Why did U.S. troops shoot at No-Gun-Ri incident?

AbstractOver 50 years after the “Forgotten War”, the countries that fought in the war, namely the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States, still blame each other for starting the war, for war crimes during the war and for many other unresolved points of contention. Also, the United States’ undeclared war in Korea continues today because the fighting was stopped only stopped by a ‘ceasefire’ in 1953. The Armistice Agreement was never turned into a permanent peace treaty, although such an outcome was promised in the Agreement.

This essay deals with the No Gun Ri incident in late July 1950, very close to the official start of the Korean War. This incident was mentioned at all by the media outside the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, where nearly 400 South Korean civilians were shot to death by United States army. By comparison, 200-500 civilians were murdered by US army troops in the infamous My Lai incident in 1968. This essay will deal with the question of whether U.S troops shot on stationary Korean civilians who showed no threat to them, or whether they shot because of DPRK soldiers secretly mixed in among the civilians. In the beginning of this essay, other so called Massacres by DPRK will be discussed, and then the No Gun Ri incident will be discussed. The essay will investigate the condition of the U.S. troops’ and the villagers’ conditions. The reason why U.S. troops decided to shoot Korean villagers will be debated in the end.

The two main sources that will be used for this investigation are ‘The bridge at No Gun Ri: A hidden nightmare from the Korean War’ and ‘No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident’. It is noteworthy that these two sources contradict each other.

word count: 298Contents:U.S massacres in Korea 2No Gun RI massacre 3Condition of U.S. forces in June and July 1950 4Refugee Control Policies of the U.S. and Republic of Korea 5The Tactical Situation 8Movement of villagers (Leading to the incident in No Gun RI) 9Shooting on civilians 10Conclusion 13Bibliography_____________________________________________________________18Appendix_______________________________________________________________19U.S massacres in KoreaThe U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy were directly involved in numerous massacres of Korean civilians (Both DPRK and ROK). Kim Il Song, the leader of the DPRK, has written in his own biography about No Gun Ri and the massacre of 35,000 North Korean civilians during the US military occupation of the area near Pyongyang.

“In Sinchun country, the U.S. imperialists and their bootlickers trampled underfoot and burnt everything in all quarters. They butchered innocent people en masse. They kicked children and pregnant women into the flames and buried old folks alive.”Other U.S. massacres of Korean civilians include those at Masan, Sachon Changyong, and Ducksung. In Masan, a massacre of Korean civilians by U.S. forces was perpetrated on 11th August 1950. Masan is a village of Kokan Ri, 240 miles south Seoul. On that day U.S. troops and aircraft fired on over a hundred villagers who were hiding in their houses in the village. U.S. forces claim that on this day, 11 DPRK soldiers had tried to breakthrough the Pusan perimeter, thus actions such as this were taken to search them.

There are over 10 officially recorded major massacres of civilians in Korean War, including In Tanyang, North Chungchong Province, 400 civilians were burnt to death in a cave on 20th January 1951 and numbers of mass bombings of civilians in Pyongyang and NamPo by airplanes. This shows that the either the U.S. army held hostile attitudes toward Koreans, or there were problems with their military tactics applied in the war, or was there North Korean army hiding among the civilians that led to shooting of U.S. troops? All of these are possible answer but there is no exact answer given both sides, DPRK and U.S. are proving with evidence that it was not their fault. Thus through focusing on one of the 3 most widely-known massacres in Korean War, No Gun Ri massacre, to help us understand the situation and have clearer view over the issues.

What happened at No Gun Ri?On 25th July, 1950, soon after the official start of Korean War, approximately five to six hundred Korean villagers were evacuated from Im Gae Ri and Joo Gok Ri, villages near No Gun Ri . The U.S. soldiers escorted them Southward, eventually to Pusan, fleeing from the war and the advance of DPRK forces. They were led to a village near a riverbank at Ha Ga Ri and the villagers were ordered to stay there for a night . The next day, as they continued their way along the Seoul-Pusan road, they soon reached the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. soldiers stopped them and ordered the group onto the railway tracks, where they were searched for prohibited items such as weapons , of which they were not found to be in posession. Even so, the soldiers ordered an air attack upon the villagers through radio communication with U.S. aircraft. Soon, planes flew over them, dropped bombs directly on them and fired guns at them, causing approximately 100 casualties . The killing did not end there, however. Those villagers who survived found protection under a small culvert underneath the railroad tracks. The U.S. soldiers brought these villagers into a large double tunnel nearby and shot them from both ends of the tunnel for over 4 days, resulting in addition approximated 300 additional deaths .

