto was “Slovakia for Slovakians” emphasising the Slovak nationality,[40] the opposite became true. He did not give Slovaks their promised constitution or national arms and in public he only spoke Czech, leading to the Slovakian complaint that he was a “Prague Slovak”.[41]

Thirdly, both nations in the common federation felt that the economical measures of the legislation are unfair. High transfer of resources from Czech lands to Slovakia, which was the reason for dissatisfaction of Czechs, was caused by the big gap between living conditions in both republics, which had to be eliminated.[42] Nevertheless, it is important to consider that it is difficult to follow the financial flows in Czechoslovakia in that era because of common federative budget, so it is hard to arbitrate between ‘exploiting’ of Slovak economy and ‘suffering’ of Czech one. It is important to consider that Czechoslovak economy was working as uniform economy of one state, and it is necessary and natural even today that the ‘richer’ parts of one country have to supply ‘poorer’ ones, such as also ‘poorer’ parts of the country have to pay taxes even though the infrastructure of the ‘richer’ part could profit from these taxes more.[43] So the whole economic conflict was just artificially made up as the result of the high tension between two nations living in the same state.

(Analysis- 638 words)

Conclusion

The hard-line communist regime in Czechoslovakia occurred during so-called normalization of Czechoslovakia after Gustav Husák became the first secretary of the KSČ in 1969. The legislative measures and restrictions of this regime caused disagreements about some national, political and economical questions between Czechs and Slovaks in the common state. Both nations were felt to be denied for their national spirit, felt to be aggrieved because of the division of powers and felt to suffer because of the economical measures in the communist Czechoslovakia. These were also some of the causes that led to the final division of these two ‘brotherly’ nations after Husák left the position of head of the state and after the fall of communism in November 1989, when the separation was possible, since Czechoslovakia was not anymore occupied by the soviet troops[44] and under influence of the USSR. However, legislation in this communist regime did not have only negative influence on the relationships between Czechs and Slovaks and living conditions in Czechoslovakia, since the big part of the nation was finally against the separation of this federation.[45]

(Conclusion- 180 words)

List of sources

Bibliography

• Brager, L. B.: The Iron Curtain: The Cold War in Europe. Philadelphia 2004
• Cottrell, C. R.: The Czech Republic- Arbitrary Borders. Philadelphia 2005
• Hochman, J.: Nádej zomiera posledná Bratislava 1993
• Hradecka, V. - Koudelka, F.: Kádrova politika a nomenklatúra KSČ. Prague 1998
• Hubl, M.: Cesty k moci. Prague 1990
• Kirschbaum, S. J.: A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New York 1995
• Kishlansky M. – Geary P. - O’Brien P.: Societies and Cultures in World History. New York 1995
• Leff, Skalnik, C.: National Conflict in Czechoslovakia. Princeton 1988
• Lettrich, J.: History of Modern Slovakia New York 1955
• Millar R. J.: Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR Cambridge 1988
• Millar, R. J. – Wolchik, L. S.: The Social Legacy of Communism Washington 1997
• Naďovič, S.: Foertsch H. - Karacsony, I. - Ostrowski, Z.: The Great Withdrawal. Bratislava 2005
• Nejedlý, Z.: Komunisté- dedici velkých tradic českého národa. 4. ed. Prague 1951
• Nogueres, H.: Munich, Peace for Our Time. New York 1965
• Plevza, V.: Historie československé současnosti. Prague 1978
• Roberts J. M.: The Penguin History of the World London 1997
• Rychlík, J.: Rozpad Československa: Česko-slovenské vzťahy. Bratislava 2002
• Šaling, S. – Šalingová Ivanová, M. – Manikova, Z.: Slovník cudzích slov. Bratislava 2002
• Steiner, E.: The Slovak Dilemma. London 1973
• Tkáč, M.: Národ bez peňazí. Bratislava 1992
• Tomašek, D.: Pozor, Cenzurováno. Prague 1994
• Wessel, S. M.: Loyalitaten in Tsechoslowakischen Republic 1918-1938. Munich 2004
• Žatkuliak, J.: Normalizácia česko-slovenskej federácie roku 1970 a jej následky. Banská Bystrica 1997






Newspapers

• Journal Alternativa: “Interview with Jan Čarnogurský” 2/1989
• The New York Times: "Prague Turns on Those Who Brought the 'Spring'", Tagliabue, John 24 Feb. 1992
• Journal Pravda: “The structure of the federative government” 27. Feb. 1969


Internet

• Danielle Seiler: Czechoslovakia: A state of perceived bias. 28 April 1998, (Date accessed: November 2007)
• Policy research department of the World Bank: Cash social transfers, direct taxes, and income distribution in late socialism. September 1993, (Date accessed: November 2007)
• The sociological institute SAV Bratislava: Československá Česká a Slovenská európska identita. April 2002, (Date accessed: November 2007)
• Open society archives: Eastern Europe’s Communist Leaders. 1 September 1966, (Date accessed: November 2007)


Interviews

• Dubček P., interview held during personal meeting, 14th July 2007, Bratislava, Slovakia
• Pollák P., interview held during meeting in his apartment, 2nd August, Bratislava, Slovakia

Appendixes

Appendix A1


Abbreviations used in the assessment

• FZ- (Federálne Zhromaždenie) Federal Congress
• CNR- (Česká Národní Rada) Czech National Council
• KSČ- (Komunistická Strana Československa) Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• KSS- (Komunistická Strana Slovenska) Communist Party of Slovakia
• ÚV KSČ- (Ústredný Výbor Komunistickej Strany Československa) Central Committee of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
• SNR- (Slovenská Národná Rada) Slovak National Council
• NF- (Národná Fronta) National Front

