To what extent did Khrushchev help diffuse the Cold War up to 1960?

Although Khrushchev could not be consistent in all of his foreign policies during 1953 to 1960, his involvement in the Cold War was instrumental to the eventual full diffusion of tension between the United States and the USSR. He made his intentions of ending monolithic communism, reducing army costs and promoting a "peaceful co-existence" clear when he came into power, and the inconsistencies in action can be largely attributed to the response and influence of the West and its Eastern allies, respectively.

Under Stalin, the USSR was incessantly preparing for US aggression, while trying to rebuild a war-torn Soviet Union. The dilemma was the choice between bread for the Russian people and protection for the nation, both of which were essential to the country's survival. Khrushchev did not inherit a Russia that was free from bondage, and thus he had to find a way to negotiate with the West in order to buy peace and so to concentrate on the rebuilding of the USSR. And thus, he, as the First Secretary of the Communist Party, presented his initial ideas of reform through his secret speech in February, 1946 to more than twenty-four million people, including the Komsomol (Soviet Communist Youth), eventually publicized internationally with the help of Allen Dulles. Even so, many orthodox historians might argue that the measures taken in Budapest during the Hungarian uprising in 1957 would testify against the supposed liberalization of the Soviet sphere. The same claim could be made about Czechoslovakia, though again, Sergei Khrushchev, son of Nikkita Khrushchev and a historian as well, would eventually claim that the Soviet military involvement prevented a civil war that would have been even more detrimental.

Having established his political stance, Khrushchev also began to cut his military financing and forces, which was about 5.5 million people in 1955. In armed forces along, Khrushchev decreased the size of the Soviet's armed forces to 640,000 in 1956, and an eventual three billion less from 1953 to 1963. The drastic changes he pushed for in politics and the military cannot be ignored as progressive actions to ensure the reduction of tension between the West and the Communist bloc. The outcome of his diplomacy, however, was only logical because though there was a temporary "Spring", shown in the installation of Gamolka and Nagy, the acceptance of Tito, departure from Austria, and visit upon American soil, the positive changes were brought to a halt by the negative responses from the West and the immediate need to return to militaristic competition and paranoia. The US, undergoing the Red Scare during that very period, was in no shape to accept the peace offerings Khrushchev made. As Sergei Khrushchev said during a recent interview, "the main purpose of the U.S.A.'s propaganda assault was not to help reforms in the Soviet Union, but to destabilize it, along with its allies." Such an impression left the Soviets no choice but to return to a hard-line approach to all Western affairs. Therefore, because of the Western party's distrust and unwillingness to cooperate, the Cold War did not thaw.

Yet even though the West and Communist Russia did not seem to reconciliate and the Cold War grew worse and was right on the brink of becoming a nuclear Third World War later on during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the seven years in question did illustrate the fact that the Cold War was perpetuated and fed by misunderstanding, fear and historical resentment.