The Associated Press reported that the civilians killed were mostly women and children . What was shocking about what happened next was that no trace of the killings, nor investigation into this catastrophic incident, could be found in U.S military archives. Historians remained unaware of the incident for decades and it was not until the mid-1990s that a group of survivors decided to publicly press their case. The United States committed numerous war crimes against humanity and genocide, in violation of the international humanitarian law during the Korean War.

One report indicates that the 7th Regiment of the 1st Cav. Division was involved in Nogun-ri massacres . Among the several branches of the U.S. military, the U.S. Air Force was probably more responsible than any other branches for the huge number of civilian killings because of its indiscriminate shootings and bombings of civilian refugees, villages, towns, and cities in violation of Hague Conventions .

The Condition of U.S. Forces in July 1950U.S. soldiers who were fighting in Korea at this moment were the Army of Occupied Japan; they were mostly trained basically as police in a land under control and not as soldiers who are ready for combat . Thus they were young, under-trained, under-equipped, and not ready to fight the North Korea People’s Army (NKPA).

What their lack of combat preparedness caused them was deficiencies in training, organization, personal strength and leadership . Proper trainings were only available for a small proportion of the troops. Classes very important to combat fighters, for example, in maintenance and communications, were insufficient. Furthermore, the equipment they were using was mostly of World War II vintage, and poorly stored . The three infantry regiments in the 1st Cavalry Division had only two of the three battalions assigned properly. And to the requirement to take the 24th Infantry Division back to its strength prior to the departure for Korea, the 1st Cavalry Division transferred nearly 1000 men to the 24th, mostly top four senior non-commissioned officer grades . This weakened the soldiers’ cohesion and reduced the number of leaders with combat experience at the small-unit level.

The most U.S. soldiers were not adequately prepared for the war condition to fight in Korea in that period from June and July 1950. They neither were experienced to deal with a strong NKPA that applied both guerilla tactics, conventional warfare, or with a large number of refugee population, which NKPA might have infiltrated or disguised among them as a refugee.

Refugee Control Policies of the U.S. and the Republic of KoreaOne problem that U.S. soldiers always faced was their inexperience to deal with large numbers and unhandled refugees who complicated the battlefield. At the beginning of the War, U.S. soldiers fought against the NKPA’s infiltrating soldiers, who dressed as civilians among them . Once they crossed the lines into U.S. positions, these infiltrated soldiers conducted guerilla-style combat operations against U.S. forces.

By late July 1950, close to the date of No Gun Ri incident, the government of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. Army Headquarters drafted refugee control policies, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets” , to defend and protect U.S. and ROK troops from the North Korean army. These policies were aimed at reducing large refugee groups’ negative impact on U.S. troops. These policies were mainly handled by the ROK National Police on uncontrolled refugee populations. Therefore, the movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cav. Division was limited to specific times of the day, and to specific purposes. The National Police were responsible for enforcing these policies.

On 26th of July, 1950, the Republic of Korea, along with the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea established a plan to control refugee movement “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets” that:-Rule out movement of refugees across battle lines (All times)-Evacuation of villages without general officer approval is not allowed-Korean civilians not allowed moving at nightsThis policy enactment by the Eighth Army was an attempt to stop the NKPA’s use of infiltration tactics, and furthermore, to protect refugees from crossing battle lines where combat would occur. Other policies included keeping refugees off roads, not leting them pass or else searching them before they passed. However, the policy did not state anything about refugees movement across friendly lines where there was little likelihood of combat.

A memo within the U.S. Fifth Air Force written by United States Air Force Colonel Turner C. Rogers regarding the “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets” notes in paragraphs 3 and 4 that the Air Force had requested that they strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching their positions. The bands of civilians have either been infiltrated by or are under the control of DPRK soldiers, but recommended that official policy to have discriminate in targeting civilians only when they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts.

This memo was written on July 25, 1950, the day before the refugees were shot at No Gun Ri.

This show that the U.S.’s policy toward strafing civilians was only applicable when they cross the line to enter U.S. forces zones or approaching their positions.

Gen. Kean’s order to the 25th Infantry Division says civilians should be considered enemy. The accompanying overlay map outlined an area covering the entire warfront.

The Tactical SituationOn 22nd July 1950, in Yongdong, nearby No Gun Ri, the 1st Cav. Division relieved the 24th Infantry Division. The 7th Cav. Regiment and 2nd Battalion moved toward the Yongdong area . With friendly forces stronger than the NKPA, the Eighth Army made a strategy to withdraw behind the last defensible area, the Naktong River in Yongdong . The 1st Cav. Division withdrew from Yongdong through a series of delaying actions adhering to the Eighth Army strategy and avoided a threatened envelopment. On the evening of 25th July, 1950, the 7th Cav. Regiment was supporting the 5th Cav. Regiment in positions east of Yongdong.