[1] Lettrich (p. 289)
[2] Masaryk propagated that Slovaks are actually the same nation as Czechs. He wanted to include Slovaks, a ‘tribe’, under the Czech culture. Kirschbaum (p. 149)
[3] Skalnik Leff (p. 136)
[4] Nogueres (p. 249-251)
[5] The communist coup in the last non-communist country in Eastern Europe destroyed all beliefs for Czechoslovakia’s independence. Roberts (p. 939)
[6] Hochman (p. 212) called it a step back to totalitarian Czechoslovakia after promising democratisation by Dubček in 1968 during Prague Spring. The resulting Soviet invasion was already the second betrayal by allies (the first one was Munich 1938) resulted in the most cynic joke in Czechoslovakia: “Every Czech knows what is the luckiest country in the world: Israel, because it is surrounded only by enemies” Brager (p. 99)
[7] “Real socialism” supposed to eliminate the ‘mistakes’ made during the Prague Spring. It was used as the reason to made KSČ centralised and autocratic. Rychlík (p. 15)
[8] According to Nejdlý (p. 71) Marxism proclaimed that “proletariat does not have homeland”, however the communism after 1945 which came to Eastern Europe and Asia was contrary, since it was based on ideas of patriotism, independence and national unity.
[9] Wessel (p. 23) states that Czechoslovakism was a political ideology from the first Czechoslovak republic (1918-1938), which stated that Czechs and Slovaks are one Czechoslovak nation including two ‘tribes’. Cottrell (p. 56) continues that the constitution of 1920 deemed “Czechoslovak” as the official language of the new republic, and designed Slovaks as “state people”, not members of a national minority.
[10] Dubček P., interview, 2nd August 2007
[11] According to secret directive of the Ministry of culture from 31 May 1972, all books that could called as ‘harmful’ or ‘revisionist’ were forbidden for public- Rychlík (p. 20)
[12] According to Tomašek (p. 154-155) this supposed to guarantee that no public discussions, which could disrupt the Czech-Slovak relations, will be held.
[13] Real meaning of Czechoslovak world federácia (federation) meant- “political connection of two or more states with equality before one constitution and where each state has the control of its internal affairs”, however this wasn’t the case. Šaling- Ivanová Šalingová- Maníková (p. 191)
[14] Czechs had ČNR- Česká Národní Rada, while Slovaks had SNR- Slovenská Národná Rada
[15] Therefore the real meaning of “federation” had been lost. Real Czechoslovak federation would have two non-subordinate political bodies like it was in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Rychlík (p. 26)
[16] Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Industry Development and Ministry of Internal Affairs were indeed subordinated to KSČ
[17] This gave Husák power to appoint ‘his people’ for the important positions in the state institutions. Hradecká (p. 97) An analogy could be the way how Stalin came to absolute power in the Soviet Union, which was also through these powers and connections.
[18] Rychlík (p.29) provides the example: Jozef Lenárt was announced to be the new secretary of KSS even before the actual elections. Indeed, as Pollák related to me, the political results of all elections were a foregone conclusion as the communist party always obtained more than 99% of the votes (interview, 2nd August 2007).
[19] “With federation we received formal coequality in the state, but still cannot solve our internal affairs by ourselves, because communism does not allow it. This overshadows all the assets of federation. By assets I mean national affairs, the nation should solve by itself, such as mainly education, culture, or partially economy.” Journal Alternativa, 2/1989, p. 41
[20] Koštúch- after KSČ declined the idea of two independent economies in the federation. Hubl (p.42-43)
[21] Direct and payroll taxes of some socialist countries in 1980s can be seen in Table 2- Appendix A2
[22] Tkáč (126) discusses that while central government was locating not profitable primary industry businesses to Slovakia, the secondary and tertiary industry of the federation was located mainly in Czech lands, so naturally Czech lands profited more money from the material that Slovakia produced.
[23] All would later become Czech politicians while arguing about the perceived exploitation of the Czech economy by Slovakia and thus justifying Czech independence. Pavol Pollák, interview 2nd August 2007
[24] The transfer of resources from the Czech lands to Slovak region can be seen in Table 2 in Appendix A2
[25] In author’s own words, the period of the federation during normalization with the final years of disintegration in 1989-1992 are the most important things to analyse to understand the Czech- Slovak relationships- Rychlík (p. 9)
[26] In particular Petr Pithard, Ján Čarnorurský, Václav Žák, Martin Porubjak, Mikuláš Huba, Anton Hrnko, Jacek Balouch, Gyorgy Varga and others
[27] Therefore Rychlík could not use the national archives for the research of 1980s and 90s. This made him use mainly private archives and the archives of non-governmental organisations. Jan Rychlík (p. 9)
[28] Pollák also was previously a member of Interhelpo, which included more than a thousand idealistic Czechoslovak Communists who formed an industrial cooperation with the Soviet Union which remained in existence until 1943- http://www.osa.ceu.hu/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/17-3-143.shtml
[29] Except the period of WWII when Czech lands were occupied by the Nazi Germany, both nations were in one country since 1526 when Ferdinand I included Czech lands into Habsburg monarchy
[30] However, Žatkuliak (p.251) states that the ideas of communism and a federation are contradictory. While communism is based on so-called democratic centralism with subordination lower party sections to higher ones like in army, federation requires division of powers.
[31] Normalisation historian Plevza (p. 36-42) states that the important moment, the creation of Czechoslovakia, was destroyed because of bureaucratic politicians (Masaryk, Beneš) who made Czechoslovakia easily destroyable by Germany. The communist putsch in 1948 opened the doors for the right solution for Czech-Slovak relations, however it still had some small ‘mistakes’ (Dubček). After 1968, KSČ finally realised the right Marxist-Leninists policies in national questions.
[32] The good example for importance of language could be seen here in China, where all the movies have Mandarin subtitles, so all the ethnical minorities speaking different dialects can understand them.
[33] Same nation cultures and same everyday problems in both republics created apparently one solid nation. However, big social and political changes in 1980s and 90s actually showed that the common national awareness was actually weak. Rychlík (p. 25)
[34] Kishlansky- Geary- O’Brien (p. 981) stated that Slovaks were never accepted as a national unit running own internal affairs. During Habsburg’s monarchy, word “Slovaks” were not even used, then during the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1948) there was only Czechoslovak nation, not Slovak one, and even during the short period during the World War II, when Slovakia declared independence, Tiso made agreement with Hitler according to which Slovakia was like a protectorate of Nazi Germany.
[35] Slovaks were recognised as a different nation and national unit and had their own government (SNR) according to Steiner (p. 41)
[36] Leff (p. 251). An analogy today could be Scot-educated Tony Blair and Scot Gordon Brown running #s 10 and 11 Downing St while the Midlothian question allows for Scotland to have a say in English issues.
[37] Slovaks- Minister of Foreign Affairs was Chnoupek, his deputy Nálepka, Minister of National Security Dzúr, Minister of Foreign Trades Barčák and the Ministries of Industry Stancel and Bahýl.- Rychlík (p.31)
[38] However, it was problematic to maintain this ratio since three out of seven ministries in the federation crated in 1969 maintained already from 1960s, where Czechs were in clear superiority. Pravda, 27. 2. 1969
[39] However even Slovak politician Karol Laco defends this veto power of the KSČ, so the common politics of Czechoslovakia were able to be achieved Rychlík (p. 27)
[40] Ibid (p. 33)
[41] However Pollák stated that Husák could not afford strengthening of Slovak patriotism, because it would result in destabilisation of internal affairs and bad image in the view of Moscow. For Husák it was much more profitable to be the head of whole Czechoslovakia, than to be just a head of ‘poor’ Slovakia.
[42] E.g. the income per capita gap in 1948 was 40% between Czech Lands and Slovakia, however thanks to the transfer of resources, in 1970s this gap was reduces to half- http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-42098-14735/unrestricted/etd.pdf. According to Millar and Wolchik, in book The social legacy of communism (p. 219), under Husák Czechoslovakia was socially and economically one of the best socialist countries. See Appendix A2 Table 3. However, Millar in his other book, Politics, work, and daily life in the USSR (p. 172), argues that the social position of Czechoslovak citizens was one of the worst from all the Eastern European countries in 1980s, since Czechoslovakia was the most egalitarian from all the countries.
[43] Rychlík (p. 43) argues that these financial supplies are negligible in one-nation country, however because of high tension between Czechs and Slovaks, politicians often used the economic reasons to accuse the other side.
[44] The last soviet soldier in Czechoslovakia, Colonel General Eduard Vorobiov left Czechoslovakia in Jun 21 1991. Naďovič- Foertsch- Karacsony- Ostrowski (p. 88)
[45] In 1993, only one year after Czechoslovakia was separated, more than 40 % of the nation assessed the separation of these two nations as negative. see Appendix A3 (Figure 1 and Figure 2)

Was the Holmodor an intentional genocidal policy by the Soviet Union Leadership?

