How did Adolf Hitler Become Chancellor?

“By appointing Adolf Hitler Chancellor of the Reich, you have handed over our sacred German Fatherland to one of the greatest demagogues of all time. Future generations will curse you in your grave for this action.” With hindsight, Erich Ludendorff’s words, aimed at Hindenburg after the nomination of Hitler as Reichskanzler in January 1933, are astoundingly accurate. The seizure of the Chancellorship was the leap onto the path to totalitarianism, genocide and world war. Yet one must remember that at the time, this was unpredictable. In order to understand how the appointment was possible, one must untangle the mélange of civilian, economic and authoritative procedures that laid the foundation for Hitler’s rise to the post.

Historians such as David Heath K.M. of Glencairn argue that the NSDAP enjoyed a rapid influx of votes during the last years of Weimar simply due to “protest votes”[1]. After Gustav Stresemann’s disadvantageous demise in October 1929 for instance, the DVP suffered a sudden oscillation of voting results due to the forfeiture of its main head supplying concrete direction and purpose. Müller and Brüning’s chimerical attempts at coalitions failed, as the principal parties found it impossible to coordinate their conflicting policies. In addition to that, during the Great Depression that broke out in the same month as Stresemann’s death, moderate parties appeared to lose millions of votes to more radical groups explicitly opposing democracy. This is manifested in the election results of 1930: the NSDAP won 107 seats in the Reichstag, second only to the SPD with 143 seats, closely followed by the KPD with 77 seats. During times of increasing unemployment and penury, “voters, it seemed, were losing faith in the larger parties”[2], choosing to express their discontent by casting their ballots for extremist, anti-democratic organisations instead. Paul Bookbinder similarly argues that the NSDAP received many votes from anti-Catholic Protestants[3]. However, this is a simplistic approach that labels the entire concept of democracy a sham; it is ridiculous to suggest that millions of people would hoax their own representative government and consciously choose to have it dissolved, despite their deprivation. One must not disregard the genuine appeal that the NSDAP had to all facets of German society as an honest party. Propaganda, deployed by publicity-mastermind Dr. Paul Josef Goebbels, “succeeded in transcending social boundaries and uniting highly disparate social groups on the basis of a common ideology”[4], aiming at all citizens: workers, farmers, men, women, youth. It drew on the rigid German customs familiar to everyone; in a society cultivating the grounded fear of social upheaval from radical Communists, the NSDAP had reassuring voice calling for the return to order and tradition. It offered the stability and concrete beliefs that the SPD, DVP and ZP could not; its solidity was sharply silhouetted against the whimsical haze of the others.
“Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few.” George Bernard Shaw’s words are tailored to illustrate Hitler’s opportunity to become Chancellor after his party became the largest in the Reichstag in July 1932 with 37.3% of the votes. After the foundering of four consecutive Chancellors since 1928, President Hindenburg, executing Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, was obliged to appoint a new one. The orthodox notion is that he naturally looked to Hitler due to the fact that he was the leader of the strongest political party and thus had clear piloting potential. However, this is not the case; in fact, this was the point at which Hitler was at his weakest. In the parliamentary election of November 1932, the NSDAP lost 4.2% of votes, dropping to 33.1%, while the KPD and DVP showed slight increases[5]. It appeared that Hitler’s career had reached an anticlimax. While conditions in Germany improved (unemployment fell from 5.5 to 4.5 million)[6], the NSDAP rapidly lost support. Hindenburg chose someone he thought would be unassuming and highly unlikely to do anything drastic. Franz von Papen, bitter about his replacement by General Kurt von Schleicher, hoped to oust the latter; his conspiracy[7] involved the placement of Hitler as Chancellor and himself as a manipulative Vice-Chancellor. Hitler was guessed to be safe and muted. This was possibly the gravest miscalculation in history. Difficult as it is to express, knowing what he brought to the twentieth century, Hitler’s political astuteness was greatly underestimated. Not only were his speeches gripping, his eyes captivating[8] and his ideas substantial, Hitler also had the invaluable talent of political infighting by playing ministers against one another.[9] According to French Ambassador André-Francois Poncet, “he was an ice-cold realist, a profoundly calculating person.” This would be a factor leading to his eventual seizure of absolute power as undisputed Führer of the German Reich in 1934.
One of the most important driving forces of the early twentieth century, often forgotten as a main catalyst of socio-political changes in the Weimar Republic, was the sweeping fear of Communism. 1917 saw the fall of one of the most well-anchored dynasties in Eurasia: the Romanov monarchy. David Heath, Laird of Glencairn, persuasively argues that communism was a realistic threat to Weimar: 50,000 Spartacists, led by Liebknecht and Luxembourg, who in turn seemed to be Lenin’s puppets, roamed the streets of Berlin in 1919[10]; the Red Army and workers’ councils called for a Socialist revolution, Bolshevism and anarchy seemed close to vanquishing the last shred of order. Hitler’s NSDAP displayed a clear stance against this threat, unlike many of the moderate parties. Industry and businesses chose to trust Hitler’s promise of capitalism, sponsoring him in the hope of purging Weimar of the threat of nationalization. These included successful businessmen Thyssen, Krupp and Ford[11]. Their money gave Hitler the ability to campaign and reach vast areas of the country: he was able to fly from town to town and broadcast speeches via radio, thus winning the hearts of countless Germans. The Sturmabteilung, violent as it was, personified a distinct front against Communism and not only eradicated Hitler’s left-wing opponents, but also proved to the public how resolute he was to act against the Marxist terror. However, this also had another effect. Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany’s army was limited to 100,000 men. With 3 million members in the Sturmabteilung opposing the vast number of Communist sympathisers, a German civil war would be a cataclysm impossible to mollify. It was clear to Hindenburg that Hitler, were he not elected Chancellor, had the power to begin it, since he would have no more to lose. The army, their nationalist purpose naturally precipitating a loathing for Communism, had to accept Hitler as the most stable choice, albeit supposedly temporary.
Tragically, Hitler’s rise to power was everything but temporary.


[1] Hayse, Michael R. Recasting West German Elites: Higher Civil Servants, Business Leaders and Physicians in Hesse Between Nazism and Democracy, 1945-1955. Page 20. Berghahn Books, 2003.
[2] Shelton, Dinah. Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, Volume 1. Page 400. Macmillan Reference, 2005.
[3] Bookbinder, Paul. Weimar Germany: The Republic of the Reasonable. Page 81. Manchester University Press, 1996.
[4] Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. Page 264. London: Penguin Books Ldt, 2003.
[5] Orlow, Dietrich. Weimar Prussia, 1925-1933: The Illusion of Strength. Page 162. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.
[6] Stachura, Peter D. Unemployment and the Great Depression in Weimar Germany. Page 109. Macmillan 1986.
[7] Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich. Page 306. London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2003.
[8] Pinkus, Oscar. The War Aims and Strategies of Adolf Hitler. Page 8. McFarland, 2005.
[9] Harvey, Richard. Hitler and the Third Reich. Page 60. Nelson Thornes, 1998.
[10] Bookbinder, Paul. Weimar Germany: The Republic of the Reasonable. Page 57. Manchester University Press, 1996.
[11] Duthel, Heinz. The Bilderberger Group - Saviors or Destroyers? Page 423. 2008.