On the night of 25th July, the 7th Cavalry received a report that a breakthrough had occurred in the sector to the norh of the 7th Cavalry Regiment’s. Thus, in the early morning hours of 26th July the 7th Cav. Regiment believed that they were enveloped without a specific order. They thus conducted a disorganized withdrawal from the position in Yongdong , and the 2nd battalion went to No Gun Ri. They spent the rest of the day recovering from undisciplined personnel and equipment. Meanwhile, there were repeated fights reported between the 7th Cavalry and NKPA, therefore they were aware that there were no friendly forces around No Gun Ri. By nine at night, they found that about 120 troops were missing , mostly of whom had been killed. Given these casasualties, there was ostensibly continuous fighting between the 7th Cavalry and NKPA, and the refugees had attacked them.

Movement of Villagers (Leading to the incident in No Gun Ri)The Eighth army policy on refugee movement, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Targets”, clearly stated that refugees should not be evacuated without officer’s approval and entering the battle lines at all times. Until now, it is unclear why was there were refugees gathered in Im Gae Ri. Some U.S. veterans remember escorting refugees from villages , but they cannot remember the names of the villages or the specific dates that they evacuated them, only remembering that it was late July. Thus it is possibile that U.S. soldiers, who were not 7th Cavalry, told the villagers to evacuate from Im Gae Ri. On the other hand, contrary to above, there is still a question as to why U.S. forces would travel 3 miles off their designated path to the village of Im Gae Ri, while there is a busy withdrawl for the mean of adding more than 400 refugees onto the crowded roads and worsening conditions. The general officers were not aware of this action and the soldier, if there was, who evacuated, it will be because of the fear of NKPA infiltrators present in refugee concentration.

But still the possibility of U.S. army evacuating the village should not be ruled out. Some veterans of the 5th Cavalry Regiment state that sometime in late July they had escorted evacuated villagers from a village that they’ve forgotten the name of . Based on these accounts there is still a possibility soldiers not of the 7th Cav. Regiment had evacuated the village.

Shooting on CiviliansU.S. ground forces fired toward refugees in the vicinity of No Gun Ri from 26-29 July 1950. On 26th July, refugees were strafed and bombed on the railroad tracks. Some escaped into the double railroad overpass tunnel where they were fired upon by U.S. forces from different sides.

The existence of NKPA infiltrators among the civilians is still debatable. Some veterans argue that they saw the firing of different weapons including machine guns, artillery and rifles from Koreans in civilians dress. They argue that they were fired upon from the civilians’ position in the double railroad tunnel. They argue that their return fire was an act of self-defense.

A letter was sent from the U.S. ambassador to Seoul on 24th July 1950, informing the State Department that U.S. soldiers would shoot refugees approaching their lines. This letter is dated the day of No Gun Ri incident, which strongly indicates that this policy existed for U.S forces in Korea"If refugees do appear from north of US lines they will receive warning shots, and if they then persist in advancing they will be shot," wrote Ambassador John J. Muccio, in his message to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

In an interview with the Associated Press, Lawrence Levine and James Crume, who worked at the headquarters of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, said that the U.S. soldiers were ordered by commanders or officials to open fire because they believed that there was NKPA hiding among the peasants. They repeatedly said that they had been fired upon by the refugees and that their return of fire was only in self-defense.

Some veterans argue that they were not ordered to attack and kill civilian refugees who pose no threat to the unit in No Gun Ri. This group of veterans totally denies the fact that there was an order to shoot. The only order given, they claimed, was to stop civilians and not to let them pass the position . They believed that if the refugee didn’t stop, then for their own defense, they could use force to stop them passing.

There were many different views toward this incident. One well noted contradiction that made investigation more difficult was the case of veteran Edward Daily. He claims to have witnessed both the massacre and the order to bring this out. He was interviewed by both U.S. News & World Report and NBC and stated that he was present at the incident and that he heard an order to kill all civilians . However, in their later investigation, the US News & World Report found that he was not a machine gunner, and he was not part of any unit at No-Gun Ri, nor anywhere near the village during the period in question.

Some veterans state that there were in fact orders to fire upon the civilians. When interviewed, they don’t remember where specifically this order came from and all state that they didn’t personally receive this order but that other soldiers passed it on to them . He had very little evidence to support his point, but the fact that they used artillery and mortar rounds that could hit innocent civilians would indicate that there was an order to allow them.