Was the Holmodor an intentional genocidal policy by the Soviet Union Leadership?
A: Plan of Investigation
1. Subject- Was the Holdomor an intentional genocidal policy of the Soviet Union leadership?
2. Methods- Will use two basic sets of sources, newspapers written at the time from prominent journalists such as Walter Duranty, Malcolm Muggeridge, and Gareth Jones as well as later books written by prominent historians such as Robert Conquest. The summary of evidence will consist of three basic sections the policies taken by the Soviet Union leading to the famine, their policies during the famine and a section focusing on the famine itself. For section C the one source will be two of Walter Duranty's articles in the New York Times and the other Robert Conquest's book Harvest of Sorrows: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine.
Words:120
B: Summary of Evidence
Stalin had introduced forced collectivization in 1928. The policy was meant to combine the smaller farms into larger ‘more efficient’ collective farms called kolkhozes. The 25 million peasant farmsteads were turned into 200,000 collective farms. This forced collectivization however, was highly unpopular among the peasants who resisted in a variety of ways including the slaughtering of their live stock as well as the burning of their crops culminating in large scale revolts braking out in mostly non-Russian areas including Ukraine. Such peasants were then bunched under the term “Kulaks” on which he declared “war”. It is estimated 5 million Soviet citizens were eventually classified as kulaks and either stripped of their land to be given the poorest land in the area, were deported to other nearby regions of the country or, in extreme cases to distant inhospitable regions without shelter or resources, or sent to gulags. The overall result was the inverse of what had been desired- rather then increasing the food output, the grain output dropped and livestock numbers fell; “famine was the natural outcome”.
The Holmodor refers specifically to such famine within Ukraine between 1932-33 which was part of a larger famine within the Soviet Union. The meaning of the word itself is debated, but is often translated as “death by hunger”. The actual number of casualties is recognized to be somewhere between 2.5 and 5 million though estimates vary. Cannibalism became widespread as the starving became more and more desperate resulting in the publishing of slogan by the Soviet authorities “Eating dead children is barbarism”. Disease, particularly typhoid, was widespread.
The Soviets pursued a number of policies during the famine 1932, introducing the law “On Safeguarding Socialist Property” which made stealing food punishable by death . The borders of the Ukraine were sealed by Red Army Units, and when aid arrived it was sent to all areas except the Ukraine. People trying to flee were rounded up and returned to famine stricken areas. The government went house to house in Ukraine removing all grain; in March 1933 220,000 starving people who left trying to find grain were returned as soon as they were caught. The quota was cut three times before the famine ended in 1934 when Stalin called a stop to the forced seizure of grain.
543 words
C: Evaluation of Sources
Harvest of Sorrows: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine
Written by well respected Robert Conquest, viewed by many as one of the foremost Soviet historians, the book has been described as “(t)he first major scholarly book on the horrors of collectivization” and hailed as “the most comprehensive history of the soviet agricultural crisis,” especially as Conquest himself states his focus on the Holmodor. However, having been published before the opening of the Soviet Archives, the book omits numerous sources that have come to light which indicate that many of the numbers and facts used in the book exceed the actual numbers. Furthermore, Conquest has since rescinded his claim in the book that the Holomodor was an intentional policy, instead saying that had Soviet policy of collectivization and dekulakization been dropped when the famine became eminent many lives could have been saved. Many of the book’s detractors claim that that the book is merely propaganda with “more than half of the references are come from extreme-right-wing Ukrainian émigrés”; As one of the advisors of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher Conquest's true motives for the book have become suspect.

The second source consists of two articles by Walter Duranty- the now infamous “Russians Hungry But Not Starving” published on March 31st 1933 and the second less known piece “Soviet Industry Shows Big Gains” published the following week on April 6. At the time they were written the two pieces were valuable both as a “first hand account” and the fact Walter Duranty was a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist for his work on the Soviet Union. Also the pieces were published in the New York Times one of the most respected newspapers. However it has since been proven that famine occurred, which Duranty had flatly denied in both pieces. In fact efforts have been made to rescind Duranty's Pulitzer Prize and he was referred to by fellow journalist Malcolm Muggeridge as “the greatest liar I have met in journalism”.
Words: 470
D: Analysis
The famine is considered one of the greatest national calamities of modern Ukrainian history, an unprecedented peacetime catastrophe. The famine is such a flash point that the Ukrainian Communist Party refused to even acknowledge that it occurred until 1990, over 55 years after it happened. The current Ukrainian president has announced his attention to make denial of the Holodomor illegal. To date over 19 countries other then Ukraine have recognized it as an act of genocide and the European Parliament adopted a resolution on October 23, 2008 recognizing the famine calling it “an appalling crime against the Ukrainian people, and against humanity” and calling “on the countries which emerged following the break-up of the Soviet Union to open up their archives on the Holodomor”. The document also “strongly condemns these acts, directed against the Ukrainian peasantry, and marked by mass annihilation and violations of human rights and freedoms”.
But was the famine actually the result of a genocidal policy by Stalin? Duranty, possibly the most prominent journalist in the Soviet Union, completely denied the famine, claiming that “conditions are bad, but there is no famine”. His sources were “Soviet commissariats and in foreign embassies with their network of consuls, [...] Britons working as specialists and from my personal connections, Russian and foreign”, sources he fails to ascribe a name to, are “more trustworthy information than I could get by a brief trip through any one area”. He instead inserts any deaths are the result of “diseases due to malnutrition.” A number of prominent Westerners in 1934 agreed with him. However there can be question now of the falsity of their reports especially with the Soviet admitting its occurrence in the 80s and the Ukrainian Communist Party adopting a resolution in 1990 also acknowledging the disaster took place. In fact Duranty's work has become so discredited an attempt to revoke his Pulitzer Prize was put forward and even encouraged by the New York Times.
Robert Conquest on the other hand refers to the catastrophe as a “terror famine” and “inflicted for its own sake” is supported to differing extents by large number of historians. His assertion that the famine was the result of “the setting of grain quotas far above the possible, removing of handful of foods and preventing of help from outside” is collaborated by historian Jasper Becker, “Stalin allowed relief to all other areas”, “Party deliberately and consciously took all grain it could from the peasants” and Robert Service, “starving majority […] had to fulfill state's requirements”. Peter Wiles says “Conquest's research has established beyond a doubt that the famine was deliberately inflicted there for the ethnic reasons to undermine the Ukrainian nation”. However not all historians agree with Conquest and Becker, both Martens and Tottle are critical of Conquest's arguments asserting that the famine was actually caused not by Stalin but by four factors, a civil war perpetrated by the Kulaks and Czarist elements, the drought, the typhoid epidemic and some by the disorder resulting from the economic and social changes and pointing to the drought rather then Soviet policy. Both Marten's and Tottle's arguments are vastly weakened by the Russian's Federation co-sponsorship of a 2003 resolution holding the Soviet Union responsible for the famine which appears to be an admission of guilt. The official documents in the archives likewise “convincingly demonstrates that the blame for the suffering and deaths of millions of people lies squarely with the Stalinist leadership”. However Robert Service notes using the definition of genocide as killing an entire ethnic group or nationality then the Holdomor doesn't really apply. Other nationalities in the Ukraine were in conditions just as poor as the Ukrainians and the grain quotas were cut multiple times 3 times at the report of famines.
Words: 797
E: Conclusion
While clearly Duranty and Conquest don't agree on whether or not the Soviets are to blame for the Holomodor its clear they agree on the answer to whether or not it was genocide. Both believe that the famine was not the result of a genocidal policy when genocide is defined as “the killing of an entire national or ethnic group”. This is a position also supported by historians Service, Tottle, and Martens among others. But Service and Conquest do accuse Stalin of failing to act adequately to prevent or stop the continuation of the famine which means while he was not guilty of genocide the Soviet leader were guilty of a kind of extreme case of criminal malfeasance.
Words 126
F: List of Sources
Becker, Jasper. Hungry Ghosts Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1996
Conquest, Robert. Harvest of Sorrows: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine Oxford University Press US, 1987
Duranty, Walter. “Russians Hungry, But Not Starving”. New York Times New York, March 31st, 1933
Martens, Ludo. “The Resolution on Dekulakization”. Another View of Stalin 1995
Meurs, Mielke. Many Shades of Red Rowman and Littlefield, 1999
“Resolution on the Commemoration of the Holodomor, the Ukrainian artificial famine(1932-1933)”. European Parliament Oct. 23, 2008. June 9, 2009
Service, Robert. A History of modern Russia from Nicholas II to Vladamir Putin Harvard University Press: New Haven, 2005
Sysyn, Frank. “The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-3: The Role of the Ukrainian Diaspora in Research and Public Discussion”. Studies in Comparative Genocide Ed: Levon Chorbajian and George Shirinian, Palgrave Macmillan 1999. pg. 182
Tottle, Douglas. Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard Progress Books: Toronto Canada, 1987
Tucker, Robert C. “Stalinism as Revolution from Above”. Stalinism Ed: Robert C. Tucker Transaction Publishers, 1999

How Did Hitler Become Chancellor?

On January 30th, 1933 Adolf Hitler walked into Hindenburg's office to assume his hard fought role as chancellor and grab hold of the reigns of a 14 year-old German democratic republic. On this day Ludendorff would warn Hindenburg of the future repercussions of his decision; “by appointing Adolf Hitler Chancellor of the Reich, you have handed over our sacred German Fatherland to one of the greatest demagogues of all time. Future generations will curse you in your grave for this action.” This insight would later prove to ring true and mark the end of Hitler’s “rise” and the beginning of the end for Weimar Germany and German democracy for the next 12 years. In order to understand how this position was obtained, one must examine the economic, political and social implications of the years that preceded the achievement as well as Hitler’s own ideology and personal assets.
AJP Taylor stated, "Only the Great Depression put the wind into Hitler's sails". Indeed, this declaration illustrates a view that is commonly used to explain the drastic increase in popularity of the NSDAP after Stresemann’s death in 1929. In 1930 the Nazi party saw their seats increase from 12 in 1928, to 107 seats in the German federal election. One could argue that these statistics can be explained by examining the effects that the Wall Street Crash of 1929 had on Germany. After the Wall Street Crash, the US called in its loans to Germany, thus leading to an economic collapse and social disorder as rates of unemployment and starvation grew. Numbers of unemployment rapidly and consistently increased from 2 million in 1928 to 2.5 million in 1929, 3 million in 1930, 5 million in 1931 and finally 6 million in 1932 just before Hitler took his place as Chancellor. In 1930 Chancellor Bruning cut government expenditure, wages and unemployment pay in hopes of establishing a means to an end. This legislature, however, was not approved by the Reichstag and thus led to President Hindenburg instituting the use of Article 48 in order to pass the measures by decree. Contrary to creating any solutions, this act put the government in further disorder and created an anarchist movement from the people. As put by historian Tony Howarth, “Hitler's policies were half-baked, racist clap-trap... but among the jumble of hysterical ideas Hitler showed a sure sense of how to appeal to the lowest instincts of frightened masses”. Amidst the chaos, Germans began looking for radical solutions and a source to blame their desperations on and Hitler gave them just that. His sympathetic policies and use of propaganda appealed to the masses. The middle class, after a shocking awakening to the obvious failure of democracy, opted for an extremist government. Nationalists and racists supported Hitler’s view that the Treaty of Versailles and reparations were to blame for Germany’s distraught social and economic situation. Although many of the workers turned to communism, this scared the wealthier classes in to financing Hitler’s campaign. Conclusively, Hitler took advantage of the vulnerable economic state of his country in order to gain support for his radically right winged party.
Despite the obvious correlation between economics and political growth, to blame Hitler’s rise to power solely on The Great Depression and the failure of Democracy in Weimar Germany is a simplistic approach to a much more complicated accomplishment. Hitler’s achievement was due far more to his party’s appeal to German society than it was to the people’s disapproval for the previous government. The NSDAP offered Germany what the other parties could not; a return to a nation built upon a traditional lifestyle of customs and security. Dr. Paul Josef Goebbels who was in charge of propaganda did a thorough job in effectively communicating these ideas and increasing support by targeting the interests of specific groups in society. The Berlin chapter of the Nazi party began printing Der Angriff as a form of propaganda. As Goebbels stressed himself, “the most brilliant propagandist technique will yield no success unless one fundamental principle is borne in mind constantly- it must confine itself to a few points and repeat them over and over”. In the case of the Nazis, these points were mainly anti-Semitism and an obvious criticism of the Weimar Republic. Evidently this tactic appealed to the public as a growing demand caused circulation to increase from 2,000 copies in 1927 to 146,694 by 1936. Furthermore, Hitler’s party took a clear stance against the rational fear of impending Communism on Weimar Germany. Unlike central parties such as the SPD who appeared to be impartial to the movement, the NSDAP put to rest many of the people’s uncertainty by employing the use of the Sturmabteilung
in order to eradicate extremist left-wing opponents. Although the group’s success was made possible through the use of committing acts of violence and terror, this
proved to be a success in its own right because it scared off other potential opponents in addition to the targeted groups. Through a combination of tailored appeal to the population and the suppression of potential opposition, Hitler had made it possible to gain a sufficient lead in the polls.
However, by 1933 when it came time for President Hindenburg to appoint a new Chancellor, conditions in Germany had already begun to improve. Levels of unemployment fell from 5.5 to 4.5 million with starvation rates to match. Surprisingly, in the parliamentary elections of Novemeber 1932 the NSDAP’s votes dropped from 4.2 % to 33.1 % while other, smaller party’s support actually increased. Hitler’s personal qualities had been a crucial aspect in carrying him so far. One of his early followers, Karl Ludecke described him by saying; “He was holding the masses, and me with them, under an hypnotic spell by the sheer force of his beliefs. His words were like a whip. When he spoke of the disgrace of Germany, I felt ready to attack any enemy.” Attributes such as captivating, manipulative speech, self-confidence and determination which gave Hitler his powerful, appealing façade was overlooked by Hindenburg and Papen who offered him the position of Chancellor. With the results of the latest polls, they were under the false perception of Hitler’s true intentions and potential and thus maintained the disillusionment that they would be able to maintain control over him after handing over to him the position.
With hindsight, this conception would prove to be false and more dangerous than anyone could have foreseen. Instead of being controlled, Hitler would use Article 48 to obtain absolute power. After years of gradually gaining support through manipulation of Germany’s vulnerable economic and social status as well as his party’s personal appeal to society, he had obtained his final position as Chancellor before absolute dictatorship.