Evidence found later to prove there was an actual order to let them shoot appeared in an 8th Cav. Regiment message, dated on 24th July 1950.

The 8th Cavalry Regiment’s journal, or communications log, records at 1000 hours, or 10 a.m., on July 24, 1950, instructions from 1st Cavalry Division headquarters to "fire everyone," including refugees, trying to cross the front line. The "G-3 Ln" is the regiment’s liaison to the division operations staff. Meanwhile, it says use discretion in case of women and children. This show they did not plan to shoot women and children, but only defending itself from NKPA.

Another source that could be called upon is the the painter, Pablo Picasso. However, this source is questionable and limited since he was not in Korea or anywhere near No-Gun Ri, but only saw what was reported in the media.

Pablo Picasso’s ‘Massacre in Korea’, completed in 1951 presented what happened in the No-Gun Ri massacre. On the left side of the painting, there are five women, one of whom is pregnant, and two children. They are butchered and shot by well-armed white men with swords and mortar rounds.

As mentioned above, in Kim Il Song’s biography he has written that “the U.S. imperialists and their bootlickers trampled underfoot and burnt everything in all quarters. They butchered innocent people en masse. They kicked children and pregnant women into the flames and buried old folks alive.”This is a question on which source is more reliable; that the U.S. veterans argue they shot only those showed threat to their unit, NKPA, no women and children were shot . Meanwhile, Picasso’s painting and Kim Il Sung’s biography show a diametrically opposed viewpoint. If Picasso’s painting and Kim Il Sung’s statements can be taken as reliable sources, then the U.S. forces would have broken International Humanitarian Law, violating and attacking people who do not or cannot take part in the hostilities, killing surrendered civilians.

On 12th January 1999, President Clinton expressed great regrets over No Gun Ri incident . He said:On behalf of the United States of America, I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950. The intensive, yearlong investigation into this incident has served as a painful reminder of the tragedies of war and the scars they leave behind on people and on nations.

Although we have been unable to determine precisely the events that occurred at No Gun Ri, the U.S. and South Korean governments have concluded in the Statement of Mutual Understanding that an unconfirmed number of innocent Korean refugees were killed or injured there. To those Koreans who lost loved ones at No Gun Ri, I offer my condolences. Many Americans have experienced the anguish of innocent casualties of war. We understand and sympathize with the sense of loss and sorrow that remains even after a half a century has passed.

The value of this source is that he is the former president of U.S., who was present when the first investigation over this massacre was done and was delivered to him as soon as it was done. The request for a response and apology for this incident was done by both DPRK and Republic of Korea’s government and people, based on the proves we have today that shows the victims, or parts of them, were innocent civilians. However, he has only said that “we have been unable to determine precisely the events that occurred at No Gun Ri,” but at least as a president, he was conscious that “regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri” and this apology is accepted by North and South Koreans today. This speech has ended the intense hostility of some South and North Korean civilians today.

ConclusionWhat happened at No Gun Ri is referred to as an ‘incident’ by the U.S. and as a ‘massacre’ by DPRK today. It was as a result of U.S. action in Korean War. One thing now certain is that the U.S. troops were inexperienced who were previously working in Occupied Japan, and they were suddenly ordered to join ROK forces to fight experienced NKPA. Thus the reason why the U.S. troops shot on the villagers can be narrowed down to the possibility that there were a large number of NKPA disguised among the villagers who shot on U.S. positions, or that U.S. forces misunderstood the order to stop civilians from approaching U.S. position and alarm fires could be given, or was it truly a cold-blooded massacre, as described by Kim Sung Il and painted by Pablo Picasso.

This investigation was severely limited by the lack of resources supporting the view that the shooting was a deliberate killing of Korean civilians. Within the DPRK there is much more that would have been available, but but during my two years of IB I have not had the opportunity to return to my country.

These limitations notwithstanding, this essay and investigation supports my view that the U.S. soldiers present at that time lacked sufficient combat experience and that they may have fired out of fear in response to a real or percieved threat which may have also been augmented by having been fired on by Korean civilians.

ibliography:Books -- Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: Free P, 1988.

- Choe, Sang-Hun, Martha Mendoza, and Charles Hanley. The Bridge At No Gun Ri: a Hidden Nightmare From the Korean War. 1st ed. New York: Owl Books, 2001.

- Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War. 1st ed. Vol. 2. New York: Cornell UP, 2004.