How did Adolf Hitler Become Chancellor?

“By appointing Adolf Hitler Chancellor of the Reich, you have handed over our sacred German Fatherland to one of the greatest demagogues of all time. Future generations will curse you in your grave for this action.” With hindsight, Erich Ludendorff’s words, aimed at Hindenburg after the nomination of Hitler as Reichskanzler in January 1933, are astoundingly accurate. The seizure of the Chancellorship was the leap onto the path to totalitarianism, genocide and world war. Yet one must remember that at the time, this was unpredictable. In order to understand how the appointment was possible, one must untangle the mélange of civilian, economic and authoritative procedures that laid the foundation for Hitler’s rise to the post.

Historians such as David Heath K.M. of Glencairn argue that the NSDAP enjoyed a rapid influx of votes during the last years of Weimar simply due to “protest votes”[1]. After Gustav Stresemann’s disadvantageous demise in October 1929 for instance, the DVP suffered a sudden oscillation of voting results due to the forfeiture of its main head supplying concrete direction and purpose. Müller and Brüning’s chimerical attempts at coalitions failed, as the principal parties found it impossible to coordinate their conflicting policies. In addition to that, during the Great Depression that broke out in the same month as Stresemann’s death, moderate parties appeared to lose millions of votes to more radical groups explicitly opposing democracy. This is manifested in the election results of 1930: the NSDAP won 107 seats in the Reichstag, second only to the SPD with 143 seats, closely followed by the KPD with 77 seats. During times of increasing unemployment and penury, “voters, it seemed, were losing faith in the larger parties”[2], choosing to express their discontent by casting their ballots for extremist, anti-democratic organisations instead. Paul Bookbinder similarly argues that the NSDAP received many votes from anti-Catholic Protestants[3]. However, this is a simplistic approach that labels the entire concept of democracy a sham; it is ridiculous to suggest that millions of people would hoax their own representative government and consciously choose to have it dissolved, despite their deprivation. One must not disregard the genuine appeal that the NSDAP had to all facets of German society as an honest party. Propaganda, deployed by publicity-mastermind Dr. Paul Josef Goebbels, “succeeded in transcending social boundaries and uniting highly disparate social groups on the basis of a common ideology”[4], aiming at all citizens: workers, farmers, men, women, youth. It drew on the rigid German customs familiar to everyone; in a society cultivating the grounded fear of social upheaval from radical Communists, the NSDAP had reassuring voice calling for the return to order and tradition. It offered the stability and concrete beliefs that the SPD, DVP and ZP could not; its solidity was sharply silhouetted against the whimsical haze of the others.
“Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few.” George Bernard Shaw’s words are tailored to illustrate Hitler’s opportunity to become Chancellor after his party became the largest in the Reichstag in July 1932 with 37.3% of the votes. After the foundering of four consecutive Chancellors since 1928, President Hindenburg, executing Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, was obliged to appoint a new one. The orthodox notion is that he naturally looked to Hitler due to the fact that he was the leader of the strongest political party and thus had clear piloting potential. However, this is not the case; in fact, this was the point at which Hitler was at his weakest. In the parliamentary election of November 1932, the NSDAP lost 4.2% of votes, dropping to 33.1%, while the KPD and DVP showed slight increases[5]. It appeared that Hitler’s career had reached an anticlimax. While conditions in Germany improved (unemployment fell from 5.5 to 4.5 million)[6], the NSDAP rapidly lost support. Hindenburg chose someone he thought would be unassuming and highly unlikely to do anything drastic. Franz von Papen, bitter about his replacement by General Kurt von Schleicher, hoped to oust the latter; his conspiracy[7] involved the placement of Hitler as Chancellor and himself as a manipulative Vice-Chancellor. Hitler was guessed to be safe and muted. This was possibly the gravest miscalculation in history. Difficult as it is to express, knowing what he brought to the twentieth century, Hitler’s political astuteness was greatly underestimated. Not only were his speeches gripping, his eyes captivating[8] and his ideas substantial, Hitler also had the invaluable talent of political infighting by playing ministers against one another.[9] According to French Ambassador André-Francois Poncet, “he was an ice-cold realist, a profoundly calculating person.” This would be a factor leading to his eventual seizure of absolute power as undisputed Führer of the German Reich in 1934.
One of the most important driving forces of the early twentieth century, often forgotten as a main catalyst of socio-political changes in the Weimar Republic, was the sweeping fear of Communism. 1917 saw the fall of one of the most well-anchored dynasties in Eurasia: the Romanov monarchy. David Heath, Laird of Glencairn, persuasively argues that communism was a realistic threat to Weimar: 50,000 Spartacists, led by Liebknecht and Luxembourg, who in turn seemed to be Lenin’s puppets, roamed the streets of Berlin in 1919[10]; the Red Army and workers’ councils called for a Socialist revolution, Bolshevism and anarchy seemed close to vanquishing the last shred of order. Hitler’s NSDAP displayed a clear stance against this threat, unlike many of the moderate parties. Industry and businesses chose to trust Hitler’s promise of capitalism, sponsoring him in the hope of purging Weimar of the threat of nationalization. These included successful businessmen Thyssen, Krupp and Ford[11]. Their money gave Hitler the ability to campaign and reach vast areas of the country: he was able to fly from town to town and broadcast speeches via radio, thus winning the hearts of countless Germans. The Sturmabteilung, violent as it was, personified a distinct front against Communism and not only eradicated Hitler’s left-wing opponents, but also proved to the public how resolute he was to act against the Marxist terror. However, this also had another effect. Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany’s army was limited to 100,000 men. With 3 million members in the Sturmabteilung opposing the vast number of Communist sympathisers, a German civil war would be a cataclysm impossible to mollify. It was clear to Hindenburg that Hitler, were he not elected Chancellor, had the power to begin it, since he would have no more to lose. The army, their nationalist purpose naturally precipitating a loathing for Communism, had to accept Hitler as the most stable choice, albeit supposedly temporary.
Tragically, Hitler’s rise to power was everything but temporary.


[1] Hayse, Michael R. Recasting West German Elites: Higher Civil Servants, Business Leaders and Physicians in Hesse Between Nazism and Democracy, 1945-1955. Page 20. Berghahn Books, 2003.
[2] Shelton, Dinah. Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, Volume 1. Page 400. Macmillan Reference, 2005.
[3] Bookbinder, Paul. Weimar Germany: The Republic of the Reasonable. Page 81. Manchester University Press, 1996.
[4] Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. Page 264. London: Penguin Books Ldt, 2003.
[5] Orlow, Dietrich. Weimar Prussia, 1925-1933: The Illusion of Strength. Page 162. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.
[6] Stachura, Peter D. Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany. Page 109. Macmillan 1986.
[7] Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. Page 306. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2003.
[8] Pinkus, Oscar. The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler. Page 8. McFarland, 2005.
[9] Harvey, Richard. Hitler and the Third Reich. Page 60. Nelson Thornes, 1998.
[10] Bookbinder, Paul. Weimar Germany: The Republic of the Reasonable. Page 57. Manchester University Press, 1996.
[11] Duthel, Heinz. The Bilderberger Group - Saviors or Destroyers? Page 423. 2008.

Was Stalin’s Death a Result of Beria’s Poisoning?

Summary of Evidence
∙Stalin’s Condition Before 1953
Stalin was going through deterioration in his health since his minor strokes before 1953. From 1951 to 1952, however, he refused to take any medication and yet his high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis and rheumatism were all developing.
∙The Final Stroke that Led Stalin to His Death
On the night of February 28th, Stalin watched a film at the Kremlin, and returned to his dacha where he was joined by Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Bulganin, who stayed until and left at 4:00 A.M, Khruschev and Bulganin separately, while Beria and Malenkov together in a car. Then the guards received an order from Stalin through Khrustalev, which was to go off duty. Up to the evening on the next day, there was a complete silence, which led to a suspicion within the guards, who were yet afraid to counter Stalin’s order and go into his suite. Eventually, Pyotr Lozgachev, one of Stalin’s bodyguards, went into his suite at 22:00 and found the crippled Stalin lying on the floor. Next to him was his broken pocket watch showing 6:30 and there was an open bottle of mineral water on the table. The guards were called in by Lozgachev and they helped him move the Boss to the sofa. The guards called Ignatiev, the Minister of State Security, who referred to Malenkov and Beria.
∙The Response of the Politburo Members
Malenkov called Beria, Bulganin and Khrushchev to inform about the guards’ report of Stalin’s physical state. It was thirty minutes after Starostin called when a call came from Malenkov, saying that he could not find Beria. Another thirty minutes later, Beria rang the guards to tell them not to inform anybody about Stalin’s illness.
At 3:00 A.M., Beria came into Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov, glanced at Stalin and swore at the guards, telling them that Stalin was asleep and therefore they should not panic or disturb him. He prohibited any use of the telephone and left the place. Around 8 in the morning Khrushchev came into the dacha, telling the guards that he summoned doctors, who arrived between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M. with artificial ventilation which, unknown for what reason, was not used.
∙The Doctors’ Examination
Stalin’s symptoms were due to brain hemorrhage caused by his hypertension and atherosclerosis but the doctors also concluded that Stalin was poisoned and they tried to treat him for poisoning while at the same time did not expose this fact to other people, including the four Politburo members. Stalin’s condition got worse as the time went by. On March 4th, besides the symptoms involving the skin on his face, legs and arms turning blue and his liver being enlarged, his blood and urine examination results proved that he was poisoned. In the morning of March 5th, Stalin vomited blood which led to a decrease in his blood pressure and several times of collapse on the same day.
∙Stalin’s Death
Stalin eventually died at 9:50 P.M., after going through a severe hardship with breathing.
∙After Stalin’s Death
Beria ran out to the corridor, calling Khrustalev to get his car to go to the Kremlin. After a while, the other Politburo members went to the Kremlin as well, to acquire power. Then the car with stretcher arrived to carry Stalin to the hospital for embalming and Khrustalev went to the hospital as well.
The guards who served Stalin were to be eliminated from their jobs, so Starostin, Orlov and Tukov went to see Beria and resist but Beria’s threat of killing them made them to depart immediately. Other jobs were given to the guards except Khrustalev who fell ill and died soon.

Evaluation of Sources
Source 1
CHUEV: Beria himself was said to have killed him.
MOLOTOV: …‘Sometimes he seemed about to come to. At those moments Beria would stay close to Stalin. Oh! He was always ready...
One cannot exclude the possibility that he had a hand in Stalin's death... he did drop hints…"I did him in!...I saved all of you!" ’

This source could be valuable in supporting the conviction of Beria as Stalin’s assassinate, referring to its origin, which is the interview of Molotov, to whom whom the suspect, Beria, talked to in person. The exact quotation from Beria, together with Molotov’s witnesses of his mysterious behavior which made Molotov believe that “he was always ready” to harm the Boss, elevates the convincing aspect of the argument. The main value of this source could be that the statement was from Molotov, the contemporary Politburo member, not a historian.
However, it should be in consideration that the book was published in 1993, which is far after Stalin’s death, and the source’s origin, to be more precise, is Chuev, who interviewed Molotov. His interview question seems to be a guiding one, as Molotov says “Oh!” indicating his realization right at that time. It arises the possibility of Chuev trying to use Molotov’s words to support his opinion and the publish date which makes this source too modern also undermines the reliability of the source because it was after when the theory of Beria’s planned murder of Stalin had been introduced. Molotov says that Beria dropped “hints” through his words but one cannot absolutely ensure if Beria really meant that he poisoned Stalin tactfully or simply contributed to Stalin’s death with some delay in summoning doctors. He seems to be creating a distorted characterization of Beria with some words that would have been not as intricate or Machiavellian to support his argument.

Source 2
“Arteriosclerosis, which developed during the night of March 1-2 on the basis of hypertonia and cerebral hemorrhage in his left brain hemisphere, has resulted, apart from the right-side paralysis of limbs and loss of consciousness, in impaired stem section of the brain, accompanied by disturbances of the vital functions of breathing and blood circulation.”

Unlike Source 1, this source originates in the contemporary newspaper articles from Pravda and contains medical reports with specific diagnoses of Stalin’s health conditions, not human judgment from a particular political member. The source could be appreciated for containing factual descriptions of Stalin’s health and as it involves nothing about Stalin being poisoned or symptoms related to it, it strongly denies the idea that Stalin was poisoned by Beria before his death.
On the other hand, this is not an official medical report from the doctors but an announcement from the Soviet government. Pravda, as a national paper published by the Soviet government, was famous to the public for being biased and inaccurate. The possibility of the manipulation made in the Politburo members’ favor cannot be excluded. Therefore the source, in spite of medical facts, lacks accuracy and the strong negative impression that Pravda gave to the contemporary society prevents one from judging Stalin’s condition totally based on such report.