- Feldman, Ruth. The Korean War. Singapore: Lerner Group; Library Binding Edition, 2003.

- Holzer, Henry M., and Erika Holzer. Fake Warriors: Identifying, Exposing, and Punishing Those Who Falsify Their Military Service. 1st ed. Philadelphia: Xlibris Corporation, 2003.

- Kim, Il Sung. Kim Il Sung, Biography II. 1st ed. Pyongyang: Miraisha, 1970.

- Robert, Bateman. No Gun Ri: a Military History of the Korean War Incident. 3rd edition Vol. 1. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2002.

Magazines -- Li, Jongchol. "Masan Massacre." Mal Magazine 12 Jan. 2001, Winter ed.: 41-48.

Reviews -- Department of the Army, Inspector General. "No Gun Ri Review." Rev. of No Gun Ri Incident. Jan. 2001:Speeches -- Clinton, Bill. "No Gun Ri." Opening Weeks of Korean War. 11 Jan. 2001. 15 Oct. 2006 <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/01/11/clinton.nogunri.03/index.html>.

Web sites –- Cumings, Bruce. "Korean My Lai." The Nation (1999). 5 Nov. 2006 <http://www.thenation.com/doc/19991025/cumings>.

Appendix AInternational Humanitarian Law: the Essential RulesThese rules, drawn up by the ICRC, summarize the essence of international humanitarian law. They do not have the authority of a legal instrument and in no way seek to replace the treaties in force. They were drafted with a view to facilitating the promotion of the law.

The parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare the civilian population and civilian property. Neither the civilian population as whole nor individual civilians may be attacked.

-Attacks may be made solely against military objectives. People who do not or can no longer take part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and for their physical and mental integrity. Such people must in all circumstances be protected and treated with humanity, without any unfavorable distinction whatever.

-It is forbidden to kill or wound an adversary who surrenders or who can no longer take part in the fighting.

-Neither the parties to the conflict nor members of their armed forces have an unlimited right to choose methods and means of warfare. It is forbidden to use weapons or methods of warfare that are likely to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.

-The wounded and sick must be collected and cared for by the party to the conflict which has them in its power. Medical personnel and medical establishments, transports and equipment must be spared.

-The Red Cross or Red Crescent on a white background is the distinctive sign indicating that such persons and objects must be respected.

-Captured combatants and civilians who find themselves under the authority of the adverse party are entitled to respect for their lives, their dignity, their personal rights and their political, religious and other convictions. They must be protected against all acts of violence or reprisal. They are entitled to exchange news with their families and receive aid. They must enjoy basic judicial guarantees.

Appendix BPresident Clinton’s speech on No Gun Ri on January 1999.

On behalf of the United States of America, I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950. The intensive, yearlong investigation into this incident has served as a painful reminder of the tragedies of war and the scars they leave behind on people and on nations.

Although we have been unable to determine precisely the events that occurred at No Gun Ri, the U.S. and South Korean governments have concluded in the Statement of Mutual Understanding that an unconfirmed number of innocent Korean refugees were killed or injured there. To those Koreans who lost loved ones at No Gun Ri, I offer my condolences. Many Americans have experienced the anguish of innocent casualties of war. We understand and sympathize with the sense of loss and sorrow that remains even after a half a century has passed. I sincerely hope that the memorial the United States will construct to these and all other innocent Korean civilians killed during the war will bring a measure of solace and closure. The commemorative scholarship fund that we will launch will serve as a living tribute to their memory.

As we honour those civilians who fell victim to this conflict, let us not forget that pain is not the only legacy of the Korean War. American and Korean veterans fought shoulder to shoulder in the harshest of conditions for the cause of freedom, and they prevailed. The vibrancy of democracy in the Republic of Korea, the strong alliance between our two countries, and the closeness of our two peoples today is a testament to the sacrifices made by both of our nations fifty years ago.

Kim Il Sung: Biography pg 315Mal Magazine pg 41The Origins of the Korean War pg 55IbidThe Origins of the Korean War pg 55IbidKorean My Lai pg 2IbidNo Gun Ri review pg 3Ibid pg 5No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident pg 31Ibid Pg 33The Cause of War, pg 15No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident pg 84Ibid pg 92Ibid pg 93The bridge at No Gun Ri: A hidden nightmare from the Korean War pg 114IbidIbidNo Gun Ri review pg 5IbidIbidNo Gun Ri review pg 6Korean My Lai pg 1Korean My Lai pg 3Korean My Lai pg 2Korean My Lai pg 3Fake Warriors, pg 71Kim Il Sung: Biography pg 315The Korean War pg 96Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States