Analysis
To figure out if Stalin died because Beria poisoned him, it is important to start considering the possibility firstly by exploring the events around Stalin’s death. After the four Politburo members left Stalin’s dacha at 4, it was Khrustalev, not Stalin himself who talked to the guards about going off duty. Beria, among the four guests, being the closest with Khrustalev suggests that he ordered Khrustalev to let the guards vacate. In addition, the fact that other guards got substitute jobs but Khrustalev, the only guard who was allowed to see Stalin being embalmed, fell ill and died raises a question if this was one of Beria’s efforts to expunge evidence that could prove him guilty.
When Lozgachev went in, he saw a bottle of water next to Stalin. Why was this bottle not sent to the Stalin Museum from the Kremlin sanitary department when it had to send medicaments and empty mineral bottles in November 1953? Was it because it contained the poison that killed Stalin? The very possible scenario in Stalin’s suite on March 1st during the hours between 4 A.M. and 10 P.M. is that Khrustalev put poison in Stalin’s water bottle while all the guards were back at home by Beria’s command.
Beria had been delaying in his response to the guards and when he came to Stalin’s dacha with Malenkov at 3 o’ clock, he swore at the guards and left the place immediately but forbade their use of communication line. According to Khrushchev, Malenkov called him right after the guards called and he thought the visit from all four Politburo members around 8 o’clock was the first visit from all of them but it was the second one made by Beria, which Khrushchev did not know. He was trying to hide Stalin’s condition and his awareness of it from others.
After Stalin’s death, Beria went out immediately to Kremlin, where he assumed authority and this, together with all his suspicious behavior before Stalin’s death, conveys the idea that Beria, with his strong motive of gaining power, took advantage of Stalin’s health to kill him with poison and achieve what he wanted.
On the other hand, there are counter-arguments that defend Beria. As Medvedev argues, for years, Stalin denied taking medication so his death could have been nothing more than a corollary of his long-term diseases. But this argument now seems to be nominal as all the symptoms due to poison written in the official medical records were exposed. The doctors knew Stalin was poisoned and that was why they did not use the artificial ventilation, which was not useful. The absence of such facts in articles from Pravda, controlled by the Soviet government, does not argue against conviction of Beria but supports it by explaining why the reports in Pravda were falsified: Beria killed Stalin and he had enough power to manipulate the facts about Stalin’s symptoms.
Yet blaming Beria with asperity for power, seen after Stalin’s death, is quite unreasonable because he did not try to appoint himself as the President but Vice-President. If Beria is to be blamed for such motive, then why not other people like Vasili Stalin, who despised his father and suffered humiliation after Stalin forfeiting his authority or Khrushchev, who was the successor of Stalin after all?
Shortly, the argument stating Stalin died because Beria poisoned him gets supports from Beria’s suspicious behaviour, his relation with Khrustalev, and the recently-discovered official medical reports. The opposite argument arises from that Stalin’s death was the result of neglected delayed treatment and that there are other possible suspects.

Conclusion
Certainly, there are a variety of supporters of the argument that convicts Beria as the assassin using poison to kill Stalin. On the other hand, their argument is depreciated by the facts that Stalin’s health was already on a rapid wane and that there are other possible suspects including his family members and the Politburo members. However, with recently discovered official medical reports corroborating Stalin being poisoned and Beria’s possession of the closest contact with the guards including Khrustalev, this argument seems to have a sizeable amount of evidentiary support. To conclude, Stalin died because he was poisoned by Beria.

Bibliography

Books
Alliluyeva, Svetlana. Twenty Letters to a Friend. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

Brent, Jonathan. Naumov, Vlamidir. Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.

Chuev, Feliks. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. Chicago: I. R. Dee, 1993.

Committee on Slavic Studies. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Cambridge: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1953.

Conquest, Robert. Stalin: Breaker of Nations. London:Penguin, 1992.

Deriabin, Peter. Inside Stalin's Kremlin: An Eyewitness Account of Brutality, Duplicity, and Intrigue. Washington [D.C.]: Brassey's, 1998.

Deriabin, Peter. Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1984.

Eaton, Katherine. Daily Life in the Soviet Union. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.

Radzinsky, Edvard. STALIN: The First In-Depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996.

Richardson, Rosamond. Stalin’s Shadow. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994.
Medvedev, Zhores. Dahrendorf, Ellen. The Unknown Stalin. London: I.B. Tauris, 2006.

Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton, 2004.

Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991.

DVD

Who Killed Stalin, DVD. Directed by Tim Robinson. UK: BBC Timewatch, 2005.

Internet
Pravda.Ru, “Secret documents reveal Stalin was poisoned.” Pravda.Ru (December 29, 2005), http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/90/363/16693_Stalin.html.

How Did Hitler Consolidate Power?

As A.J.P Taylor said, “Hitler’s rise to power was consequential;, it was only a matter of time.” [1] The creation of Hitler’s dictatorial state was established not long after his invitation to become Chancellor in January 1933.. In fact it was right after his becoming of chancellor when he really began to exploit his powers, eventually declaring ‘A Thousand Years Reich’ after being crowned Fuhrer on August 19, 1934. [2] But how was Hitler able to get even greater support from the German population in later years after becoming Fuhrer? How did he gain an allegiance from the German people in his consolidation of power?

“Make the lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe it.”[3] This is one of Hitler’s most famous statements and the ideology he followed. Hitler’s primary method of consolidating power was to forcefully entice the German people by the means of terror and use of propaganda. In other words, even if the German people did not know that they were being dragged to supporting Hitler against their will, this was exactly what Hitler was doing. On the other hand, for the Germans that were reactionary against his Nazi regime, they were sentenced to time in concentration camps. This did not bother him as he already had control and strong support from a great number of the German youth. As Hitler said: “He alone, who owns the youth, gains the future.” [4] He had the future of Germany in his grasp. But for Hitler to better control Germany and diminish rebellions he had to strike terror into the people and those who would oppose his rule. Therefore, Hermann Goering established the GESTAPO on April 26, 1933. [5] Goering wrote in his book “Germany Reborn” “Finally I alone created, on my own initiative, the State Secret Police Department. This is the instrument which is so much feared by the enemies of the State, and which is chiefly responsible for the fact that in Germany and Prussia today there is no question of a Marxist or Communist danger.”[6] But it was in April, 1934, when Goering handed the GESTAPO over to Himmler that it began to develop as a division of the SS, where after they truly became a terrorizing force over the German people.[7] However, it was not until the Gestapo law publicized by the government on February 10, 1936 that the Gestapo organization was above the law. [8] This meant that the courts were not allowed to interfere with the activities of the Gestapo in anyway. The “enemies of state” were placed in ‘Schutzhaft’ or protective custody but this did not mean the person was protected against harm.[9] They were placed in concentration camps and tortured depending upon their hierarchical standing. This was but one method in which the Nazi party tried to forcefully get the German people to blindly support them.? Whilst terror was being applied to manipulate the actions of the German people, propaganda was also extensively used to control the way people thought. Hitler appointed Dr. Joseph Goebbels as Reichminister for propaganda and National Enlightenment in 1933. [10]Goebbels’s job was to control what was shown to the public, certifying that nothing damaging to the Nazi Party was shared with the public. He also tried to propagandize the views of the Nazi party and in return give off a positive sentiment. Goebbels, with the title of Reichminister for propaganda was given complete control over the press, radio, cinema and theatre all of which materially benefited Hitler’s consolidation of power. One of the first demonstrations against non-Nazi teachings, illustrating Nazi mind control over the German youth was on the midnight of 1933, May 10th, where thousands of Nazi College students participated in the mass burning of books. [11] Many of the books which were already censored and written by Jews and communists; approximately 20,000 books were burnt outside the University of Berlin.[12] In addition, Goebbels and other members of the Nazi party were already rewriting all textbooks and teachings to educate the German youth. This was very important in fact in creating loyal followers of Hitler and the Nazi party. The Nazi schooling curriculum would include biology, history, geography, science, etc. But the aim of the Nazi teachings would be to promote a knowing a race superiority, self-discipline and strong nationalistic fervour at a young age. For example, biology was the study of different races to ‘scientifically prove’ racial superiority.[13] “Racial Instruction” began at the age of six and Hitler himself decreed that “no boy or girl should leave school without complete knowledge of the necessity and meaning of blood purity.” [14]As Hitler himself said,: “Let me control the textbooks and I will control the state. The state will take youth and give to youth its own education and its own upbringing.”[15] Another key element in Goebbel’s propaganda movement was to heighten Hitler’s position as Fuhrer in the eyes of the German people. In other words it was to make him appear even greater. On Hitler’s birthday, Joseph Goebbels would always prepare a speech in front of the German masses to compliment him for what he has been ‘doing’ for Germany. On Hitler’s 49th birthday in 1938, Goebbels said: “In these moving moments, we saw in the Fuhrer's face that the pain of his people was his pain, that he shared their pain and misery, that no one could suffer more for his homeland than he.” [16]This is only just one extraction from the long speech Goebbels had to make. However, it shows how Goebbels was through propaganda in speech making Hitler appear to the German people as an honorary hero of Germany. He wanted to make the people see Hitler as their saviour and moreover as their “God.” At the same time, Hitler and his Nazi party was also brainwashing kids into an organization known as the Hitler Jugend. In 1932, there was just under 107,956 youths in the Hitler Jugend. By the end of 1939, there was over 8,000,000 enrolling.[17] He stated that: “When an opponent declares, ‘I will not come over to your side,’ I calmly say, ‘Your child belongs to us already... What are you? You will pass on. Your descendants, however, now stand in the new camp. In a short time they will know nothing else but this new community.’”[18] This is exactly what Hitler had accomplished. They were loyal to him as the SS were. For when Allied forces invaded Germany near the end of war, the Hitler Jugend stood against them. The new generation of Germany had been completely brainwashed by Hitler and Nazi propaganda. Hitler was able to consolidate power through many ways, but the easiest way in which he did so was by “forcefully” making people support by “brainwashing” people with the use of propaganda and striking terror in them. He had the support of a large number of the youth in Germany and regular Germans so controlling and improving his view to the German people was not too hard.

Another way in which Hitler was able to consolidate power was by pleasing the German people. Hitler at the time was seen as an icon of victory. He had three main aims which many historians argue today were long term effects in Germany leading to World War Two: ‘tearing up’ the Treaty of Versailles, Lebensraum and uniting the Germans in a single country. However, these long term effects set the foundation for a stronger Germany. In 1934, a year after Hitler’s coming to power; he gave orders to rearm Germany. The army grew from 100,000 men to 300,000 by October 1, 1934. [19] They also constructed two battle cruisers called the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau and six submarines which were all prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles.[20] In just a year’s time, Hitler openly announced the decree of conscription and that the army would be increased to 550,000 men.[21] At the same time, countries around Germany were forming diplomatic alliances but none did anything to stop Germany’s breaching of the Treaty of Versailles. On March 2, 1936, Hitler ordered his army to march into Rhineland. [22] He sent in 30,000 equipped troops but it was a gamble as he noted that if the French were to act “we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our legs.”[23] But out of luck, the British refused to help the French and they also did not fight. So the Germans were able to easily occupy the Rhineland. During the same year as the occupying of the Rhineland in 1036, Hitler also formed a number of foreign alliances. In 1936, he had the Rome-Berlin Axis pact with Mussolini and the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan on the other side of the globe. By forming these alliances with foreign countries he was not only strengthening Germany, but he was also building up an even greater belief in him within the German people. In 1938, Hitler was ready to form a union, or Anschluss with Austria. He wanted to bring German speaking people into a single country. But the Anschluss was forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles.[24] Hitler began by ordering the Nazi Party in Austria to create chaos. When the Austrian leader Schuschnigg banned this, Hitler held a meeting with him whereby he threatened to invade if the Nazis were not given the most important roles in the Austrian government. Schuschnigg had to agree but he tried to hold a vote for Austria to remain independent or part of Germany. However Hitler had other plans, Schuschnigg was replaced by and Austrian Nazi called Seyss-Inquart and asked Hitler to send German army into Austria to restore order. Later on, the Gestapo and SS were sent in to deal other enemies. Austria was now part of Germany and its people lived under the Nazi reign of terror. However, Hitler wanted more land. He looked to the richest part of Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland as it contained 3 million people living there that spoke German because it was part of the Austrian Empire before 1919.[25] Hitler ordered the Sudeten German Party leader, Konrad Henlein to stir up trouble in Sudetenland[26]. Henlein arranged riots complaining that the Czech government was treating Sudeten Germans unfairly. Whilst this was happening Hitler gathered his armies around the border ready to fight. But this time they couldn’t invade as the Czechs had a powerful ally, France to help them. Hitler was not ready to battle two countries at the same time. But within a few months time, Neville Chamberlain, Prime Minister of Britain persuaded France to let Germany have Sudetenland as they feared that it could escalate into a big war. France agreed with Britain that they would not be involved and Germany took over the Sudetenland. Hitler was keeping his promises to the German people. He promised ‘living space’ and breaking of the Treaty of Versailles and that is what he gave them. By doing this Hitler gained an even greater support from the German people and was able to consolidate power fairly easily with few people against him.

Hitler was able to consolidate power by keeping his promises to the German people. He had gained an allegiance from them and could further expand his power by taking over other countries with support from Germany. Britain and France adopting a policy of appeasement made it even easier for Hitler to consolidate power. He was gaining more support than he ever had and was becoming overly audacious in his plans. However, Hitler did not stop and with his invasion into Poland whereby he knew Britain would protect them he did not layback. This was the final string triggering World War II.

Skills shown in answering the question- ¾ (presentation a problem in particular)

Knowledge- 4/4

Understanding the question- 4/4

Historiography- 4/4 (although limited to simple quotes)

Analysis and interpretations- 2/4 No attempt to provide contrary arguments

17/20



[1] The Origins of the Second World War, A.J.P.Taylor, Page 21.

[2] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, Page 212

[3] http://thinkexist.com/quotation/make_the_lie_big-make_it_simple-keep_saying_it/175795.html

[4] Hitler, one of his speeches in year 1935. http://thinkexist.com/quotation/he-alone-who-owns-the-youth-gains-the-future/348635.html

[5] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, page250

[6] Germany Reborn, Hermann Goering.

[7] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, page250

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid, page 251,

[10] http://www.hyperhistory.net/apwh/essays/comp/cw35propaganda.htm

[11] http://blog.tianya.cn/blogger/post_show.asp?BlogID=1157398&PostID=12666086

[12] Hitler’s Dictatorship, Part One, page 19.

[13] http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/Nazis_Education.htm

[14] Ibid

[15] Notable Quotes of Socialism, http://www.wealth4freedom.com/truth/Socialism.htm

[16] Joseph Goebbels, “ ‘Es gibt Männer, die man achtet, bewundert und verehrt ---den Fuhrer aber lieben wir.’ Die Rundfunkrede des Reichsministers Dr. Goebbels am Vorabend des Geburtstages des Fuhrers,” Volkischer Beobachter, 21 April 1938.

[17]http://www.japanweb.info/browse.php?u=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5sb2VzZXIudXMvZXhhbXBsZXMveW91dGguaHRtbA%3D%3D&b=31

[18] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, Page 249

[19] Hitler’s Dictatorship, Undoing The Treaty of Versailles, page 22

[20] The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich, William Shirer, Page 260

[21] Ibid

[22] Ibid, page 268

[23] Hitler’s Dictatorship, Undoing The Treaty of Versailles, page 23

[24] Ibid

[25] Ibid, page24.

[26] Ibid.